751G.5/7–953: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
61. Repeated information Paris 21. It is a tragic irony that defeatism of French Government (revealed in Paris telegram 16 of July 9 [8])1 should reach such a pitch at very moment when a new and competent French General—Navarre—is entirely convinced that with little additional effort or sacrifice by France victory can be wrested from Viet Minh in relatively near future to the enduring prestige and advantage of France, not only in Indochina, but for her world position as well. Navarre’s conviction of success is entirely shared by General O’Daniel and all members of his mission who have just completed extensive and critical study on the ground of French capabilities and new offensive plans. Beginning at the Foreign Minister’s conference in Washington and carrying on afterwards in Paris, we will have to make every effort to persuade French political leadership and public opinion of fact of the possibility, I would say certainty, of French victory, the advantages of such victory, and the loss to France in her African, European, and world position if she fails to take the victory which can be hers. I think that the President and the Secretary, Ambassador Dillon in Paris, Admiral Radford, General O’Daniel, General Gruenther,2 and Bonsal should work on French political leaders to eradicate this highly understandable but unjustified defeatism with regard to the effort in Indochina. I am surprised that Reynaud would say that there was “no light at the end of the tunnel”.
French gloom also seems incongruous in light recent progressive declaration concerning increased independence for Associated States, declaration which provides solid foundation for improved French Union relations, with logically expected result greater support. French effort by Indochina states themselves.
I take it there has been no change in our view of strategic necessity of not merely holding communism in Indochina but of gaining an [Page 648] early victory over it. If it is necessary in order to obtain determined continuance of French military effort here, I believe it would be in our national interest to assume a greater share of financial burden. Aside from financial burden, French and French Union casualties in this war do not compare with our casualties in Korea. For twelve-month period ending May 31, 1953, total French Union and Associated States casualties were 25,080 but of this total only 8,460 were among French Metropolitan and French African troops. French Metropolitan and African troops killed in this period totalled 1,440.
The temporary loan of 20,000 men from European front asked for by Navarre is obviously easily within French capabilities if there is the conviction of necessity of supplying them. I understand Admiral Radford said that if necessary the US Navy could undertake to transport these additional troops from Metropolitan France.