Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 161st Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, September 9, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

September 9, 1953

[Extract]

Present at the 161st Council meeting were the following: The Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration;² the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget;³ the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission;⁴ the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Douglas MacArthur, II, Department of State; Elbert P. Tuttle, Department of the Treasury; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President;⁵ Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; Gerald D. Morgan and Bryce Harlow, White House Staff; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

1. Further United States Support for France and the Associated States of Indochina (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 5,⁶ and September 8, 1953;⁷ NSC Action No. 874)⁸

After Mr. Cutler had summarized previous Council action on this problem, and read the recommendations in the State Department report, he suggested that the Vice President call first on Secretary Dulles.

Secretary Dulles said that ever since the August 6 action of the National Security Council regarding Indochina, the State Department had been working very actively with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and Mr. Stassen, on the problem of Indochina. The task of bringing the French to make an increased effort in Indochina had been difficult, since the prevailing mood in France, especially in the Chamber of Deputies, was to get out of Indochina. The French parliament was at the moment in recess, and Secretary Dulles hoped it would remain so; but there was always the danger that it would be summoned back, in which case the Indochinese question would become a political football in parliamentary debate.

Secretary Dulles expressed his firm conviction that Premier Laniel was really disposed to make this additional effort in Indochina. Thus for the first time we have a French Government which sees the necessity of building strength in Indochina. Likewise for the first time, we have a French commanding general, Navarre, with a dynamic approach to the military problem in Indochina. General Navarre’s new plan of campaign calls for the sending of nine fresh battalions, together with supporting units, to Indochina. If the plan is carried out, local forces in Indochina would be increased by the end of the calendar year by 68,000 men.

Equally important, said Secretary Dulles, was the fact that the French Government have recently given promises of political independence to the Associated States, which the United States Government thinks is essential for the success of the total program. In the long run, said Secretary Dulles, the Indochina area cannot be held except by the people of the Associated States.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, continued Secretary Dulles, have reviewed General Navarre’s plan, and, according to Secretary Dulles’ understanding, the Joint Chiefs considered the plan practical and feasible. Accordingly, the problem of financing the plan would now seem to be the last major obstacle to putting it into effect. Speed is of the essence. It was important to start the plan in motion before the return of the French parliament and in order to get the additional forces out to Indochina in readiness for the resumption of hostilities at the end of the rainy season in October. The French hoped to start these forces on their way at the end of September, so that they would have arrived in Indochina by the end of October.

The problem, therefore, is essentially a financial problem, since the French have indicated inability to carry out the new program unless the United States is prepared to assume a much larger share of the total cost, namely, $385 million in addition to funds already programmed by the United States for Indochina. The decision as to where this money will come from, said Secretary Dulles, is primarily a decision for Mr. Stassen and for Mr. Hughes of the Bureau of the Budget. Clearly, however, this would involve recourse to the transfer powers of the President.

Secretary Dulles then informed the Council that in the course of his conversation with the President in Denver the previous Monday,⁹ the latter had indicated his general approval of the State Department’s proposals to assist the French to make this new effort. This does not mean, added Secretary Dulles, that all the details of this assistance have been crystallized. The NSC was free to discuss these. It was simply that the President had indicated that the solution of the Indochina problem was a first priority, coming after Korea if not now actually before it. The President had stated his belief that the loss of Indochina could not be insulated, and that that loss would, shortly after, cost us the rest of Southeast Asia. Korea, on the other hand, might be an insulated loss. The President, said Secretary Dulles, had also commented on the great desirability of concentrating our funds and resources on the most important objectives, so far as the law of the land permitted. If the Congress would go along with this proposed concentration of effort on cleaning up the situation in French Indochina, we would be able to get real results. The President added that he assumed that there would be careful consultation with members of the appropriate Congressional committees, so that they would not be taken by surprise or feel that they had been presented with an accomplished fact. If such conferences were carefully arranged, the President believed that the Congress would support the proposed use of the Presidential transfer powers.

Secretary Dulles then predicted that it would probably take two or even three years to achieve a real decision in the Indochina war. A marked improvement in the situation, however, would be visible much sooner. He expressed the belief that this U. S. assistance might very well induce the Chinese Communists to renounce their aid to the Vietminh. It was with this objective in mind, he went on, that he had made his statement (approved in advance by the President) in his speech at St. Louis, which indicated that if the Chinese Communists overtly intervened in the Indochina war, the consequences would be grave and might not be confined to Indochina itself. The French, Secretary Dulles pointed out, have long feared the contingency of Chinese intervention, and have used this fear as an argument in favor of giving up in Indochina, or at least going slowly in their campaign. It was with the objective of making Chinese Communist intervention less likely that he had made his statement, and Secretary Dulles enumerated possible actions by the United States to execute this threat which the Chinese Communists would not find pleasant to contemplate. In any case, Secretary Dulles expressed his conviction that his St. Louis statement had done much to encourage the French to make a new effort in Indochina.

