Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

751G.00/3–1554: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State

top secret

Saigon, March 15, 1954—noon.

1688. Repeated information Paris 523. It seems most probable that at Geneva the Communists will confront us with a proposal for a ceasefire followed by genuinely free elections for a national assembly—possibly under UN supervision—for all of Vietnam. They must know that if such elections were held today with a slate of Ho candidates camouflaged as genuine nationalists riding on the peace wave lined up against some sort of Bao Dai combination unfortunately linked in the popular mind with alleged French domination, they would almost certainly win, both in the controlled zones and in Viet Minh areas. In addition to this natural present advantage the Viet Minh would constitute the only strong, well organized political group, proposed by querulous, ill-organized, fiercely competitive and narrowly partisan groups.

The Communists may be expected either to open the conference with such proposal, or to use it as dramatic response to any initial Western proposal. The present Laniel–Pleven conditions for a truce and political negotiations (Paris telegram 3240 repeated Saigon 362¹) will certainly not be acceptable to the Communists, who may be expected to ask the world why they should abandon diplomatically advantages which the French have not been able to force them to give up by force of arms, e.g.—withdrawal from South Vietnam and the Tonkin Delta and cessation of Chinese aid. Brushing aside such details as legalistic and unnecessary, they could pose as the truly democratic party and offer us free elections.

If we failed to accept such an offer we would open ourselves to most telling attacks as the opponent of democracy and the proponent of continued war, greatly damaging our cause and our prestige in Vietnam and before world opinion. It is thus of paramount importance either to forestall this Communist gambit if possible, or, if presented, to counter it effectively without losing the psychological initiative and preventing the development of a situation which the Communists could use to smear us with an anti-democratic label.

(1) In searching for solutions, possible course of action meriting immediate exploration is to contrive to have the Vietnamese hold national elections prior to the Geneva conference, and thus present the Communists there with the fact of a functioning elected government, either negotiating accords with the French to perfect the country’s independence or already in possession of completed agreement. If such elections were possible, they would not only limit the scope of possible Communist proposals, but would also strengthen the Vietnamese-French position before world opinion and help provide a political apparatus throughout the controlled zones which would strengthen the social fabric, satisfy nationalist and democratic aspirations thus diminishing the Viet Minh appeal, and improve the basis for a political counter attack against the Viet Minh. Many difficulties lie in the way of such elections, the fact of newness and lack of strength of Buu Loc Government, the inertia and confusion of Vietnamese themselves, lack of strong political leaders and the opposition of Bao Dai. In addition time is short, and the necessary organization and technical facilities will be difficult to assemble in so little time by inexperienced personnel. Still, the reward would be great, and the present political climate seems ripe for such development, with former President Huu² saying last week that there is a “general upsurge of popular feeling in favor of elections and a national assembly”. (See Embtels 1638³ and 1653,⁴ sent Paris as 506 and 515.) It will be remembered that ex-President Tam⁵ told us while he preferred indirect elections to national assembly he saw the possibility of “safe” direct elections for such a body.

(2) Whether or not such controlled zone elections could be held prior to the conference, a Communist proposal to hold free nationwide elections might be countered with an acceptance of the principle, and a demand to hold such elections simultaneously in Vietnam and in Germany. The comparison of the two situations might be somewhat more valid if elections for a Vietnamese Government could be held first, but in any event we could make a powerful case for linking the two problems. A Communist demand for free elections throughout Vietnam would probably be similar to the recent allied position at Berlin and this could be pointed out tellingly. Having presented such a proposal for Germany, only to be rebuffed by the Communist world, we now find the same principles in their proposal for Indochina. We point out the similarity, which they have perhaps not noticed, merely because the parallel is so striking, and, now that they have accepted the principle of genuinely free elections, they surely would not desire to extend this benefit to Indochina without offering it simultaneously to Germany, thus solving two of the world’s most difficult problems at a single stroke. Although the terms of reference of the Geneva conference may preclude this maneuver and the French, desirous of an end to the fighting in Indochina, may refuse to permit it (Bidault has stated his opposition to “global” solutions) we feel that such a counterproposal would stymie a Communist offer of free elections here while regaining the psychological initiative for the West, since it seems highly improbable that the Soviets would be willing to accept a united, democratic, West oriented Germany in exchange for a probably Communist dominated Indochina.⁶

Heath

1. Dated Mar. 6, p. 435.
2. Tran Van Huu, Prime Minister of Vietnam, May 1950–June 1952.
3. Dated Mar. 10. For text, see volume xiii.
4. Telegram 1653 from Saigon, Mar. 12, read: “Re last paragraph Embtel 1640, repeated Paris 508. USIS has noted since decision at Berlin discuss Indochina at Geneva Conference that Saigon Vietnamese press has ceased making use of normal supply of anti-Communist editorial material and factual stories. This material accepted from USIS but not published.” (396.1 GE/3–1254) For text of telegram 1640 from Saigon, Mar. 10, see volume xiii.
5. Nguyen Van Tam, Prime Minister of Vietnam, June 1952–December 1953.
6. In telegram 1703 to Saigon, repeated to Paris as telegram 3220, Mar. 18, the Department replied that it would welcome any successful manifestations of political vitality in Vietnam including the holding of national elections prior to the Geneva Conference if this were feasible and asked if the Embassy recommended any action by the Embassy or by the Department. The Department stated that it did not believe it was possible to contemplate countering a Communist proposal to hold free nationwide elections in Vietnam with demands that such elections be held simultaneously in Vietnam and Germany. The Department felt that such a counterproposal would involve an implicit admission that the Western position with respect to Vietnam was roughly equivalent to the Soviet position regarding East Germany. (751G.00/3–1554)