396.1 GE/4–754
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)
Subjects:
- 1.
- Chinese Aide-Mémoire Regarding Geneva Conference
- 2.
- Consultations Regarding Security of Southeast Asia
- 3.
- Postponement of Consideration of Proposed Sino-American Security Pact
Participants:
- Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
- Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
- Mr. McConaughy, Director, Chinese Affairs
Ambassador Koo called at Assistant Secretary Robertson’s request. Amb. Koo said he was about to request an appointment with Mr. Robertson when he received the call from Mr. Robertson’s office.
Mr. Robertson asked Amb. Koo to state his business first.
1. Chinese Aide-Mémoire Regarding Geneva Conference1
Amb. Koo said that he had been instructed by the Chinese Foreign Office to inform the Department of the substance of an Aide-Mémoire as to the Geneva Conference which was being delivered immediately to the American Embassy at Taipei. Amb. Koo said he anticipated that we would receive the full text shortly from our Embassy at Taipei.
Amb. Koo summarized the Aide-Mémoire as follows:
As to the Geneva Conference, the Chinese Government felt it desirable to indicate its attitude and expectations. At the same time the Government wished to express its appreciation for and admiration of the Secretary’s excellent speech of March 292 setting forth the U.S. position with regard to the non-recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, and its non-admission to the UN.
The Chinese Government felt that the scope of the Geneva Conference should be strictly limited to the two specified items:—Korea and Indochina.
The Chinese Government would not consider itself bound by any decision affecting it which might be reached at the Conference, since the Chinese Government would not be a party to any agreements reached.
The free world side should avoid any agreements which would not be in keeping with UN principles:—there should be unconditional withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops from Korea and unconditional cessation of Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh in Indochina.
If the discussions should prove fruitless, the Conference negotiations should not be protracted indefinitely. Prolongation of the Conference would only serve Communist propaganda objectives.
[Page 499]As to Indochina as well as Korea, a definite time limit for the discussions should be fixed.
There should be no departure from the original UN objective of a unified, independent and democratic Korea.
The three Associated States of Indochina should be invited to the Indochina phase of the Conference, but the Viet Minh should not be allowed to participate in the Conference.
Chinese Communists action in training and supplying the Viet Minh forces constituted in itself an act of aggression and a threat to the peace. Therefore, the UN should take some collective action. Communist China was carrying out covert aggression. Covert aggression was as bad as overt aggression. Communist China is responsible for aggression in Indochina, regardless of whether the Peiping Regime has actually sent Chinese Communist armed forces to participate in the fighting.
The free world side should agree that no regime fostered and supported by the Communists will be recognized as a legitimate government. This principle is a logical outgrowth of the Secretary’s speech of March 29 in which he said that the free world could not be indifferent to the grave threat which would result from the imposition by force of the Communist political system over the States of Southeast Asia.
Finally, the embargo on strategic war material to Communist China should not be abandoned or relaxed.
Mr. Robertson said that he was glad to have this exposition of the views of the Chinese Government. The Aide-Mémoire would be considered carefully when the full text arrived. He said that he hoped the Ambassador would make it clear to his Government that the arrangements for the Conference were ideal from the Allied standpoint. There appears to have been some misunderstanding on this score in Taipei. The Geneva Conference will not be a general conference on Far Eastern issues with Communist China playing the role of an accepted power. It is necessary for Communist China to be there, since it is impossible to settle a dispute without talking to one’s opponent. It is necessary to talk to the other side in order to seek peace. It would make no sense to talk to representatives of countries having nothing to do with the fighting while ignoring the aggressors who are responsible for the breach of peace. The Korean Political Conference is set up exactly in the form which we have been striving for since last September and October. It is the sort of conference Mr. Dean had sought unsuccessfully at Panmunjom. It was clear after Mr. Dean broke off the talks at Panmunjom pending the receipt of a Chinese Communist apology that no agreement would be reached at Panmunjom, because the Chinese Communists do not make a practice of apologizing. Mr. Dulles had picked up the ball at Berlin and had seized an opportunity to get precisely the kind of conference we had [Page 500] envisaged as best suited to our purposes.3 The Conference would be uncluttered by neutrals; it would be a two sided Conference; the Russians would be present as a responsible participant on the Communist side along with Communist China and the North Korean Regime; the agenda was limited to the two essential questions of Korea and Indochina; all the countries who fought on the UN side were invited; it was expressly provided, in the face of strong Soviet opposition which had been maintained until 6 PM on the last day of the conference, that no diplomatic recognition was implied. Mr. Robertson said that the terms of the Resolution represented a very considerable diplomatic triumph for Mr. Dulles. He felt that the criticism of the resolution was based largely on a misreading, or actual neglect to read, the text of the resolution.