As to the financial problem, Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that if the additional $385 million accomplishes what we hope and think possible, namely, a reversal of the previous French attitude, the prospect of victory, or the postponement of imminent defeat, it would be the “cheapest money we ever spent.” If we don’t spend the money the French will certainly get out of Indochina promptly, and the whole area will be immediately overrun by the Communists, and neighboring areas as well. Such a contingency would call for far larger U. S. expenditures than were currently contemplated.

In conclusion, Secretary Dulles stated that he had no doubt that the course he was now advocating before the Council was the course which the Council had approved in principle on August 6, and that it was a sound course. He expressed the hope that considerations of national security would outweigh the technical difficulties of finding the money, and he hoped that the National Security Council at its present meeting would act in such fashion as to enable the State Department to give the French the green light to go ahead. He was certain that if this happened the State Department could readily work out the detailed agreements with the French on the expenditure of the funds.

Finally, said Secretary Dulles, if the new French effort in Indochina succeeded, it would increase rather than decrease the level of French support for NATO.

The Vice President commented, at the end of Secretary Dulles’ statement, that American stakes in French Indochina were obviously very great indeed—so great that the risk must be taken that the new French plan would not work. Indeed, what troubled him, said the Vice President, was the adequacy of the $385 million. Ought we to indicate a willingness to do more?

Secretary Dulles replied that the President had thought that in the forthcoming talks with the Congressional leaders about Indochina we should warn them that we might have to come back for a supplemental request of the magnitude of perhaps $100 million. Accordingly, the President apparently thought that we might need more than the $385 million.

The Vice President then inquired whether Secretary Dulles thought that the French plan could be carried out with the $385 million grant of assistance. Was this amount of money actually available?

Secretary Dulles replied that the $385 million was available under present law and appropriations.

The Vice President then inquired the views of the military as to the adequacy of this amount.

In reply, Admiral Radford pointed out that the French had never said that this amount was all that they needed to achieve their objectives. They had merely indicated that this amount was required for the calendar year.

Secretary Dulles supported Admiral Radford’s statement, and warned that we might require a comparable amount from the Fiscal 1955 budget. He went on to point out that the French program was limited not only by considerations of money, but by the physical capacity of the French to spend money wisely. $385 million would be sufficient to finance as large an effort as the French were physically able to make. This judgment was confirmed by Admiral Radford.

Secretary Humphrey then stood up and said that he was obliged to leave the Council to make a speech, but before leaving he wished to go on record that, subject to the working out of the details, it was his view that the United States had no option but to proceed promptly with this program in Indochina. No time should be lost.

(Secretary Humphrey then left the Cabinet Room, and his place was taken by Mr. Tuttle.)

Mr. Hughes, speaking for the Bureau of the Budget, pointed out that the sum of $385 million was the figure supplied by the French Government in terms of francs, and that it had not yet been screened by any American officials.

Mr. Stassen reported that in response to the August 6 decision of the Council he and his people had tried to find ways and means of meeting this request for financial assistance out of FY 1954 Mutual Security funds, pointing out that this procedure would be much more satisfactory to the French than a commitment to assist them which would be conditioned by a future appeal to the Congress for supplemental funds. In the course of conferring on how best to secure this sum, Mr. Stassen said that he and his colleagues had reached the decision that it was impossible to re-screen the French figure at the present time. He therefore proposed, by use of the Presidential transfer powers, to transfer some $317 million from Title I. The impact of such a transfer, said Mr. Stassen, would fall most heavily on the future lead time of Army end items for NATO. To secure the remainder of the $385 million, recourse could be had to two possible sources: First, French franc counterpart funds; and second, transfer of funds from Title III, earmarked in the appropriations for Far East military assistance. Mr. Stassen stressed the vital importance of consultation with the appropriate members of Congress on this problem, and also added that under the proposed transfer procedures it would be unwise to make a lump sum payment to the French. It would be much more sensible to make specific payments to them as they incurred specific expenses in carrying out the new program in French Indochina. In short, we must have demonstrated expenditures by the French before we made payments to cover these expenses. Only thus could we be sure that the money was being used by the French in the fashion agreed to by us when we agreed to assist them. For these reasons, Mr. Stassen suggested amendments in the language of the present report which would make his point clear.

