795.00/4–1553
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
Subject:
- Current Thinking about Korea’s Future
May I suggest that it might be timely for the three Office Directors to meet with you in the near future to discuss some of the major issues in the Far East posed by the problem of Korea’s future and current Soviet tactics. The recent National Security Council papers on the Far East need to be reviewed in terms of at least these two problems.
I am troubled by recent statement in the press that the United States should insist on the so-called “waistline” of Korea as the territorial settlement for the establishment of peace in Korea following an armistice. This concept has been developed in the editorial of the current issue of Life, in a recent statement made by Senator Taft, and in the views attributed to Mr. “X”, who gave the background briefing last week. It is reinforced by another concept, given sanction by the National Security Council at its meeting last Wednesday,2 that the armistice agreement will be considered void if a peaceful settlement has not been arrived at “in a reasonable time”.
Both concepts may do us great harm. They contradict the fundamental political and military reality underlying the Korean hostilities, which is that neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. in the present status of the world balance of power has the desire to use maximum force to gain full victory in Korea. Neither side has decided to make Korea the ultimate test of strength for imposing its will on the other.
The first concept is an illusion born more of hope than of reflection. Once an armistice agreement has been put into effect, there are limitations upon our military power in Korea over and beyond those now existing, which will prevent us from fortifying our negotiating position with the threat of superior strength. In the context of the Korean situation alone, there is now no foreseeable way in which to persuade the communists to accept at the Council table what we have not been able to compel on the battle field. It is inconceivable that Peking or Moscow would negotiate the disappearance of the Korean communist regime, the extension of ROK territory beyond the 39th parallel, and the creation of a nondescript buffer zone in between.
[Page 909]When we had the power to do so in 1951, we did not take North Korea. Now that our relative strength in Korea is much less, we cannot, except at great cost and diversion of force. I believe we missed an opportunity that cannot be recreated because circumstances have greatly changed.
The United States cannot now undo the irrevocable decision made in the spring and summer of 1951 not to press for a territorial or military settlement in Korea by superior force. It was thought that our military and political interests coincided in this policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that there was no sufficient advantage to moving into North Korea much beyond the present battle line, while there were military reasons for terminating hostilities there in order to permit the phased withdrawal of United States forces from Korea. The Department of State apparently had its political reasons for not advocating a policy that would have sought to regain control of most of Korea.
A decision to consider the armistice agreement null and void will have an even more serious consequence than an attempt to extend the territory of the ROK in a political settlement. Since the United States Government has believed during the past two years that our immediate and long-term objectives in the Far East and in the world at large were best met by the termination of hostilities and the conclusion of an armistice along the lines recommended by the Joint Chiefs, it has logically followed that a political settlement in Korea would probably not reach any satisfactory conclusion or bring about the freedom and unification of Korea. The Political Conference has been looked upon as a probable stalemate that the United States could live with indefinitely if a suitable armistice had been put into effect and remained in force. To change this concept now means that we may return to a state of belligerency or a condition of hostilities in Korea if the Political Conference does not fulfill our requirements. We might discover ourselves very much alone without our Allies to follow through such a decision. We may find such a general let-down at home and abroad after an armistice has been in operation for several months that it might be quite impossible to carry out the nullification of the armistice except as an oral gesture.
If we do not insist that the settlement in Korea be limited to Korea, but prepare ourselves to negotiate with the Chinese communists on an overall Far Eastern basis, it might be possible to work out some kind of a settlement in Korea and the Far East that might provide at least a temporary relaxation of tensions there. I firmly believe that we cannot even approach our political objectives in Korea without taking into account that Peking and Moscow will ruthlessly use Korea as a quid pro quo to gain communist objectives such as the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, relaxation of trade controls, disarmament of Japan and the return of Formosa. Perhaps there is some basis for believing [Page 910] that the Chinese communists might be induced to stay out of Southeast Asia.
- This memorandum was also addressed to Johnson. Walter S. Robertson was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs on Mar. 27, 1953 and began his duties on Apr. 8, 1953.↩
- The reference is to the 139th meeting of the NSC on Apr. 8; for a report of that meeting, see the memorandum of discussion, p. 892.↩