795.00/4–1553: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
priority
1225. Rptd info CINCUNC eyes only Clark DIP 464. Had lengthy conversation with President Rhee yesterday with reference to Korea’s attitude toward international developments especially those brought up by Ambassador Yang during conversation with Secretary on April 8,1 including Rhee’s five points and possibility of US–Korean security pact.
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Rhee declared he does not want to rock boat and he deeply appreciates US aid without which his country would collapse but he wants peace with unification all Korea and he continues doubt whether such peace obtainable by program envisaged today by US and UN, namely (a) exchange sick and wounded PW’s (b) conclusion armistice along lines last autumn’s negotiations (Article 4 draft armistice agreement). President explained at length reasons for these beliefs which I gather are already largely known to Department. He was particularly emphatic regarding futility of political conference as vaguely defined in Article 4 which meeting he declares is perfect target for Commie tactics of indefinite delay while Commie efforts redoubled to subvert South Korea. Rhee continues to urge “peace through victory” failing that, Commies should be told that as earnest of good faith Chinese forces in Korea should withdraw north of Yalu, after which peace conference could convene with some prospect of success.
Turning to immediate forthcoming problems of armistice negotiations, President said he greatly preoccupied lest talks merely duplicate period July 1951 to November 1952. He declared Korean people cannot endure another interminable fruitless session.
Would it not be possible President asked for US Government give assurance that if Commies do not within few days of resumption of armistice negotiations show unmistakable evidence of real desire for peace, negotiations will be terminated? President reiterated that moral Korean people cannot support further delay although at same time he insisted ROK army eager to get on with war, even alone if necessary. He also stated he lacks confidence in good faith Commie peace initiative to which I replied it was unnecessary believe in Commie good faith as prerequisite to testing whether peace move genuine in so far Korea concerned.
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Conversation on Rhee’s side punctuated with repeated complaints over alleged cavalier treatment of Korean views or ignoring of Korean views and also with references to fourth of Rhee’s five points: “Official representative of ROK shall participate fully in any international conference or meeting discussing or considering any phase of Korean problem.”
Without accepting foregoing at face value, Korean views nevertheless cannot altogether be dismissed. Some part of our present difficulty with Rhee may result from belief on his part that having shouted unheeded in the wilderness, he is now obliged enter market place and speak his piece there, if not regardless of embarrassment that may cause us, at least in hopes that public declaration of his views may prove more effective propellant than further unpublicized discussions. This it seems to me is more likely explanation of Rhee’s attitude (based on frustration) than desire on his part deliberately to cause trouble or to make US Government role more difficult.
When I asked what Rhee would like to suggest as specific measure adopted to meet situation described President said “we don’t ask anything from America except not to be taken for granted;” when I pressed for less general answer he said that although Panmunjom talks have included Korean liaison officers, latter have really been merely subordinates of UN commander, rather than representatives of ROK Government (or of President Rhee). What he would like therefore is “genuine Korean Government representative,” responsible to him as ROK President, attached to UNC negotiating group. Rhee explained that by this he did not picture ROK representative at council table across from Commies arguing or disputing with UNC representative and thus disclosing division among allies, since before Commies we must always show solid front. What he has in mind Rhee said is mechanism whereby Korean point of view may be made clear to UNC negotiators before those negotiators meet Commies (for example by having ROK representative present at Munsan headquarters) together with arrangement permitting ROK representative to attend Panmunjom sessions, even though he may take little or no part in discussion.
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With reference to Ambassador Yang’s talk with Secretary on April 8, President said thus far he has received only brief telegraphic summary (which I gather is less informative than Department’s telegram 634 April 11).2 I accordingly went over points set forth Department’s telegram 634 and suggested that as soon as awaited airmail summary from Ambassador Yang arrives, we have further meeting.
President Rhee then made following statement substance of which he requested I convey to Secretary Dulles and through him to President Eisenhower:
[Page 912]Please say said President Rhee that our people are terribly tired. For you, with all respect, this has been a distant war, but for us all our country has been devastated and our capital city destroyed and our industries ruined. For three years we have existed on a hope. We have tried as hard as we can and you have given us wonderful support. I know you have to make very difficult world decisions; I know that to you Korea is only one of many places where Commie gangsters have to be faced. What little I have been able to do has been to hold my people together. I am old and tired, and my life—win or lose—is nearly over. My value to my people is the faith they have that all my life I have fought for Korean independence; my value to your government is that the Korean people trust me. If the American Government can give Korea security pact, that is what Korean people most need to help them continue fighting. But if American Government cannot give us security pact, then unilateral declaration would be next most helpful, even though Commies would probably try to exploit it as without any binding effect. So I say that if bilateral pact would make difficulties for us, then recognizing your problems within which Korea perhaps seems small to you, I hope at least your government can make statement saying that no matter what happens, American Government will not forget Korea. If President Eisenhower himself could make declaration on Korea’s behalf, President Rhee said that would be particularly effective insofar as Korean people concerned and be especially appreciated by him.