Secretary Dulles replied that this procedure did not seem wholly satisfactory to him. He pointed out that the figure of $385 million had been reached with the understanding that it did not cover merely the cost of the additional French effort in Indochina, but that $100 million of the $385 million was designed to help pay the cost of the current French effort in Indochina, notably the cost of training and equipping native troops.

Secretary Dulles’ reply to Mr. Stassen and the latter’s rebuttal involved the Council in a lengthy discussion of the precise purpose for which the $385 [million] was intended, which discussion was concluded by a statement by Mr. Stassen to the effect that what the United States ought to be prepared to finance was what the French Government had set down in its September 1 memorandum to the United States Government. Certainly, said Mr. Stassen, we don’t want any open-ended commitment to the French.

After agreeing to changes of language to clarify this point, Mr. Cutler asked Admiral Radford for the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the adequacy of General Navarre’s new military plan.

Admiral Radford replied that the Joint Chiefs believed that the success of this forthcoming French effort would largely depend on the skill and effectiveness with which it was carried out by the French and the native troops in Indochina. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs firmly believed that we ought to support the Navarre plan. Speaking personally, Admiral Radford observed that he had been close to the problem of Indochina for at least four years, and that this was the first time that the political climate had actually improved to a point where military success could be achieved. With aggressive implementation of the Navarre plan, Admiral Radford predicted that the war in Indochina could be reduced in scale to mere guerrilla operations in the course of a single season of fighting—certainly in two such seasons. He personally felt that we could not spend this amount of money to better advantage anywhere else in the world.

Secretary Wilson then addressed to Admiral Radford a question as to the likelihood of Chinese Communist intervention.

Admiral Radford replied that fear of this intervention explained why the French had been dragging their feet, but expressed the belief that the Secretary of State had put the Chinese Communists on notice in his recent speech, and he did not believe that the Chinese would come in. In any case, they would find such intervention extremely difficult as long as we controlled the sea, since the land transportation system and the terrain would make the land approach very difficult for large-scale intervention.

Mr. Cutler commented that if some of the money in question was to be used to pay native troops, this fact should be carefully explained to the Congress.

Mr. Stassen confirmed that such expenditures for troop pay were indeed contemplated, and agreed with Mr. Cutler that this point should be gone over carefully with the Congressional leaders.

Mr. Cutler then pointed out that at the August 6 meeting the President had expressed a willingness to release the French battalion in Korea for service in Indochina. Was this battalion, he inquired, one of the nine called for by the Navarre plan? Secretary Dulles replied in the affirmative.

After further discussion of changes in the text of the subject report in order to provide for greater flexibility in securing the requisite money, Mr. Cutler expressed the view that any attempt to secure written assurances from the French Government that in return for this assistance it would press for French agreement to ratify the EDC treaties, would be a mistake. Any such written assurances would be certain to leak out, and would cause the Laniel government great embarrassment.

Mr. Cutler then referred to the ways and means of approaching the key Congressional leaders on this problem, since it was necessary to move rapidly and most Congressmen were out of town.

Mr. Stassen said that a major effort would be required to convene conferences with the appropriate members of Congress. He said that he planned to see Congressman Taber¹⁰ himself, but added that other members of the Council and of the White House Staff should be called in to assist in the task. He indicated that it would take at least three days to go through this process.

Mr. Cutler then inquired as to how the United States assistance to the French Government would be revealed. Should it be announced by our Government, or by the French Government? Or would it just leak out?

Secretary Dulles replied that Premier Laniel would have to make some kind of a statement about this next week, but such a statement should not be made until after the conclusion of the Congressional conferences. Thereafter the announcement might well take the form of a joint US–French statement by the President and Premier Laniel. Plans to meet this problem were still in flux.

Secretary Wilson stated his understanding that the program of assistance to the French Government for Indochina was something that we would go ahead with regardless of the conferences with the Congressmen.

Mr. Stassen replied that the objective of the conferences was to inform the members of Congress fully as to our proposal, but not actually to ask their permission to carry it out.

Secretary Dulles concurred in Mr. Stassen’s view that the President had the legal right to invoke his transfer powers, adding, however, that it was vastly important to assure ourselves of the good will and understanding of the Congressional leaders and not to take them by surprise.

