Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351

Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State for the National Security Council¹

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

Subject:

• Assistance for Indochina.

Reference:

• NSC Action No. 874²

1. On August 6, 1953 (Action No. 874), the NSC agreed that if the Department of State, Foreign Operations Administration, and the JCS found that the French program for carrying on the war in Indochina held promise of success, the United States should furnish additional support for this program. The NSC directed the Department of State and the FOA to submit to the Council detailed recommendations for doing so.

2. Since the NSC action in reference, the French Government has provided the United States Government with more detailed estimates of the forces build-up necessary for execution of these plans, cost estimates, and a description of French strategic and tactical objectives. The French Government states that additional United States assistance in the amount of $385 million is required. (The French memoranda are attached as Annex A.)

3. Since coming into power, the new French Government has taken the following actions:

(a) It has demonstrated full support of a new Commander, General Navarre, who has reinvigorated his command and appears determined to wrest the initiative from the Vietminh.

(b) In the face of a reluctant public opinion, it has followed through its bold decision to send reinforcements to Indochina. Provided the French Government has assurances of additional United States support as requested, embarkation will begin in the immediate future and all the reinforcements are scheduled to reach Indochina by November 1, 1953. In concert with the Associated States Governments, the French Command has continued to expand the recruitment of indigenous armies.

(c) Following upon its declaration of July 3, 1953, contemplating a much wider independence for the Associated States within the French Union, the French Government’s opening moves with respect to negotiations with the States have been generous and promising.

4. The Laniel Government appears to be the first since the Indochina fighting began which is committed to take both the political and military steps which are necessary to achieve a satisfactory solution of the Indochina problem. At the same time, if it succeeds in this task, it will also be in a position to live up to its European responsibilities and to make its due contribution to NATO and EDC.

5. The Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the French plans and taken note of French actions. They concur in the opinion that the French program holds promise of success and can be implemented effectively. It should be recognized that, given favorable progress in the 1953–54 campaign, a substantial further contribution of United States aid will probably be required in Fiscal Year 1955.

6. The Secretary of State and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration have agreed upon recommendations for procedure to be followed in providing the necessary additional assistance. (Annex B)

7. A prompt decision by the United States Government in support of the French plans is of the highest importance. Early strong affirmative action by the United States will strengthen the hand of the French Government in seeking from the French Assembly the credits necesary for prosecution of the war, and in convincing the public of the prospects of success. It would also have a most helpful impact upon General Navarre and his command in encouraging them to move forward rapidly and vigorously in the implementation of their plan. Failure by the United States Government to act rapidly will most probably result in decisions by the French Government entailing a withdrawal from Indochina and the probable loss of Southeast Asia to the Communists.

8. In granting this additional assistance to the French Government, the United States Government should obtain assurances to the effect that the French Government is determined:

a. To put promptly into effect the program of action set forth in its memorandum of September 1;

b. To carry this program forward vigorously with the object of eliminating regular enemy forces in Indochina;

c. To continue to pursue the policy of perfecting independence of the Associated States, in conformity with the July 3 announcement;

d. To facilitate exchange of information with American military authorities and to take into account their views in developing and carrying out French military plans in Indochina;

e. To assure that no basic or permanent alteration of plans and programs for NATO forces will be made as a result of the additional effort in Indochina.

9. The United States Government should make it clear to the French Government that:

a. The amount of $385 million is deemed to satisfy in full the request made by the French memorandum of September 1;

b. No further financial assistance may be expected for Calendar Year 1954;

c. The United States Government retains the right to terminate this additional assistance should for any reason the French Government plan as outlined in the memorandum of September 1 prove incapable of execution or should other unforeseen circumstances arise which negate the understandings arrived at between the two governments based on paragraphs 8 and 9 herein.

10. The Department of State should enter into further conversations with representatives of the French Government to formalize agreement between the two governments on the basis in paragraphs 8 and 9 above.

