Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, January 7, 1956—3:12 p.m.

1436. Department appreciates analyses Karachi 1246² Kabul 681³ and will comment more fully later on views expressed therein.

Meanwhile Department desires proceed without delay in accordance with President’s last message to Afghan King to arrange meeting between King and Governor General preferably accompanied by simultaneous talks between Prime Ministers and staff. We hope such meeting would at minimum accomplish:

(a) easing of tensions between two governments, and

(b) discussion and progress on such matters as expediting Afghan transit trade, exchange envoys, reduction propaganda and reopening consulates. Both sides might be reminded US willingness consider possibility providing aid needed improvement transit trade facilities. Although little possibility settlement Pushtunistan question itself may be expected at this time, dispute might be brought into less acute stage.

Department realizes there are number of obstacles in way of initiating talks and, if talks held, of their success. Since one of greatest is Afghan insistence on discussion of Pushtunistan question and Paks refusal publicly consent to this, it would probably be advisable talks be announced as on open agenda basis. It is essential that Pakistanis agree at least to listen (Karachi’s 1080)⁴ to Afghans statement their case, responding perhaps with reassurance their intention to protect cultural identity of Pathans in Pakistan. We also think it advisable Pushtun question be by agreement last item for discussion. We believe most effective means resolve tentative atmosphere presently surrounding question high level talks would be for Paks issue firm invitation to King and Daud visit Karachi soonest, presumably followed by return visit Paks to Kabul. Outcome talks will depend largely on atmosphere preceding and surrounding meeting; we will continue to urge both sides do everything possible create conciliatory atmosphere.

Accordingly request Ambassador unless he perceives objection inform both Prime Minister and Governor General that US Government is convinced every effort should be made to bring about a meeting between King and Governor General and preferably also between respective Prime Ministers. To this end we strongly urge that Paks be prepared issue firm invitations for Karachi meeting at early date. If Paks agree you may say that US Government disposed instruct its Embassy Kabul approach Afghans informing them confidentially that firm Pak invitation forthcoming if they in turn will give assurances of their acceptance without unrealistic conditions.

You may further explain to Paks substance of foregoing discussion of what we would hope to accomplish at such meetings, and reassure them we fully realize difficulties and risks such proposal which nevertheless only one which appears presently to offer immediate possibility of ameliorating deteriorating situation.

Suggest Embassy London discuss with British desirability British High Commissioner Karachi supporting US representations (London 2653).⁵ Karachi should keep US [UK] High Commissioner currently advised of representation.⁶

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1–356. Secret. Drafted by Jones, cleared with Taylor G. Belchner of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, and approved by Rountree. Also sent to London and repeated to Kabul, Ankara, New Delhi, Dacca, and Lahore.
2. In telegram 1246, January 3, Ambassador Hildreth assessed the chances for any real settlement of the fundamental issue dividing Pakistan and Afghanistan as “very unpromising at moment.” He proposed a “holding action” for the immediate future, “coupled with determined effort to improve atmosphere Pakistan–Afghan relations, and development of attitude and ideas on part of Pakistanis which might at appropriate time succeed in breaking deadlock.” Hildreth doubted whether there was any real prospect for progress on the Pushtunistan issue and was convinced “that high level conference which spotlighted failure would have markedly adverse effects.” In addition, any U.S. moves which included “undue pressure on Pakistanis and/or excessive inducements to Afghans would certainly impair our position Pakistan and probably throughout Middle East.” (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 681, December 28, Ambassador Ward suggested that “since Pakistan–Afghan rapprochement is not one-shot proposition and high-level meeting would be only first step on road back to normal relations, Embassy on balance inclines toward view that sooner first step is taken the better.” (Ibid., 611.89/12–2855)
4. See footnote 4, Document 103.
5. Dated December 30, 1955, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/12–3055) Alexander C.B. Symon was the British High Commissioner in Pakistan.
6. In telegram 1301 from Karachi, January 11, Ambassador Hildreth informed the Department that Pakistani Governor General Mirza agreed to accept the Afghan invitation to visit the King some time between April 1 and June 30 “if proper invitation and suitable cessation hostile propaganda occurred.” The Ambassador commented that he believed the Pakistanis, although pessimistic about the outcome of the meeting, “will give it the old college try because as they themselves said otherwise a complete waste of time and energy.” (Ibid., 689.90D/1–1156)