Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/5–3152: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
priority

Tokyo, May 31, 1952—11:58 a.m.

C 69351. Refs: A. C 68350.² B. JCS 908998.³ C. CX 68655⁴ D. CX 68355.⁵ E. JCS 909747.⁶

1. I have Conducted An Extensive review of the records of the recent meetings of the armistice negotiators, held personal discussions with Adm Joy, and secured comments and recommendations from the armistice delegation pertaining to Communist reaction to our package armistice proposal and possible future means of conducting negotiations. It is our unanimous belief that the Communist opinion of the firmness of the UNC final position has been materially lessened in recent meetings conducted under present operating instructions. It is our unanimous opinion that the only hope for an armistice on present terms lies in convincing the Communists that our position is firm and final. Prior to 23 May the Communists had on many occasions stated that, unless the UNC was prepared to formally terminate negotiations, we could have no justification for objecting to the holding of normal meetings; in fact, they stated it was our duty to do so. Evaluation of the Communists act on 23 May of insisting that the UNC delegation establish the date for the next meeting cannot be effected at this time. It may be another form of a challenge to terminate negotiations. Failure to accept this challenge can only indicate weakness in our position.

2. Present procedure has thus far proven ineffective in securing an armistice, and it is considered that this condition will continue to exist. This, in some respects, is supported by the relief shown by the Communists, as reported in ref C, when we adopted our present position of making statements other than to reiterate our firm, final, and irrevocable position. It is believed that this belief stemmed from relaxation of fear engendered by one of two causes:

a. That our position was indeed firm;

b. That we would accept their challenge to unilaterally terminate negotiations. Communists may have definite date to which the negotiations must be extended.

Adoption of course of action recommended in part II (2) of ref A (unilateral suspension of further meetings until Communists accept our terms, maintaining contact with them by liaison officers), to which I gave my concurrence in ref D, is the means by which we can best convince the Communists that our position is firm, final and irrevocable. It is the nearest we can approach accepting their challenge to unilaterally terminate negotiations. If the Communist desire for an armistice is sincere and if they will ever accept our firm stand on the POW issue, it is considered that responsibility for reconvening plenary sessions to accept our terms would not be a controlling factor.

3. Communist ability to continually propagandize their arguments and positions, however unfounded, and to refute UN proposals by warped, slanderous and fallacious charges, counter-charges and statements by means of a controlled press has given them a decided propaganda advantage. The UNC delegation has habitually presented factual information supporting our firm and reasonable proposals. However, experience has demonstrated that our press representatives generally show little or no interest in filing copy which merely repeats arguments supporting UNC position after such arguments have lost their immediate news value. For this reason it is considered that the only effective means of soliciting additional public and international support for UNCposition is to publicize our position and arguments in support thereof at governmental level. Such would heighten their news value. This is especially true if it is considered that adoption of the course of action as recommended in para 6 below is dependent upon securing still further public and international support.

4. Several possible courses of action in addition to the one recommended in para 6 to solve the present deadlock in negotiations have been considered here. These include such actions as:

(1) Propose that liaison officers meet to investigate procedures which could be employed to accomplish our proposed impartial rescreening of all POWs after the armistice is signed.

(2) Unilaterally suspend negotiations for a definite fixed period, such as for one week.

(3) UNC delegation launch a strong propaganda attack against Communists doctrine and philosophy.

(4) Adopt delaying tactics, i.e., agree to a meeting on the subsequent day but short time prior to scheduled meeting notify Communists that we are unable to attend, continue such for several days, meeting with them at occasional intervals.

