751G.5/7–853: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State
106. Repeated information Saigon 16. Reference Embtel 30.1 During calls yesterday to present Ambassador Hughes2 to Pleven, Laniel and Reynaud, each of them brought up Indochina in vein similar to reference telegram. Occasion was taken to tell them, as Ambassador had previously told Bidault, of warm Washington reaction to latest independence proposals. Pleven was gloomiest and saw no satisfactory answer. He stated that desire to be rid of Indochina war was as strong a factor here now as desire to be rid of Korean war was in United States during election campaign and that prospect of Korean armistice made longing for Indochina armistice almost uncontrollable. He stated Gen. Navarre sought an increased military effort. This was out of question; it would be difficult to maintain existing effort.
In response to reminder that much of United States aid for fiscal year 1954 as agreed in April had been conditioned on increased effort in Indochina, he said he was fully aware of it and greatly disturbed by present situation. Present and prospective Vietnamese forces were inadequate, but France could do no more; pressure to end the fighting was too strong. If an armistice attempt failed, there might be greater popular support for war than now, but this was faint hope. It would be difficult to withstand popular pressure for withdrawal of French troops before Vietnamese were ready to replace them. Best hope was that promise and fact of greater independence would pull non-Communist nationalist elements away from Ho.
In response to suggestion that armistice in Indochina might be harder to reach than in Korea where there was at least relatively firm demarcation line, he agreed that in this respect at least, it would be far more difficult. Any attempt to draw line at narrow point between sea and Thailand frontier would safeguard south which was already 90 percent pacified, but would leave loyal Laos and Tonkin reservoir of rice and manpower to Communists with prospect south would succumb in year or two.
Laniel said merely that Navarre was optimistic, but wanted resources [Page 644] which could not be given him. Speaking more in general than of Indochina he said, “We hope you can help me for after me comes Mendes-France.”
Reynaud covered much same ground as reference telegram. In present atmosphere Navarre’s hopes and demands were simply unrealistic. France was attempting too much for her strength and her first duty was in Europe. It was true that United States was bearing 40 percent of the Indochina burden, but 60 percent of cost of struggle fought for free world rather than for France was too much. Trouble was that France could see no light at end of tunnel. If present government could not negotiate some relatively satisfactory arrangement, Mendes-France would come in and negotiate far worse one. Meanwhile top priority must be given to winning increased loyalty of Viets and to building up their forces. Asked flatly if he envisaged United States bearing larger share of burden, he replied not necessarily and that United States assistance in supplying methods used for rapid training of Korean forces might help. In this connection, he implied that United States personnel experienced in training Koreans might be useful. He said he would also welcome specific United States suggestions and expressed interest in talking to Bonsal tomorrow.