Recommendations:

11. That the NSC approve:

a. The granting of additional assistance not to exceed $385 million or its equivalent in local currency as requested by the French, on the basis set forth in paragraphs 8 and 9 above;

b. The provision of this aid, through the use of the President’s transfer powers, in conformity with Annex B.

Annex A

Memorandum by the French Government³

secret

Paris, September 1, 1953.

[Translation]

This memorandum contains the information that the French Government is furnishing the American Government in response to two questionnaires submitted by the American Embassy on August 26 and 27, 1953.⁴

It is, first of all, necessary to affirm that if the financial situation forces the French Government to make, in 1954, certain reductions in military credits below 1953, the French Government nevertheless intends to carry out for Indochina the recommendations made by General Navarre; the execution of the recommendations has already begun. Their complete execution remains subject to the granting, by the American Government, of additional aid amounting to 135 billion French francs which was the subject of the memorandum of August 18, 1953.⁵ In the event that this aid could not be granted, a complete reconsideration of the plan of operations in Indochina would be unavoidable.

I. Forces in Indochina and Their Costs.

The costs necessary to bring about a satisfactory solution of the Indochina problem have been calculated based upon the program presented by General Navarre. They consist of, on the one hand, expenditures required for the National Armies of the Associated States, on the other, expenditures required for the Expeditionary Corps.

A. National Armies of the Associated States.

The necessary expenditures amount to: 195 billion francs.

The present financial situation prevents France from undertaking, even in part, these expenditures in 1954. It is for this reason that the French Government requests of the United States an additional aid, for these purposes, of: 135 billion francs; in the expectation that the Associated States would be able to contribute to the development and the maintenance of their own forces, to the amount of the difference, that is: 60 billion.^*

By way of comparison, it is indicated that in 1953:—this part of the French budget was 68 billion francs, the financial situation having prevented this part from reaching 78 billion as had been planned;—the share of the budget of the Associated States had been 32 billion (figure based on the piaster at the rate of 10 francs). The detailed breakdown of these expenditures, by type and for each national army, is given in Annex 1 attached;⁶ the latter is presented, as requested by the memorandum, in the same form used in the tables of the first theoretical study, established in connection with the visit of the French Ministers to Washington in March 1953.⁷

The plan of development of the National Armies corresponding to the foregoing expenditures, remains, in its broad concept, the same as set forth in Washington. It calls for reaching by December 31, 1954, a build-up to 315,930 men, very close to the figure 311,650 given in table A of the documentation established in March (“suppletifs” included).

Annex 2 attached shows, in its tables 1 and 2 set up in the form of the previously mentioned table A, the numerically small modifications made to the force build-up.

The only important modifications made to the initial theoretical plan concern the units of the branches and services originally planned (Annex 2, Table IV).

It is apparent, in fact, that a greater and more rapid effort must be made, in favor of light infantry units and that the establishment of certain units of the branches and services must be deferred and carried over until the year 1955.

Annex 2 shows in its table 3 and along broad lines, the modifications thus planned of which several, it is noted, are being negotiated with the Vietnamese Government. These modifications would have effect upon the orders of matériel of all origins (French and American) and will result in a reduction in the volume of matériel necessary in 1954 for the National Armies, in particular heavy matériel.

B. Expeditionary Corps.

The necessary expenditures amount to: 259 billion francs,^† This figure represents, in comparison to the total of credits established in 1953 (after the reductions made in May) a reduction in expenditures of: 31 billion francs. This reduction had been obtained in compressing the estimates to the greatest degree and include a reduction in reserve stocks from 9 to 6 months (excluding munitions). Except for this reservation, the budgetary provisions take into account all needs concerning the essential objective: deliver to the Viet-Minh a decisive blow which could eliminate them or lead them to negotiate.

Annex 3 attached establishes after a practical study in Indochina and at Paris the first theoretical plans which were initially recapitulated in the form of table C of the study furnished last March in Washington concerning the costs of the Expeditionary Corps.

