396.1 WA/7–753
Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State
In discussing the forthcoming Foreign Ministers’ meeting with the President tomorrow morning,1 I would suggest that you first outline the schedule of meetings to him: tripartite meetings Friday [Page 642] afternoon,2 Saturday morning, Monday afternoon, and Tuesday afternoon; bilateral with the British on Saturday afternoon and Tuesday morning; bilaterals with the French on Sunday afternoon and Monday morning.
I would then show him a copy of the agenda (attached)3 for the tripartite meetings. You might explain to him that aside from Korea and depending upon developments there at the last moment, the two big subjects with which the meetings will deal are Germany and Indochina.
[Here follows one paragraph of discussion on Germany.]
Indochina.
I think it would be advisable to warn the President that the French will approach us on Indochina in a different key than heretofore. In other words, it is no longer a question of inducing the French to maintain their effort indefinitely in Indochina for $50,000,000 or $100,000,000 of additional aid. Instead, the French would probably tell us that the present Laniel Government is the last government in a position to work toward a solution in Indochina better than out-and-out negotiations with the Communists, leading to evacuation. This is probably so. The French will probably make three major points: (1) as long as it is proposed to negotiate the Korean settlement in multilateral forum, why would this not be proper for Indochina?; (2) the French will stress the recent initiative which they have taken with the Associated States with a view to granting them in fact the independence they have been given in theory; (3) following the above point, the French will stress the French public’s insistence for a decrease in France’s Indochina effort and will seek to justify such a decrease on the grounds that there is no reason why they should continue to make the same sacrifices for their three sovereign partners in the French Union.
Our main objectives will be (1) to seek to restrain the French Government from making any impulsive decisions concerning direct negotiations with the Communists and withdrawing from Indochina; (2) essentially, we think that time must be gained so that the recent liberal step taken by the French can become translated first into actions and second into a greater realization on the part of the people of the Associated States that they are fighting for themselves and not for the French; (3) it seems to us that the only ray of hope in Indochina lies in an increase in the local armies (and particularly the training of officers) in accordance with a radically stepped-up tempo as compared to heretofore; (4) we will strongly oppose the introduction of Indochina in any Far East negotiations in view of the likelihood that this would lead to undesirable concessions elsewhere.
[Page 643]Lastly, you might mention to the President that a new look should be taken at present US policy with a view to determining what we should do in Southeast Asia should the worst come to the worst and French pull out in the near future.