As to the composition of the Indochina phase of the Conference, the French were entitled to take the lead on the Allied side. They would take the principal initiative in setting up the Indochina phase. We certainly felt that the Associated States should be at the Indochina phase of the Conference. Under the principle which he had just enumerated, of the necessity for talking with your enemy in order to make peace, it might also be necessary for the Viet Minh to be present in some capacity. However, the composition of the Indochina phase was not yet determined, and nothing conclusive could be said on the subject.
In response to a question from the Ambassador, Mr. Robertson said that the Conference would not be a round table one and that decisions binding on all participants of course could not be taken by Conference vote.
Mr. Robertson said that Communist China would not be at the Conference as a recognized Asian power, but, in the Secretary’s words, as a culprit brought before the bar of justice.
Ambassador said that he was very glad to hear the Assistant Secretary’s exposition which gave him a better understanding of the nature and purpose of the Conference. He said he would transmit the substance of the explanation to the Foreign Office.
2. Consultations Regarding Security of Southeast Asia
Mr. Robertson said it was the conviction of the Department that if Vietnam should be lost to the Communists, all of the rest of Southeast Asia would eventually be lost. The actions of Communist China in supporting the Viet Minh approached very closely to outright aggression. In the face of the grave threat to all the free community of the [Page 501] Pacific Area, there was a need for united action to meet the threat. Consultation among the States of Southeast Asia was a necessary prelude to united action and the Secretary was in the process of discussing with the diplomatic representatives here of the various Governments what might be done to reach agreement on political action to meet the threat.
The Ambassador inquired if some sort of a joint declaration was contemplated. Mr. Robertson said that something of the sort might be considered. The Secretary had called in the Ambassadors of all the Governments particularly concerned and was reviewing the problem with them.
The Ambassador asked about possible action which might follow if a joint warning by a community of free nations were not heeded by the Communist side.
The Assistant Secretary said that agreement of course was prerequisite to any sort of action, political or otherwise, and that the current consultations were to explore the possibility of agreement as to what should be done under various circumstances.
3. Postponement of Consideration of Proposed Sino-American Security Pact
Assistant Secretary Robertson said in reference to the proposal of the Chinese Government for a bilateral security pact,4 that we had made a recommendation that such a pact be negotiated, and that negotiations be opened before the Geneva Conference convened.
However, there was much detailed spade work to be done before authorization to negotiate such a pact and agreement as to the provisions it should embody, could be obtained throughout all the interested quarters of the Executive Branch of the Government. Furthermore, members of both Houses of Congress had to be consulted. The Secretary felt that it was a physical impossibility to complete this process in the short time remaining before the Geneva Conference. Many of the officials who would be involved in obtaining clearance for a pact were deeply involved in preparations for Geneva.
The Ambassador asked if it would be correct to say that the matter had been placed before the Secretary; that the Secretary had not made a decision on the policy question involved, but had decided that consideration of the matter would have to be postponed in view of the lack of opportunity to examine it adequately before Geneva?
Mr. Robertson said he thought this was a reasonably accurate description of the situation.
-
Dated Apr. 7, not printed. Transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 579 from Taipei, Apr. 8, not printed. (396.1 GE/4–854) Subsequently sent to the Department as an enclosure to a note from Ambassador Koo to Secretary Dulles, Apr. 20, not printed, requesting that consideration be given to the points presented in the memorandum. (396.1 GE/4–2054)
The Department responded to Ambassador Koo in a note dated May 15, not printed, indicating that the U. S. views with respect to the Geneva Conference were given to him by Robertson on Apr. 7 and were contained in Secretary Dulles’ speech of Apr. 28 at Geneva (see footnote 2, p. 153). (396.1 GE/4–2054)
↩ - Printed in Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 12, 1954, pp. 539–542. See editorial note, p. 487.↩
- See editorial note, p. 414.↩
- For documentation on the proposed security pact between the United States and the Republic of China, see volume xiv.↩