C. Equipment of Support Battalions and Units of the National Armies Created in 1954.

It is correct that the present stocks of matériel and the deliveries of the MDAP and MSP matériel, ordered and awaited under fiscal year 1954 should satisfy the needs for equipment for the year 1954, with the exceptions noted in paragraph B above.

Every effort is being made to give the entire equipment picture as soon as possible, but to obtain this information requires the participation of the French Command in Indochina; it is thus impossible to present it now.

II. Effects Upon Requirements of the Adoption of the Navarre Plan.

As stated above, the French Government approves the plan of which General Navarre presented a summary to General O’Daniel. For the implementation of this plan, as a function of the timetable for the development of the Armed Forces, General Navarre has recommended:

1. That he be granted reinforcements in air forces (transport, fire support and intelligence support) and in naval (transport and fire support) for an appropriate establishment of battle corps in the combined operations planned.

2. That he be granted temporary reinforcements in land forces to give the battle corps the means considered necessary for the 1953–54 campaign to the extent that the state of development of the national armies will not have permitted the release of the necessary number of regular units.

The French Government responded to these requests with the following conditions:

1. Naval and Aerial Reinforcements.

A. Naval Forces.

Two LSTs will sail from the Metropole to Indochina in the beginning of October but they should return, at the dry season (intermousson) of springtime, 1954, on condition that they are replaced by LSTs or equivalent ships furnished by the U.S.

The Jules Verne will be maintained in Indochina until the delivery by the US of an equivalent transport vessel.

The carrier Arromanches will return to Indochina at the beginning of October.

B. Air Forces.

The personnel of an additional transport group is ready to return to Indochina October 1, if the necessary C-47 aircraft are obtained through US aid. Requests to this effect have been made by General Ely in Washington as well as by Saigon.

Various personnel have been granted, for communications, GCA and radar, reinforcements of the SVR, transport, Gonio aircraft and will be sent to Indochina by the first of October.

Reinforcements in SVR personnel by B–26 is under study.

2. Temporary Reinforcements in Ground Forces.

3 elements of regimental command and 9 battalions of infantry.

1 battalion of engineers and 1 artillery group of recoilless 75mm with a personnel of about 7,200 men (French, North Africans and Africans) to be filled out locally by about 2,400 locals to be recruited.

These elements will all be landed in Indochina by November 1, 1953.

III. Plan to Increase Land Forces in 1954.

The arrangements planned for providing to Indochina the total personnel necessary for the maintenance, in 1954, of the effectives of the Expeditionary Corps and of the French Cadres in the National Armies are being worked out.

To facilitate the solution of this problem, studies have been undertaken in Indochina, along the lines of an adjustment of the detailed plans set forth in Washington in March 1953.

These adjustments are set forth in Annex 2; they have essentially consisted—with a view, in particular, of lessening the needs for specialized personnel (above all, cadres) of certain units of the branches and services to be postponed until later, or even perhaps not to be established at all.

It is thus, for 1954, and for the Vietnamese Army that 14,500 men of the units of the “exceptional plan” have been cut out, but compensated by the advanced setting up of 10,000 men of the third tranche of the light battalions (which was only planned for the beginning of 1955).

Thanks to an excess of 4,500 anticipated at the end of 1953, the total strength of the Vietnamese Army at December 31, 1954 will thus remain fixed at the 272,000 men mentioned in March in Washington.

This measure considerably lessens the needs for specialist categories difficult to find and hard to train and greatly lightens the demand on the Metropole for cadres for the National Armies (which changes from 7,000 in the Washington plan to 5,600 in the Navarre plan of August, 1953).

In conclusion, a certain number of the recommendations formulated by General Navarre have already been carried out; the study of others is very advanced, but the complete execution of the plan remains subordinated:

1. to the granting of the 135 billions aid requested.

2. to the satisfaction of the needs for aid in US materials presented by General Navarre and which he considered essential to the execution of his program; these are the requests for C-47 planes for a 4th transport group, and appropriate maritime transport (LST or Peckett cargo vessels).

