Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

106. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 14, 1955—3 p.m.

612. Embtels 635,² 590,³ 384.⁴ In view recent developments Embassy believes it appropriate review our attitudes vis-à-vis Daud Government. Such review may be helpful to Department in charting future course action and to Embassy Karachi in talks with GOP officials.

1. Daud’s removal—for past two years this Mission, Embassy Karachi and Department have indulged in great deal wishful thinking re (1) imminent downfall Daud and (2) alleged split in Royal family, with King and his uncles supposedly leading a moderate group in significant opposition to Daud.

With regard to (1) Daud has withstood all pressures brought to bear on him and emerged each time stronger than before. Recent Pakistan blockade offers particularly noteworthy example in this regard. In May, Embassy believed (Embtel 635) that if removal Daud was a sine qua non of joint US–Pakistan policy only and all-out effort including threat complete US withdrawal might have 50–50 chance success. Embassy of opinion chances of success now even less. Daud now has “national” backing from Loe Jergah, open transit lines through USSR and recent removal Defense Minister Arif gives him virtual control Army.

With regard to (2) above, King has proven himself weak reed on which to lean. There is little or no firm evidence of his attempting disassociate himself from Daud’s policies or taking strong stand against him. If anything, he seems to be almost completely prisoner of Daud. Similarly, Shah Mahmoud, apparently now in his dotage, represents only faint hope. During Loe Jergah, which presumably would have given him scope to exercise his vaunted influence with the tribes, he went on hunting expedition in North. Pakistan Chargé, who is largely responsible for theory that Shah Mahmoud is on verge getting premiership mandate from King, admits that he has not seen Shah Mahmoud nor have any Pakistan agents since just before flag settlement in September. It was at that time that Pakistan Chargé got impression that Shah Mahmoud could replace Daud. No doubt Shah Mahmoud would like premiership but he has given no evidence whatsoever of leading a movement against Daud.

To summarize Daud’s present position then, Embassy and most observers are of opinion that he is in position of unprecedented strength. Given conditions as they exist in this virtual police state, where there is no free press, no political parties and where ruthless suppression of minorities is the accepted pattern, such opposition as does exist against Daud is inarticulate, uncohesive, leaderless and impotent.

In view of above it seems highly unrealistic for US or Pakistan to pursue courses of action which are colored by thought in the back of our minds that Daud is about to fall. Unless US is prepared to join Pakistan in an all out campaign to unseat Daud, he will merely exploit, as in times past, any attacks by foreigners to strengthen his position further. His great energy, as evidenced by his public works developments, whereby he can show spectacular (for this country) achievements, will continue to temper his local unpopularity. He is stubborn, and if needled, is fully capable of jumping from Pakistan frying pan into Soviet fire while his unhappy people stand by helplessly as witnessed. Therefore, unless USG is willing to take all out measures against Daud … Embassy firmly believes that we must accept Daud regime as a reality. If circumstances combine to remove him, that would be a welcome bonus, but to predicate our policy or in any way encourage Pakistanians to base theirs on such tenuous hopes would certainly be a mistake which could cost us dearly.

2. Evaluation of “get tough policy” in Embtel 590 Embassy pointed out that US association with Pakistan and (apparent) British policy of “firm stands” and “joint demarches” would be not only dangerous but most probably useless unless USG is prepared, if necessary, to go all the way and write off Afghanistan should Daud counter such pressures by committing country irrevocably to Soviets. Embassy assesses risks of such gamble as follows:

(1) If faced with solid US–Pakistan–British front and threat complete US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Daud might knuckle under, reject further Soviet overtures, adopt a reasonable posture on Pushtunistan and compose GOA differences with Pakistan. However, given the nature of the man and his past performance, Embassy considers this happy result highly improbable. In this connection, US and its allies should not overrate leverage of threat withdrawal US aid because:

(a) Present aid consists primarily of advisers producing but little economic or political impact in country.

(b) EXIM Bank loan is viewed by Afghanistans as commercial banking deal and colored by GOA disillusionment re Helmand. (Embtel 553)⁵

(c) Daud would count on Soviets to replace US aid. Soviets thus far have shown every indication willingness do so and Daud’s hopes will undoubtedly be raised to higher pitch by Bulganin–Khrushchev visit.

(2) However, even if Daud personally stands up under pressure of all-out joint campaign by Western powers, such move might consolidate the forces opposing him and result in his disposition. This result is more likely than any personal surrender by Daud himself, but Embassy believes, for reasons fully explained above, that there is much less chance for its success now than six months ago.