After further discussion of plans to contact the appropriate Congressional leaders, the Vice President expressed the view that the announcement of our proposed move should be made as dramatically as possible at the right time, and not be permitted to leak out.

Secretary Dulles agreed on the vital importance of avoiding a leak, not only because of unfortunate repercussions in the United States, but likewise in France.

Mr. MacArthur expressed the opinion that the announcement should be handled in such fashion as to provide Premier Laniel with maximum support in France for a course of action which was politically very risky for him.¹¹

The National Security Council:¹²

a. Noted and discussed the memorandum from the Department of State on the subject enclosed with the reference memorandum of September 8, 1953, including the September 1 memorandum from the French Government and the report that the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concur in the opinion that the proposed French program holds promise of success and can be implemented effectively.

b. Agreed to recommend to the President:

(1) The granting of additional assistance, not to exceed $385 million or its equivalent in local currency, as requested by the French, on the following basis:

(a) The United States Government should obtain assurances to the effect that the French Government is determined:

(i) To put promptly into effect the program of action set forth in its memorandum of September 1.

(ii) To carry this program forward vigorously with the object of eliminating regular enemy forces in Indochina.

(iii) To continue to pursue the policy of perfecting independence of the Associated States, in conformity with the July 3 announcement.

(iv) To facilitate exchange of information with American military authorities and to take into account their views in developing and carrying out French military plans in Indochina.

(v) To assure that no basic or permanent alteration of plans and programs for NATO forces will be made as a result of the additional effort in Indochina.

(vi) To provide appropriate information to the United States Government of the amounts of the expenditures for the military program indicated in the September 1 memorandum from the French Government.

(b) The United States Government should make clear to the French Government that:

(i) The appropriately established financial requirements for the military program as indicated in the September 1 memorandum from the French Government, not to exceed $385 million in Calendar Year 1954, will be provided by the United States Government.

(ii) The amount of $385 million is deemed to satisfy in full the request made by the French memorandum of September 1.

(iii) No further financial assistance may be expected for Calendar Year 1954.

(iv) The United States Government retains the right to terminate this additional assistance should for any reason the French Government plan as outlined in the memorandum of September 1 prove incapable of execution or should other unforeseen circumstances arise which negate the understandings arrived at between the two governments based in paragraphs (a) and (b) herein.

(2) The provision of this additional assistance, to the extent necessary through the use of the President’s transfer powers, in conformity with Annex B of the enclosure to the reference memorandum of September 8, 1953, or otherwise.

Note: The recommendation in b above, as subsequently approved by the President, transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration for implementation.¹³

. . . . . . .

1. Prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on Sept. 10.
2. Harold E. Stassen.
3. Rowland R. Hughes.
4. Lewis L. Strauss.
5. Sherman Adams.
6. Reference is to the report by the Department of State (circulated by memorandum of Aug. 5), p. 714.
7. Supra.
8. Of Aug. 6, p. 718.
9. See footnote 5, p. 750. No additional record of the discussion between Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower on Sept. 7 has been identified.
10. Representative John Taber of New York, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.
11. In telegram 977 from Paris, Sept. 9, Ambassador Dillon reported that Germain Vidal, director of Premier Laniel’s personal staff, had expressed the fear that there had been “a French indiscretion,” and that a substantially accurate account of the situation regarding additional aid for Indochina would appear in the French press the following day. (751G.5 MSP/9–953) The New York Times of Sept. 10, page 2, dateline Paris, Sept. 9, reported that the National Security Council was considering a French request for $385 million. At the Secretary of State’s staff meeting held on the morning of Sept. 10, Thruston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, reported that the results of yesterday’s NSC meeting regarding Indochina had leaked to the press, rendering Congressional consultation on the subject less effective. (Secretary’s Staff Meetings, lot 63 D 75) At the Department of State daily news conference on Sept. 10, Lincoln White, Deputy Director of the News Division, refused specific comment on the New York Times report. (ON files, lot 60 D 641) On Sept. 11, the New York Times further reported (page 1, dateline Washington, Sept. 10) that the French request had been approved by the NSC.
12. Paragraphs a and b below constituted NSC Action No. 897 of Sept. 9, 1953 (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”), subsequently approved by the President, and circulated to the National Security Council by Executive Secretary Lay by memorandum of Sept. 11, 1953; for text, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, pp. 153–155.
13. Executive Secretary Lay’s memorandum of transmittal, Sept. 10, is not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351)