Annex 4 attached establishes the principles which will guide the military action of our High Command from the strategic and tactical points of view; these principles remain those which were explained to General O’Daniel, and which have received the approval of the French Government, on condition that the necessary means, explained above, are obtained.

The considerations developed in the present memorandum concern only Indochina.

It is not in fact possible at the present moment to state clearly exactly what will be the French military expenditures in 1954. One of the hypotheses under consideration would involve a reduction of these expenditures by around 150 billions below those of 1953.

But this figure includes the saving corresponding to the fact that it is not planned to maintain as a charge to France the subsidy of 68 billions allocated in 1953 to the three Associated States for the establishment of their armies. With respect to the French NATO military forces, it is not planned to reduce their budget figure by 100 billions below 1953. It is certain that the reduction which could be undertaken will not exceed 30 billions; the definite figure will be established during the coming weeks.

Laniel

Note: Two subsidiary questions were asked in the US memoranda.

The first concerns the battalion in Korea; in this respect, the intention of the French Government is to soon transfer this battalion to Indochina; it will be part of the reenforcements whose composition was fixed during the recent visit of General Navarre to France, and which includes, with respect to infantry, a total of 9 battalions.

The second concerns the initial cost of soldiers belonging to the National Armies of the Associated States; the reply will be found in Annex 5.

Annex 4

Principles of Military Action in Indochina.

The principles which will guide the military action of our High Command in Indochina remain those which have been explained by General Navarre, on the one hand to General O’Daniel at the time of the latter’s visit to Indochina in June 1953, and on the other hand, to the French Government at the time of the Commander in Chief’s visit to Paris in July (National Defense Committee of July 24, 1953).

These principles can be defined as follows:

A. From the Strategic Standpoint.

1. It has been amply demonstrated that, in the face of an adversary whose potential in effectives of regular units is perhaps stabilized, but whose potential in arms and equipment of all kinds is increasing and becoming unceasingly valuable because of Chinese aid, and whose moral potential is maintained or reenforced thanks to Communist ideology, there is only one way to hope to gain victory, and that is to take the offensive. To again seize the initiative of operations and the offensive implies first that the friendly forces have the numerical superiority necessary to achieve a rupture of the equilibrium between the two sides and then that the largest and best part of the forces can be applied in those zones favorable to the destruction or annihilation of the enemy forces. The achievement of this program must furthermore be pursued despite any undertakings by the enemy, which is, at the moment, in a favorable situation in relation to our forces which are still assigned to the static tasks of occupation and pacification of the zones of territories under their control.

2. The rupture of the equilibrium of forces will be attempted—considering that the French effort will remain limited to what is now considered a ceiling—by a substantial and continued increase of the national armies. To the extent that these forces develop quantitatively and qualitatively, they will become suitable to assume the responsibilities for maintenance of order, first in the quasi-totality of the zones now under our control, then in further and further extended zones. The takeover by the national armies of the surface defense in the zones now under our control will free up units which are not static—French and local—which should thus become available for the war of movement against the main Viet Minh battle forces. The extension of the zones occupied by friendly forces will thin out the enemy potential all the more to the extent that the zones of extension are chosen from among those considered by the enemy to be vital due to their richness in human and food resources, or because of their geographic position.

B. From the Tactical Standpoint.

The undertaking of this strategy then leads to the establishment of plans for the development of friendly forces in such a way that they are definitely articulated in:

1. Surface defense forces with the task of occupying and pacifying zones under friendly control, and with the especial duty of assuring the freedom of operation and security of the logistic support of the armed forces.

2. The surface defense forces will include units of all branches, especially infantry, organized within a territorial framework.

They will be almost entirely composed of units of the national armies (with the exception of several French units for the protection of certain particularly important sensitive zones).

These forces will include particularly the light battalions (called K.Q. battalions in Vietnam) whose essential mission will be to pacify the territory and to keep it pacified, thanks to a form of organization adapted to the territory and to the enemy; by their way of life and by an appropriate method, these light battalions must combat regional national units (sic—presumably Viet Minh) and finally annihilate and supplant them, thus bringing security and confidence to the population.