(3) If Daud neither surrenders to Western pressure nor is deposed, US would have to call his bluff and abandon Afghanistan. If this were done in the right way, … the free world might still extract the following profit from Afghanistan’s loss:

(a) The actual withdrawal of US from Afghanistan might well achieve what the mere threat of doing so probably would not, namely spur a consolidation of anti-Daud forces and smoke out leaders willing to really lead a movement to depose him.

(b) US write-off of Afghanistan would strengthen our position with our declared allies, especially Pakistan.

(c) It would also be a stern warning to fence-sitters, would-be blackmailers and those countries who now apparently believe that best way to extract US largesse is to work both sides of street.

(d) Soviet takeover in Afghanistan would probably shake India’s neutralist tendencies to core and might induce Nehru to repulse Soviet overtures to India all of which would undoubtedly be of greater importance to US interests than Afghanistan.

(e) Similar salutary effect might result in committed Muslim nations when they see one of their numbers swallowed up by Soviets.

(f) US write-off of Afghanistan would put all nations in area on notice that US cannot and will not go beyond certain point to help countries who are not willing to help themselves.

(4) On other side of balance we must recognize that loss of Afghanistan to Communist bloc would:

(a) Be a severe blow to US prestige throughout free world.

(b) Probably result in Soviet outflanking northern tier security position by thrusting salient between Pakistan and Iran and bring Soviet influence to Pakistan’s backdoor.

(c) Have serious repercussions in US political scene where loss of one more country to Communists almost certain to raise controversial foreign policy issues in election year.

The above are stark realities which face US if we try to base our policies either on hopeful assumption that Daud is about to fall or can be knocked down with a straw. Even throwing Sunday punch at him presents US with a set of unpleasant alternatives. In these circumstances it seems all the more important to make every attempt to convince Pakistanis and Afghans of urgent need to engage in high level talks and negotiate their differences. If this attempt fails, then other alternatives may have to come into play.

3. Pakistan-Afghanistan talks we concur Ambassador Hildreth (Karachi Embtel 1036)⁶ that if no Pakistan-Afghanistan talks are held Daud will keep moving into Russian sphere. In event of failure of talks, we believe that if there is substance to belief that opposition to Daud policies exists, that opposition will be strengthened, even though he tries to place blame on Pakistanis. If talks succeed, Daud’s position no doubt will be strengthened, but there is much to be said for his being identified with any Pakistan-Afghanistan rapprochement rather than having his demagogic energy silenced only until he can again come to power riding the Pushtunistan horse. While Loe Jergah strengthened his hand, it also made it possible for him to make almost any sort of deal with Pakistanis without concern for his home-front.

We concur with Department (Deptel 384) that hopes should be tempered for progress on traditional Pushtunistan question, but if the Pakistan-Afghanistan temperature can be lowered, that in itself would be a gain, as would, of course, progress in such matters as transit.

Ward

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.89/12–1455. Secret. Passed to the Army and Air Force.
2. In telegram 635, May 24, Ambassador Ward outlined several possible alternatives for U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Daud administration. In his opinion, Ward emphasized, the entrenchment of Daud in power would be inimical to U.S. interests in the area since it would likely lead to closer ties between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, and long-term hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the Embassy’s viewpoint, the Ambassador continued, Daud was a “poor investment for US support”; he admitted, however, that opposition to Daud involved substantial risks and urged the Department to weigh carefully all these factors in deciding upon a course of action. (Ibid., 689.90D/5–2455)
3. Dated December 12, not printed. (Ibid., 611.89/12–1255)
4. In telegram 384, December 10 (telegram 1238 to Karachi; repeated to Kabul as telegram 384), the Department of State suggested that at the moment it was extremely important to encourage a conciliatory atmosphere in both Karachi and Kabul. Recent Afghan behavior, the Department pointed out, indicated that any U.S. threat to discontinue aid to Afghanistan would be likely “to propel Daud into Soviet arms while further weakening elements in Afghanistan friendly to West.” (Ibid., 689.90D/12–855)
5. In telegram 553, December 2, Ambassador Ward reported that Naim, in a recent conversation with Export-Import Bank officials, forcefully detailed Afghanistan’s discouragement with the Helmand Valley project. “In Embassy’s opinion,” Ward commented, “if either GOA or we walk out on this vast project which has gained world publicity, whatever other repercussions there may be, Helmand dams will always be pointed to in Afghanistan as well as Asia as monument to American folly. No amount of explaining on our part could divert such adverse comment.” (Ibid., 889.2614–Helmand/12–255)
6. See footnote 4, Document 101.