795.00/4–1453: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
priority
1218. Following are joint Embassy-KCOMZ views re ROK Government attitude on armistice. Being forwarded independently through military channels to Department of Army.
ROK Government has assumed clear and unequivocal position of opposition to armistice and advocacy of national unification by force which has been expressed by Office Public Information, National Assembly, Foreign Ministry and President Rhee himself. Press comment has supported government position and campaign of mass rallies organized by government is building up. Rallies have already taken place in Seoul, Pusan and Inchon. Can be anticipated that in absence some move in direction ROK objectives, as stated in government’s “five points”, latter may adopt increasingly difficult attitude.
Motivation behind present ROK attitude, which reflects long-standing government position, is strong natural desire for national unification under ROK coupled with feeling of insecurity arising from (1) fact of 1950 aggression, (2) reality of political pressure of Russo-Chinese power-mass and (3) fear US may not come to ROK support in event future aggression.
Possibility exists President Rhee might take action to effect some degree of withdrawal ROK support for UNC, such as representation on [Page 907] armistice delegation or, as extreme, but militant use of ROK Forces, if he thought this would achieve his long-range objectives. Danger here is his general unpredictability and tendency occasionally to act without adequate prior consideration of consequences. On balance, however, we doubt he will go this far as he has shown himself in past to be political realist re strength his own position and he is undoubtedly aware such move would isolate him from only real support ROK has, namely, US–UN. We believe present campaign is essentially attempt to maximize his bargaining position vis-à-vis US with view to obtaining fullest possible US support his goals. His letter of March 21, 1952 to President Truman1 indicates extent to which ROK opposition to armistice is for purpose obtaining formal defense assurances for future. At present time Rhee is probably in position to turn Korean “public opinion” in one way or other concerning this issue.
Recommend US Government consider urgently what measures can be taken now to satisfy ROK objectives and seek to obtain their continuing support for US–UN policy. Maximum satisfaction, short of “unification through victory,” would be US Government agreement to some form of bilateral security pact with ROK, possibly together with assurances of US support for Korean unification by peaceful means and reconstruction aid, and full-fledged ROK participation in political conference following armistice. We recognize difficulties involved in security pact, as outlined to Ambassador Yang by Secretary Dulles,2 but recommend continued effort to find way to overcome them. Second possible course would be unilateral public assurance by President that US will not desert Korea coupled with such of above-suggested supplementary measures as are feasible. We doubt, however, whether public declaration alone will satisfy Rhee sufficiently to modify his attitude on armistice.
Since ROK Government is mobilizing its resources behind campaign of opposition believe course of action should be decided soonest and decision made known to Rhee. We should also consider as matter of urgency what concessions in addition to support for armistice and US–UN policy should be asked of ROK (for example, agreement on general principles of civil affairs agreement covering UN forces) if bilateral security pact given.