Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/5–3152: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Chief of Staff United States Army (Collins)¹

top secret
emergency

Tokyo, May 31, 1952—4:31 p.m.

CX 69393. Ref DA 910149, 31 (30) May.² This message in 5 parts.

Part 1. 1. In accordance with instructions cited in reference message, I plan to meet Van Fleet in Pusan Monday, 2 June. After conference with Lightner and UNCURK, I plan to see Rhee, accompanied by Van Fleet. At this conference I will outline the 12 major points covered in reference message. At this time I do not intend to indicate, in any way, that I am delivering a final ultimatum, but will state in strongest terms my position as the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command in support of stand taken by United States Government and UNCURK.

2. It may be necessary for this Command to tolerate actions by Rhee which are abhorrent and to endure embarrassing political incidents precipitated by him. It is believed that all such incidents and actions should be handled by other departments of the United States Govt with advice of the military until such time as the results adversely affect either the combat operations of 8th Army or the social and economic situation in Korea which, in turn, will adversely affect the combat operations of 8th Army. At such time the military will be forced to act.

Part 2. My views on present critical political situation are as follows:

1. For the immediate present there are 2 possible courses of action, to wit:

A. Continue to urge Rhee to moderate his illegal and unconstitutional action with the forlorn hope that he will listen to reason.

B. Only other alternative would be to take over and establish some form of interim govt.

2. For present and unless serious civil disturbances interfere with military operations, I believe it wise and intend to follow the line of action in 1A above. If necessary to take action indicated in 1B above, I will require advice and guidance in detail as to the type of interim govt and the auth for its establishment.

3. For future planning to meet the occurrence of below listed contingencies which may occur at any moment I submit the following courses of action:

A. If an election is held and President Rhee is not elected:

(1) In the remote possibility that President Rhee accepts defeat gracefully, it is recommended that he should be urged to serve his country by making a world-wide lecture tour at UN expense to explain his country’s problems and needs.

(2) Pres Rhee may successfully order the dissolution of the National Assembly, declare the election null and void, and install himself as head of State, or he might accept defeat but organize strong opposition and resort to strong-arm methods. Such actions on the part of President Rhee would undoubtedly cause serious internal disturbances and as a consequence might endanger the supply lines of the 8th Army and the mil situation in general. In the event that such disturbances seriously interfere with mil operations, it will be necessary for me to assume control and again I will require advice and guidance outlined in para 2 above.

B. If National Assembly is sufficiently intimidated and Rhee is reelected:

Continue present policy of supporting the legally elected President of the ROK, using all means available to influence him to stay within the bounds of law and constitution.

C. If no election is held and the Presidency becomes vacant: Again in this case it will be necessary to assume control and I will require the advice and guidance outlined in para 2 above.

Part 3. The following action could develop in the immediate future and would influence most adversely the mil situation: President Rhee remains adamant in his refusal to lift martial law and, in an attempt to employ the ROK Army and the National Police for his own political purposes, takes action to abrogate the agreement which places the ROK Army under the UNC.³ It is absolutely essential to preclude such action. I plan to have General Lee, Chief of Staff ROKA, assured that under such circumstances he will receive complete UNC support in continuing the ROKA on its present mission of repelling Communist aggression. In case of defection of individual ROKA units, the 8th Army will be directed to withdraw logistic support from those units and block their movement. 8th Army will be further directed to deny transportation for movement of National Police units to affected areas if such units are operating under Rhee’s direction.

Part 4. In the case of any of the developments outlined in part 2, para 1B, 3A (2) and 3C and part 3 above, the 8th Army will require immediate and strong reinforcement, both in combat troops and military government specialists. The only immediate combat reinforcements are those in the Far East Command. Adequate mil govt reinforcements are not immediately available to the UNC. The current restrictions imposed on movement of troops from Japan do not permit the dispatch of any sizeable force to Korea. Even if such restrictions were lifted, I do not consider that I can reduce the forces presently in Japan beyond 1 RCT without seriously jeopardizing my ability to carry out my primary mission, the defense of Japan.

Part 5. Summary.

1. The situation created by Syngman Rhee’s flagrant violation of governmental processes may lead to a serious situation requiring positive and forceful mil action on the part of the UNC.

2. Until the situation deteriorates to the point where our mil operations in Korea may be jeopardized, I believe negotiations and pressure upon Pres Rhee to desist from his high-handed procedures should be handled through diplomatic channels, specifically by UNCURK and the Embassy in Pusan, supported by myself and my subordinates. The point I am making is that as long as the difficulties remain largely political, political channels should direct our efforts to bring normalcy to the situation. In this connection it seems to me particularly unfortunate that Ambassador Muccio should be absent at this critical time.

3. I also feel very definitely that even though Pres Rhee may refuse to heed the admonitions of our govt and the UN, as he has already done, and even though his acts bring embarrassment and shatter some of the democratic ideologies which we hold dear, we still must not, through precipitous action, or the threat thereof, do anything that will jeopardize the military situation. It is apparent to all that any such threats as we may make will be realized by Rhee, as well as ourselves, as emanating generally from weakness. We do not have the troops to withstand a major Communist offensive, to regain uncontested control of prisoners of war on Koje-Do, and to handle major civil disturbances in our rear areas at the same time. Therefore, we must swallow our pride to a certain extent until Rhee, through his illegal and diabolical actions, has catapulted us into a situation where positive action must be taken. Then I will muster all the forces available, even establish mil govt or martial law, or such other steps as may have been directed by my govt to handle the situation.

1. This telegram was sent to Van Fleet in Korea for his information.

2. The Department of State sent a copy of DA 910149 to the Embassy in Korea for its confidential information as telegram 892, May 30, 1952 (795B.00/5–3052). In it, Clark was informed by Collins that the Departments of State and Defense were disturbed over the political and military implications of the internal ROK crisis. They believed that the UNC should support U.S. Government and UNCURK efforts to convince Rhee to lift martial law and restore constitutional processes as the best means of securing stability and security in the Pusan area.

   The Department of Defense suggested that Clark or Van Fleet meet with Rhee and bring home “in strongest terms” the danger of Korean political instability to the UN military operations in Korea. The General was to urge Rhee to compose his differences with the National Assembly. Finally, he was to register strong objections that unjustified martial law in Pusan had not been lifted and inform Rhee that the UNC supported the UNCURK statement of May 28. Collins asked for Clark’s views and recommendations on the military aspects of the situation.

3. President Rhee had assigned operational command of ROK ground, sea, and air forces to General MacArthur as CINCUNC in a letter of July 15, 1950. (UN document S/1627; printed in Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 7, 1950, p. 206)