Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 163
United States Minutes of the Second Session of the Second Meeting of the ANZUS Council, Washington, September 9, 1953, 2:30 p.m.1
WAM M–2
[Here follow a list of those present (30) and the record of discussion of subjects other than Indochina.]
Indochina
The Secretary said that the situation in Indochina has given the Administration great concern. It would be difficult to limit the consequences of a disaster in Indochina. He noted how important these consequences would be for Australia and New Zealand. Siam, Northern Malaya, Burma and Indonesia would all go if Indochina were lost. The possibility of salvaging the situation has at times looked extremely gloomy since a combination of three elements was needed:
- (a)
- French willingness to make a more vigorous military effort and commit more forces, in the face of French public opinion in favor of liquidating the war.
- (b)
- French willingness to grant a large degree of independence to the native peoples in order to increase their part in the struggle, without which it is doubtful if the struggle can be won.
- (c)
- A decision as to whether it would be worthwhile even to make the effort, in view of the likelihood that even if it succeeded it would be a passing success since 300,000 Chinese Communists could always move in as they had in North Korea.
The situation still has not been resolved, but there still seems to be a fair chance that it may be. The French have taken far-reaching steps [Page 790] toward granting independence. These are actually being felt as a result of the July 3 declaration. General Navarre is taking a dynamic approach, reversing the previous static policy. We feel that the character of the war can be changed if the French are given the means to do it. The question is whether or not General Navarre can get the necessary backing from Paris in this regard.
The Secretary referred to his speech in St. Louis last week, which had been approved by the President and the Joint Chiefs, in which he stated that Chinese Communist aggression could not occur in Indochina without grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina. He felt that that statement will suffice to keep the Chinese Communists out and get the French to act more vigorously. If the Chinese Communists did move in in force, it might very possibly enlarge the area of military action there and involve a larger role for Chiang’s forces. The Secretary said his statement was intended as a deterrent, to prevent miscalculation. While recognizing the serious problems faced by France, the Secretary said he thought there was a better chance of holding the area than seemed possible some months ago.
Mr. Webb suggested that General Gentry2 might add a few words since he had just been there. General Gentry stated that there had been no change in the disposition of Chinese Communist forces and that we would have some warning if there were because of their airfields. He said that the French officers are full of confidence in the new regime and that General Navarre had volunteered to him that short of Chinese Communist intervention he would have the situation well under control within a year. General Gentry himself thought two years would be more likely.
The Secretary agreed on the two years and said that an advantage will be missed if the French troops do not go ahead in the fighting season which opens up in a few days. He acknowledged that the other side was better prepared and that we may have temporary disappointments.
General Gentry stated that it was clear to him that the French are not going to leave the initiative to the Viet Minh. He had been shown the Vietnamese National Army which is being put together and said that some elements may be good in a few months but that it would be 18–24 months before the Vietnamese Army is really effective and the French can pull out.
The Secretary said that anything the Australians or New Zealanders could do to help out would be to the good.
[Page 791]Mr. Webb said that that was the purpose of General Gentry’s visit. General Gentry added that he had offered the French supplies and they had seemed very pleased.
Mr. Casey asked if the danger was not from the French weakening rather than from a Viet Minh offensive.
The Secretary replied in the affirmative, adding that he was sure the French could win. However, they were probably more concerned with the effects of their actions in Indochina on the situation in North Africa.
Ambassador Munro asked what would happen if the French simply withdrew from Indochina.
The Secretary said that we have been concentrating on preventing such a situation from becoming a reality and have hopes that it will not, but that we had plans for such a contingency.
. . . . . . .
[Here follows discussion of subjects other than Indochina.]
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The Second Meeting of the ANZUS Council was held in Washington, Sept. 9–10, 1953. Those present at the Second Session included, for the United States, Secretary of State Dulles, Assistant Secretaries Merchant and Robertson, and Counselor of the Department MacArthur; for Australia, Richard G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs, and Sir Percy Spender, Ambassador to the United States; and for New Zealand, T. Clifton Webb, Minister for External Affairs, and Leslie K. Munro, Ambassador to the United States.
For additional documentation on the Second Meeting of the ANZUS Council, see volume xii. Unpublished minutes, background papers, and other material on the conference are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 163.
↩ - Maj. Gen. W. G. Gentry, Chief of the General Staff of New Zealand.↩