3. The battle corps will be essentially made up of units of branches and services grouped in variable tactical complexes according to the conditions in which they will be used (mountain infantry, airports). The basic complexes will be of the “combat team” type (an organization for command and communication; 3 or 4 battalions; one artillery group; service elements). A certain number will be grouped in divisions whose command element will be capable of “capping” (coiffer) a certain number of groups (in principle, 3 of the same type).

Outside these divisions and groups, it is intended to provide for a certain number of general reserve units which can be earmarked and used according to the circumstances of the moment.

The characteristics of these elements of the battle forces will be, together with fire power, the flexibility and mobility needed for guerrilla warfare and in order to command the enemy rear; it is planned for the latter to use air transport and particularly helicopters.

Because of the characteristics of the theatre of operations, and the nature of certain zones still occupied by the Viet Minh, it is also planned that certain units would receive amphibious training. Arrangements have already been undertaken to set up an amphibious command and for the specialization of several units (for example, river flotillas).

In a general way, cooperation between the air force and navy will be pushed to the maximum.

The logistic support of this ensemble of surface defense forces and battle corps will be provided by a territorial infrastructure of the services (i.e., presumably area service commands). The national armies and the French forces are cooperating in the setting up of battle corps and the territorial organization of the services.

For the purpose:

On the one hand, of a close coordination of methods, and to seek the greatest efficiency, it is very much hoped to have a centralized direction of instruction and combat training, both for the national armies and the French forces,

And—on the other hand, for economy, it is greatly desired to pool certain French and local means of logistic support for the armies.

C. Timetable.

1. The above note has not established a rigorous timetable for the operations to be conducted henceforward. Such a timetable cannot be considered, because account must be taken of the actions and reactions of the enemy; however, it will be noted that July and August have already seen the carrying out of operations predicted in paragraphs “primo” of General Navarre’s note:

• —the initiative has been seized by:
• —local offensives in central Vietnam (Quang Tri, Pha
• —command and guerrilla operations (Langson, and operations on the Annam Coast).

2. On the other hand, there has been established a timetable for the development of national armies and the concomitant setting up of battle corps. The units for the French and local battle corps will only in fact become available:

• —on the one hand, when most of the surface defense missions have been turned over to the light battalions for which various stages of establishment are programmed;
• —on the other hand, when the personnel and matériel intended for the technical support units of the groups and divisions (artillery, communications, matériel etc.) have arrived at hand.

A timetable for the setting up of battle corps was given to the General O’Daniel mission at Saigon on July 8, 1953. There is attached hereto a copy of this document⁸ which was recently modified by General Navarre. But it can be clearly stated that the organization (of units) planned for the third quarter of 1953 has been advanced and increased in order to prepare for any eventuality at the beginning of autumn, 1953.

In addition the arrival of temporary reenforcements provided by France will very shortly permit the increase before the first quarter of 1954, the number of infantry groups.

Annex B

Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

Recommendations for procedure in furnishing an additional $385 million of MSP aid for support of military operations in Indo-China.

The Department of State and the Foreign Operations Administration consider it feasible to use $385 million to carry out the Program of Additional Aid for increased military effort in Indo-China. The amount that can be transferred by the President, under Section 513(a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, from European military end-item funds to the Associated States for military and other support assistance is at least $317 million. This amount is 10% of the total of new military funds appropriated and unobligated balances of Military funds reappropriated by the Mutual Security Appropriations Act, 1954. Under a broader construction of Section 513(a) transfer authority, the 10% transfer factor might be applied to a base composed not only of new military funds appropriated and unobligated balances reappropriated but also of military funds obligated in previous fiscal years but still unexpended. Under this broader construction, the 10% amount would be far in excess of $317 million. However, the legal question of whether this broader construction of Section 513(a) is permissible requires closer study. Before it could be used as a firm basis for planning, consultation would have to be had with Comptroller General and/or appropriate Congressional Committees. For purposes of the new $385 million aid program for the Associated States, it is recommended that we count on a transfer from European military funds, under Section 513(a), of an amount within the $317 million total that is clearly available from a legal point of view. The balance of the $385 million can be met either by the use of up to $100 million of regular Title III military funds, or by requesting that the French expend $80 million worth of franc counterpart funds, not now committed for other purposes, for this program; or by a combination of funds from both sources.

