Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1 GE/4–654

Memorandum by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)¹

secret

[London, April 6, 1954.]

The position of the United States Government with reference to certain matters arising out of preliminary discussions of the Indochina phase of the forthcoming conference at Geneva is as follows:

1. The United States delegation at Berlin clearly understood from the French Foreign Minister that the agreement to discuss the question of Indochina at Geneva was on the condition that France would not agree to any arrangement which would directly or indirectly result in the turnover of that area to Communist control. The United States presumes that the United Kingdom, because of its vital security interests in the area as well as its role in the free world, would solidly support this position. For the French to agree to any arrangement leading to the surrender of the area would result not only in the loss by France of her position in the Far East but in an abrupt decline in French prestige throughout the world with almost incalculable consequences.

2. The United States is seriously concerned by what appears to be growing expectations in France that Geneva will produce a settlement for Indochina as a result of United States concessions to Communist China. The basic position of the United States on Communist China has been set forth in Secretary Dulles’ speech of March 29.² Especially pertinent was Secretary Dulles’ statement that “We shall not, however, be disposed to give Communist China what it wants from us merely to buy its promises of future good behavior.” Apart from the United States estimate that, given the present military and political situation in Indochina, any settlement negotiated in the immediate future could only result in ultimate complete control of all Indochina by the Communists, there is no possibility whatsoever of concessions by the United States to Communist China in return for any promises or agreements they might indicate their willingness to enter. Long experience has shown that the exchange of performance for Communist promises is a swindle; the United States will not participate in any such arrangement.

3. With reference to any special position for Communist China at Geneva, the United States has already made clear its position that it does not consider procedural matters as unimportant and unconnected with substance. It is the firm position of the United States that it will not agree to any procedural arrangement which gives or implies that Communist China has some special position different from other participants. In particular, the United States would not agree to any proposal that Communist China would be consulted by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, or the U.S.S.R. with reference to the composition of the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference; nor would it agree to the French proposal to constitute a five-power working group on Indochina. As a practical matter, the United States would expect that the Soviets, on their part, would in fact consult China, but the tripartite agreement at Berlin³ clearly would preclude any consultation of China by the Western Big Three, since in fact such consultation would give China a special status. In summary, the United States remains unalterably opposed to any proposal, procedural or otherwise, which would give Communist China a special place or imply a “five power” concept.

4. On the important question of participation in the Indochina talks, the United States at present envisages that the following states would be present: the United Kingdom, France, the United States, the U.S.S.R., Communist China, and the Associated States. The United States is giving further thought to this matter in preparation for tripartite discussions at Geneva.

5. The United States believes it to be essential at this time that the three Western Powers have complete understanding on the above basic points, and the United States would hope for the strong support of the United Kingdom in discussions on these matters with the French Government.

1. Memorandum sent to Eden in accordance with instructions contained in telegram 5090 to London, Apr. 1; for text, see volume xiii. Copy transmitted to the Department as enclosure to despatch 3357 from London, Apr. 6, not printed. (396.1 GE/4–654)
2. Printed in Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 12, 1954, pp. 539–542. See also editorial note, p. 487.
3. For documentation on the tripartite agreement, an informal understanding between France, the United Kingdom, and the United States with respect to the status of Chinese Communist representation at the Geneva Conference, see volume vii. For text of the pertinent portions of the Berlin Conference Final Communiqué, issued Feb. 18, see p. 415. For additional information pertinent to this matter, see telegram Dulte 87 from Berlin, Feb. 18, in volume xiii and telegram Dulte 88 from Berlin, Feb. 18, p. 15.