Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

top secret
STF D–2b

[Washington,] July 9, 1953.

Indochina—French Position

The French have informed us that Indochina is the only subject which they wish to discuss bipartitely with us.

During the recent prolonged French Government crisis, Mendes-France, Marie, Pinay, Laniel and Bidault all included in their investiture speeches statements to the effect that France somehow had to reduce her Indochina burden and that this would be discussed with the United States in the forthcoming meetings.

We can expect the French to raise the following points:

1. After seven years’ expenditure of French blood and treasure it is now necessary for French to be able to “see the end of the tunnel”. Indefinite continuation along the lines of the past is now out of the question.

2. This French Government may be the last which can discuss Indochina in terms of seeking a military decision or even of holding the line; successor governments or even this government may be led to open direct negotiations with Ho Chi-Minh.

3. France may seek to introduce Indochina into Far Eastern negotiations at the political conference following a Korean truce, or in a subsequent multipartite meeting. We may expect to hear the line that if negotiations are suitable for Korea they are indicated for Indochina.

4. Minimum condition for continuation of French effort at present rate to give a chance of success to new military and political plans will in all likelihood be a marked increase in US assistance, i.e., involving a sizable amount of budget-supporting aid as well as equipment.

us talking points

1. Appreciation of French Effort

a. Tribute to French Expeditionary Corps in Indochina and French Union troops.

b. Note wise and hopeful French decision for increasing sovereignty of Associated States.

c. We understand public sentiment in France especially as articulated during recent government crisis:—seven years of war—sacrifices in men and money.

d. We recognize situation is French responsibility, but in view of gravity of situation and its possible far-reaching consequences believe they would wish us speak with complete frankness.

2. Negotiated Peace in Indochina not Possible or Desirable

a. Preoccupation with Indochina natural when important negotiations proceeding in Korea and while consideration being given to possibility of other negotiation with Communists.

b. But even if Sino-Soviet-Viet Minh were willing to negotiate on Indochina, difficult to foresee how negotiations under present conditions would lead to anything other than de facto turnover to Communists sooner or later and probably sooner.

c. Unfortunately situation radically different in Indochina and Korea.

• —no continuous front
• —distribution of population very different
  • Korea 6 million North
    • 23 million South
  • Vietnam 11 and 11

d. Negotiation with Ho Chi-Minh bound increase his strength; he would dominate elections or any coalition government.

3. Recommended Course of Action

Seems to us an Indochina solution could be advanced by:

a. Decision to persevere.

b. Political moves granting “dominion status” in order to assure firm political and psychological base for military program. Recent French note event of historic importance; desirable to announce concrete follow-up soonest to gain maximum beneficial impact.

c. Sharp step-up in Associated States Armies program and particularly speed-up of officer training.

d. Vigorous offensive action, as projected by Generals Navarre and O’Daniel.

e. A temporary increase of French combat forces (possibly 10,000 men) would appear necessary to wrest initiative from Viet Minh. We feel present military trend must be reversed in the fighting season beginning in September or October if burden is ever to be turned over to native armies with prospect of success. French reinforcements might be withdrawn in phases as these forces take hold.

4. Ways in which United States can Assist

a. In case of reaction by Communist China to French Union successes:

1. Should an increased level of Chinese material aid to Viet Minh require it, we would undertake to increase ours; if an Armistice should release material from Korea, some of it can go to Indochina; we would modify our aid program in case Sino-Viet Minh should improve their weapons.

2. If Chinese should intervene directly—reaffirm assurances given to Mayer in March (subject to our constitutional limitations and possibly in framework of UN). Also we accept now French proposed addition to “Greater Sanctions Statement”² (“—we of opinion that Armistice must not result in jeopardizing restoration or safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia.”)

b. Although Congress, in economy mood, reasonably certain that appropriations can be obtained for continuing programs which give reasonable promise of solidity and success, particularly if developments arising out of July 3rd announcement prove mutually acceptable.

c. New French political program gives prospect for recognition of Associated States by additional Asian states. US prepared to aid in this respect.

d. We prepared give training assistance to native armies.

5. Prospects for Success

a. Realize this program not easy for France, politically or militarily, because of French people’s desire to match German build-up in EDC. Yet position of France in Europe and free world interest cannot enter more satisfactory phase until Indochina affair is safely wound up. We believe this positive program affords better chance of success than withdrawal or negotiated peace, which conceals within it difficulties and dangers, the full range of which we cannot fully appreciate at present.

1. This paper was drafted by Edmund A. Gullion of the Policy Planning Staff; Henry B. Day, Deputy Director of PSA; and Ridgway B. Knight, Acting Director of the Office of Western European Affairs. It was prepared for use in connection with bilateral talks with French officials which were slated to occur during the course of meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at Washington, July 10–14. For documentation on the conference in general, particularly on its European aspects, see volume v.
2. For documentation on this subject, see volume xv.