Transfers of funds for military purposes under Section 513(a) must be reported by the President to the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees and also to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the House.

We can assume that it will be legally possible for the Foreign Operations Administration, using military end-item funds, to carry out substantially the program envisaged in the French memorandum of September 1, 1953. However, because of the extraordinary nature and magnitude of the proposed program, it is desirable to have consultation with appropriate members of each of the following Congressional Committees:

Senate Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations; House Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, Appropriations.

In addition to being given a general description of the proposed program and the reasons therefor, these Congressional leaders should be advised that some of the funds may be used directly for troop pay of native forces in Indo-China. While the legislative history of the foreign aid legislation indicates opposition by members of the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees to the use of Mutual Security program funds directly for troop pay, Section 303(a) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act contains exceptionally broad authority to expend military funds in “the general area of China” for any form of assistance that will help achieve the policies and purposes of the MDA Act.

A further item to be covered in consultations with Congress concerns the technique of furnishing this additional aid. It should be pointed out that consideration is being given to the possibility of channeling all or the bulk of the additional military aid for Indo-Chinese forces through the French Government in order to achieve proper accounting for funds. It is important that the reasons for the use of this procedure be explained to the Congressional leaders, since the House Foreign Affairs Committee stated in its report on the new legislation that “It is the hope of the Committee that more aid will go directly to the forces of the three Associated States rather than funneling all the aid through the French.”

1. The copy of this paper in the files of the Policy Planning Staff bears a notation indicating that it was drafted by Gullion and Stelle of S/P and reflected changes by Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor of the Department. (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Indochina”) Executive Secretary Lay transmitted the paper to the National Security Council by memorandum of Sept. 8, for consideration at the 161st Meeting of the NSC, Sept. 9. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351)
2. Of Aug. 6, p. 718.
3. This text constitutes the unofficial translation transmitted by the Embassy in Paris to the Department by teleconference on Sept. 1, as modified by minor changes indicated in telegram 910 from Paris, Sept. 3. Confirmation texts of the memorandum and its annexes were transmitted in despatch 709 of Sept. 3. The official French text was transmitted with despatch 938 of Oct. 2. Regarding the communications cited above, see footnote 1, p. 748.
4. The memoranda are identified in footnote 4, p. 739.
5. Regarding the French memorandum of Aug. 18, see despatch 589 from Paris, Aug. 20, p. 732.
6. This figure appears to be in any case the extreme limit of the effort which the states are capable of carrying themselves. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. Annexes 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the French memorandum are not printed. Annex 1, “Expenditure Forecasts for National Armies,” consists of one page of text and a table. Annex 2 consists of five pages of tables on the development of the armies of the Associated States. Annex 3 is a one-page table titled “Provisions for Expenditures in 1954 for the French Expeditionary Corps.” Annex 5 consists of a one-page table titled “Cost Price Per Man in 1954—Each Army of the Associated States.”
7. The study under reference has not been identified specifically. French plans and requirements were considered by a U.S. working group which visited Paris from Mar. 8 to 13. The French concept of strategic operations in Indochina, logistical problems, and financial requirements were embodied in the so-called Letourneau Plan which was discussed by U.S. and French officials at Washington Mar. 26–31. For documentation on consideration of the French program as set forth in March 1953, see pp. 400–464 passim.
8. Not including the air and navy expenditures estimated for 1954 on a preliminary basis at 57 billion, this figure including the re-enforcement elements requested by General Navarre. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. The document under reference accompanies neither the source text nor the official French language copy of Annex 4. The text of the latter indicates that the July timetable was not being attached. (Despatch 938 from Paris, Oct. 2, 1953; 751G.5 MSP/10–253)