5. The foregoing courses of action are not recommended at this time.

6. Adm Joy, Gen Harrison, members of the delegation, and myself are unanimous in our opinion that we should now make firm plans to execute the recommended action set forth in HNC 1236.⁷ We believe the most logical procedure to follow in accomplishing our mission is that shown below:

a. Continue sessions as at present, meeting as infrequently as possible, using themes in each session as suggested in ref B and refuting Communists false accusations. We would thus continue until we are able to present a firm, final, and accurate figure based on the completed rosters of those PWs and CIs who are to be returned to Communist control. These rosters can be made up to include either:

(1) Those who have now been screened and have indicated their desire to return Communist control, plus those in pro-Communist compounds who have not as yet been screened, or

(2) Provided screening is possible as outlined in my CX 68858,⁸ all of those POWs and CIs who indicate their desire to return to Communist control after the complete screening has been accomplished. The time for the completion of total screening would be dependent upon the success of the present operation to seize uncontested control of PWs and CIs at Koje-Do.

b. Submit to the Communists and to the press the new firm figure of PWs and CIs to be repatriated, stating emphatically that this is not a new proposal and that it merely replaces the previous approximate figure of 70,000. We would simultaneously make an appropriate explanation of the accuracy of the new figure. At the same time we would inform the Communists of the fairness, firmness and finality of the UNC proposal and immediately propose a recess for an appropriate time (approximately one week) for them to restudy and reevaluate our final proposal. We would also state our willingness to amplify and clarify at any time any portion of our proposal which they might not understand. These foregoing statements would be couched in such terms as to clearly imply that if the Communists do not accept our proposal within a reasonable time, the UNC would then unilaterally recess negotiations until the Communists indicate their readiness to accept our proposal of 28 Apr.

c. If, after receiving the new firm figure, the Communists do not agree to an armistice within a reasonable period (approximately one week), the UNC would recess unilaterally until such time as the Communists accept our offer or break negotiations. We would clearly state to the Communists that our liaison officers would continue to be available for the purpose of clarification or amplification of our package proposal and to arrange details for a plenary session when the Communists decide to accept our final armistice proposal as submitted to them on 28 Apr.

7. It is requested that I be permitted to implement the above course of action at my discretion. The basis for final rosters will be determined after the implementation of the operation for seizing uncontested control on Koje-Do (see my CX 68858).

8. If the foregoing procedure should fail to result in an armistice and the Communists should not terminate negotiations, it is doubtful whether any further progress could be made at this level. I am in no position to properly evaluate the last final step which my govt or the United Nations might take to achieve an armistice in Korea. One possible final effort might be to attempt, via circuitous channels, to implant the idea that the UNC might accept a proposal and to induce the Communists to make a proposal whereby the armistice would be signed on presently agreed terms which would exclude repatriation of POWs. Upon signing of the armistice, the control, the responsibility for feeding, clothing, etc, and the determination as to the ultimate disposition of all POWs of both sides would pass to a group of neutral nations. Both sides would agree in the armistice to abide by the decision of such neutral group. It would be desirable to have the United Nations General Assembly as the “neutral” group. A more acceptable solution to the Communists might be to have the neutral group composed of United Nations countries which have not actively participated in the Korean War. If efforts to influence the Communists to make a proposal similar to the foregoing were unsuccessful, such might be suggested by the United Nations or, as appropriate, members of the United Nations, employing diplomatic channels.

1. A marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram.

   For Clark’s own account of why he sent these recommendations, see his From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 106–107.

2. Printed as HNC 1236, May 12, p. 193.
3. Dated May 16, p. 203.
4. The telegram, dated May 18, 1952, is not printed. In it Clark transmitted to the JCS the recommendations of the UNC Delegation at Panmunjom, which was more than ever convinced that it faced a protracted period of propaganda and, from a negotiating point of view, believed it would be advantageous to unilaterally suspend the talks until the Communists accepted the proposal of Apr. 28. Joy, speaking for the delegation, realized however that this course of action was not approved by Washington. He therefore recommended continued adherence to his existing tactic at Panmunjom: refusal to discuss the elements of the proposal of Apr. 28 combined with an aggressive propaganda campaign against the Communists (795.00/5–3152).
5. Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 194.
6. Not printed (795.00/5–3152).
7. Dated May 12, p. 193.
8. Dated May 22, p. 219.