Office of the Historian

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Indochina”

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State1

top secret
[Washington,] July 6, 1953.

While this is a long paper,2 I believe you should read it. At the meetings, the French will probably not inform us that they are about [Page 641] to pull out of Indochina, but they are likely to indicate at the meeting that the end of the road is approaching.

This paper seeks to explore the consequences for the United States of a negotiated peace in Indochina. It seems to me to require our Government to be prepared to answer three major questions:

a.
If the French, as they undoubtedly will, ask us for massive budgetary assistance, what assurances can we give them in view of the temper of Congress to eliminate foreign aid in a year or so? Can we extend any hope of special appropriations for French budgetary relief even after MSA expires? (The need now is for budgetary rather than material aid. Without assurance of continuing assistance, the French are likely to put a term to their resistance.)
b.
If, despite loss of prestige and investments, the French should be inclined to leave anyway what means do we have to persuade them to stay?
c.
Is Indochina so important to our security that American forces should be used there even in the absence of Chinese Communist intervention? Should not NSC at least be examining this question?

These points can certainly not be settled while the French are here. But they are certain to be raised. Would it not be well to discuss some of them with Defense and some Congressional leaders before the Conference?

  1. Robert R. Bowie became Director of the Policy Planning Staff on May 18, 1953. This memorandum was drafted by Edmund A. Gullion of the Staff.↩

  2. The attached paper, a draft of July 6 prepared by Gullion and titled “Indochina at the Crossroads,” is not printed. The 13-page paper was circulated in document STF D–2, July 6, which included an abstract reading as follows:

    “Although the Mayer Mission last March outlined a general plan for a military solution of the Indochina problem within two years, it is increasingly likely that the current French Government or its successor will be forced to transfer its hopes and efforts to some kind of negotiated peace …

    “Contrary to the situation in Korea, it is difficult to conceive of any negotiated peace in Indochina that would not result in the loss of the entire country to the Communists, possibly followed by the loss of all Southeast Asia …

    “The loss of Indochina would endanger the security of the United States; the fight must be continued to a decision if possible, or at least to the point where Indochinese troops who are convinced that they have something to fight for, bear the main burden; we should strongly discourage French efforts to negotiate peace or to withdraw prematurely; to the measure that it works toward these goals, we should give increased material and moral support to the Laniel Government; and we should make an early determination as to whether we should use American armed force in case of defeat or default by the French, even in the absence of a Chinese aggression.” (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Indochina”) The ellipses in the quotation appear in the source text.

    ↩