Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

751G.00/3–1554

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

top secret

[Washington,] March 15, 1954.

Subject:

• Indochina Discussions at Geneva.

Before becoming immersed in the position papers and working groups which will characterize our preparations for Geneva, I would like to set down, with a view to securing your concurrence, certain principal guidelines which, if you agree, I should like to use as defining FE’s position:

(1) A substantial part of US aid to and support of France and the Associated States is predicated on French determination and ability to carry out a military plan described in Bidault’s note of September 29, 1953,² to Ambassador Dillon in the following terms “… the strategic plan of the French Command consists essentially of retaking the offensive with a view to breaking up and destroying the regular enemy forces. Convinced that the military problem in Indochina can be settled only in conformity with such a plan, the French Government confirms that it intends to carry forward vigorously and promptly the execution thereof”.

(2) There is growing evidence of a waning determination, if not ability, on the part of the French to carry through to a conclusion the plan above described. Regardless of the reasons for this changed attitude or of its justification, we are not currently in a position to draw any practical consequences from this apparent falling away from the Franco-American understandings of last September. In other words, we cannot currently alter our policy of financial and military end-item support for the French in Indochina even though the French appear to be altering the concept on which that support has been based. The maintenance and, to the extent possible, the improvement of the present military position and the avoidance of anything which might contribute to its deterioration are essential elements of our policy.

(3) Our side will not obtain at the conference table, whether in Korea or in Indochina, any more than the enemy believes our side has the ability and determination to achieve on the field of battle. At best, if we can convince the enemy that we have the ability and determination to achieve a given result, we may be able to avoid having to demonstrate them practically.

(4) We will maintain at Geneva our firm position regarding nonrecognition of Communist China by the US, US refusal to admit Communist China to the UN, US support of Nationalist China and the non-lifting of the embargo on trade with Communist China.

(5) It appears unlikely that we will be in a position to bolster the French with assurances of US military intervention in Indochina in order to prevent a settlement unacceptable to us or to insure military victory for our side. We will probably not be in a position to use the threat of massive retaliatory action against China to enforce an acceptable solution in Indochina.

(6) Thus, assuming that we do get to a point of actually discussing Indochina at Geneva, we will be able to achieve a negotiating result no more favorable than is warranted by Franco-Vietnamese capacities and will power at the time. We have no fresh political or military contribution to make to a settlement.

(7) Every effort will be made by the enemy to divide France and the United States, to contrast a peace-loving, reasonable France anxious to stop the death of her sons with a warmongering United States eager to continue a slaughter in which American soldiers are not engaged.

(8) Since France, the UK and the US will be unable to present a strong, united front in the matter of China policy or of the stepping up of the military potential of our side, it is particularly important that they do present such a front with regard to a proposal for peace in Indochina to be submitted as a French initiative at Geneva with the full support of Vietnam, the US and the UK. I conceive of agreement on such a proposal as a major task in the preparations for Geneva. A proposal of this kind should involve the acceptance of the principle that a country divided by eight years of bitter civil war needs a cessation of hostilities, a radical reduction of armed forces and a fairly lengthy period of political and economic reconstruction before it can achieve a reunited national existence. The necessary controls for the operation of such a proposal could be supplied by the UN or in some other mutually agreed manner. Some major elements in a specific proposal might be the following (submitted purely for illustrative purposes):

(a) A cease-fire based on the conditions recently set forth by Laniel and presumably including also return of all prisoners.

(b) Arrangements for reciprocal reduction of native armed forces and armament under controlled conditions.

(c) Concentration of non-native armed forces at stated bases and their reduction in accordance with a timetable geared to the reduction of native forces. (Substantial non-native forces should remain until final establishment of representative native government in order to guarantee the lives and property of the French residents and their native supporters.)

(d) No change in status quo of Vietnamese Government or of Democratic Republic of Vietnam so far as international relations are concerned. This would mean in effect that the question of Vietnam’s definitive membership in the French Union would not be settled until the formation of a unified national government in 1957 (see below), although present and prospective constitutional and treaty relationships between France and Vietnam would continue in force as long as the present Vietnam Government endures.

(e) Provisional arrangements for local administration including an allocation of provinces more or less on a statics quo basis. This would amount in effect to a continuation for a couple of years of the patchwork which has characterized the eight war years. Provision for a gradual restoration of freedom of movement throughout the country would also be required although in the case of outstanding political or military leaders this would be a delicate matter and might be considerably delayed.

(f) Provisions for the prompt restoration of major roads, railroads and communications throughout the country. France and the US might announce a willingness to devote a substantial portion of the money they are now spending on fighting the war to the intensive reconstruction of Vietnam.

(g) Provisions for the political reconstruction of the country including the announcement of January 1st, 1957 (for example) as the date for nation-wide elections to a national assembly which would draw up a definitive constitution for Vietnam.

(9) The above is of course far from being even an outline of a complete proposal. I am not convinced myself of the workability of all the suggestions made. But I do think that our side can and should work out a proposal, which, if accepted by the enemy, we could live with. It should also be one which, if refused by the enemy, would at least give us the “conference” advantage of having taken, at the opening of the discussions on Indochina, a comprehensive and reasonable attitude. Furthermore, the fact of having made a real effort to find a workable solution through negotiations should improve the position of the three governments most concerned on our side (France, Vietnam and US) with their own public opinions should it prove necessary and feasible to develop further military assets in order to seek a solution through military means.

1. Under an intradepartmental reference slip, Mar. 16, Bonsal forwarded a copy of his memorandum to MacArthur with the following comment: “The attached memorandum is designed to attempt to clarify the substantive outline of our position at Geneva with regard to Indochina. Mr. Robertson tells me that he goes along with the first seven paragraphs but has reservations regarding the 8th and 9th paragraphs.” (751G.00/3–1554)
2. For text, see volume xiii.