Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan¹

Washington, December 23, 1955—7:17 p.m.

440. Department found analyses contained Kabul’s 612² and 652³ very helpful. Strides made by Soviets towards position of dominance in Afghan affairs makes more urgent than ever development counter ties between Afghanistan and Western world. Indispensable step this direction is improvement Pak-Afghan relations despite understandable Pak pessimism and distaste for bargaining with Afghans.

Since latest response from Afghan King to President Eisenhower does not close door to suggested meeting between King and Governor General, present might be most propitious time to press forward with proposal. U.S. role in bringing about this result however must continue to be that of helpful bystander without creating impression U.S. intends assume mediatory role.

Following lines suggested as of possible assistance to Embassies in influencing host governments:

For Kabul:

Department assumes you will wish take maximum advantage of present air of apologetic friendliness now prevailing Kabul. Noting our appreciation for King’s latest message you might stress our pleasure His Majesty’s expression continued willingness use any means achieve peaceful settlement. We sincerely hope both sides will observe conciliatory approach towards outstanding differences. Accordingly U.S. Government hopes for high level meetings between two at earliest possible moment. Obviously talks to be successful will require moderate and careful formulation of position both sides and demonstration beforehand that talks entered into in good faith.

For Karachi:

Department recognizes problem with Pak government is one of overcoming fears, probably well grounded, of Afghan efforts twist meeting to propaganda purposes. However Department hopes Pakistanis will proceed with firm invitation to King and Prime Minister to visit Karachi at earliest possible moment. Believe terms of invitation in regard possible discussions should be as vague as possible and without specific exclusion question Pushtoonistan as possible item. They should also be warned we fear benefits proposed high level talks would be dissipated if instead half-hearted effort were made to hold lower level exchange at something like Atik–Shah level where almost inevitable failure would effectively discredit whole concept of negotiations.

Inform Department soonest your comments foregoing suggested procedure as well as views advisability other friendly nations urging both sides undertake talks.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.89/12–1455. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Thacher and Witman and approved by Allen. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to New Delhi, London, Tehran, Ankara, and Lahore.
2. Document 106.
3. See Document 107.