Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting at the Pentagon Building, July 10, 1953, 11 a.m.¹

top secret

Washington, July 10, 1953, 11 a.m.

Present

• General Collins
• Admiral Fechteler
• General Eddleman
• General Ruffner
• General Everest²
• General White³
• General Partridge⁴
• Admiral Gardner⁵
• Colonel Cams⁶
• Captain Phillips⁷
• Mr. H. Freeman Matthews
• Mr. Robert Bowie
• Mr. U. A. Johnson
• Mr. Douglas MacArthur II
• Mr. Edmund Gullion
• Mr. Ridgway B. Knight
• Mr. Chas. C. Stelle
• NSC
• General Gerhart
• Mr. S. Everett Gleason
• CIA
• Mr. Amory⁸

[Here follows discussion of subjects other than Indochina.]

JCS Answers to Questions Concerning the Navarre Plan

(General Collins distributed the attached “Proposed Answers to Questions Concerning the Navarre Plan”.)

Mr. Matthews: Before we get to your specific answers to the questions, could you tell us what your general reaction to the Navarre Plan is?

General Collins: We think that the plan as a plan is good enough provided they actually carry it out.

Mr. Matthews: Do you think it could be carried out without the two divisions from the outside?

General Collins: I don’t see how from here the Chiefs can really pass on the exact force requirements for the Plan.

Mr. Bowie: What do you make of the difference between O’Daniel and Navarre as to whether the French could organize 3 or 5 divisions from the troops that are already on hand in Indochina?

General Collins: I agree that it isn’t quite clear from O’Daniel’s message⁹ what the difference between them is based on, but O’Daniel has urged that we give support to Navarre’s request for further divisions from France. Speaking purely as an individual, I would say that if the French really exerted themselves and took strong offensive action they have enough troops right now to do the job. I am not prophesying they will, but if they really organize into divisions and abandon the strictly defensive strategy that they have been following so far, it seems to me that they have sufficient forces to really inflict defeat on the Viet Minh.

Mr. Bowie: What is the relationship between your answers to questions 3 and 4? To question 3 your answer is that Southeast Asia is critically important to U.S. security interests. To question 4 your answer is that you are opposed to committing American ground forces in Indochina.

General Collins: We think that Southeast Asia is very important. From a military point of view, however, we are opposed to putting in U.S. forces and particularly under our present ceilings. If our political leaders want to put troops there we will of course do it, but we would have to have revision upward of our force ceilings.

Mr. Bowie: If we were faced with the loss of Indochina to the Communists what would your advice be from a military point of view?

General Collins: I think we would just have to sit down with our political leaders and talk the things over.

Admiral Fechteler: We do have a Marine Division which is ready to go and which we could put in, although there again we would require an upward revision of our budget ceiling.

General Collins: It wouldn’t just be a question of putting in one division. If we go into Indochina with American forces, we will be there for the long pull. Militarily and politically we would be in up to our necks. In Indochina we wouldn’t have as advantageous a position as we have in Korea. For one thing if we started to put troops into the Tonkin Delta we would have to defend what has always struck me as a very vulnerable port at Haiphong. If I were the Commies I would have long since denied Haiphong to the French. The French don’t have the port protected strongly on the north at all. Anytime the Commies really wanted to they could come in on the north of the port and get in a position to put artillery fire on the harbor. It seems to me that if we went into Indochina with U.S. forces, we would be in for a major and protracted war.

Enclosure¹⁰

Proposed Answers to Questions Concerning the Navarre Plan

1. Q. Are the 2 extra Divisions (French) essential to the success of the Navarre operation?

A. As stated in the O’Daniel report¹¹ one of the principles of the Navarre Plan for conduct of the war in Indochina is “To build up progressively a battle Corps by grouping battalions into regiments and regiments into divisions and by giving to the units thus created the necessary support—.” In commenting on the plan, General O’Daniel stated that there are enough troops in Vietnam to organize at least 5 divisions for offensive action. However Navarre disagrees but he has agreed to organize 3 divisions of Vietnam troops for offensive operations in Tonkin Delta and plans to ask French Government for the bulk of 2 more French Divisions (strong in engineer and signal support) for decisive offensive operations this fall. Navarre’s idea is to win the war in Indochina as soon as possible, and have the Vietnam Army take over and to withdraw the bulk of French forces to Europe. General O’Daniel’s report indicates a need for additional forces in Indochina in order to attain an early decision. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unable to estimate the number required.

2. Q. What would the NATO say to this?

A. It is probable that NATO would object to the transfer of two French divisions to Indochina even though supported by the United States.

3. Q. Is Southeast Asia essential from a military point of view?

A. Yes. NSC 142/2 [NSC 124/2] states on page 1, paragraph 2, “Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term United States security interests”.¹² The primary U.S. military objective in the Far East is the security of the off-shore island chain. With respect to Southeast Asia, the U.S. objective is to prevent it from passing into the Communist orbit and to assist the indigenous governments and people to develop the will and ability to resist Communism from within and from without and to contribute to the strength of the free world. Southeast Asia is the principal world source of some strategically important commodities upon which the United States places great reliance. The loss of Southeast Asia could result in such economic and political pressures upon Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan’s eventual accommodation to Communism. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia would seriously threaten the U.S. position in the Pacific off-shore island chain and would seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far East.

4. Q. Are we willing to commit 2 American divisions? If so, is there a Marine division available?

A. No. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that they are opposed to committing American ground forces in Indochina and, in addition, NSC 124/2 states on page 11, paragraph 10 c (3) that the U.S. expects France to carry the burden of providing, in conjunction with the Associated States, the ground forces for the defense of Indochina. In view of U.S. commitments to Korea and NATO and requirements for a strategic reserve, together with budgetary limitations, two American divisions cannot be committed to action in Indochina at this time.

5. Q. How about getting the French to make a U.N. action out of this?

A. The French have consistently opposed making this a U.N. action on the grounds that it is an internal civil action. However, from a military point of view, based on our experience in Korea, it is doubtful that anything would be gained by making the effort in Indochina a U.N. action.

6. Q. If so, could we put in Thailand and Philippine Divisions?

A. The U.S. does not have control of Thailand and Philippine forces, and their forces probably could become available only as a result of Thailand and Philippine participation in U.N. action in Indochina. Even if desirable to involve the U.N. in French Indochina, neither Thailand nor the Philippines possesses military units of division size nor do the political and economic situations in either country permit them under present circumstances to offer more than token forces.

7. Q. a. What would be the cost to the French to expand with the supporting units necessary for the reorganization?

b. Is the pay of the native troops the same as French Troops?

A. a. In view of the preliminary nature of the O’Daniel report on the Navarre Plan, clarification is needed as to the French organization of the potential divisions and the type and scale of equipment before a suitable cost analysis can be made.

b. The base pay of French and native troops is essentially the same. However, French troops receive an allowance for foreign service in addition to base pay.

8. Q. Could the United States support the requirements for additional equipment and at what cost (Estimate)?

A. The United States could support the requirements for additional equipment in Indochina only at a sacrifice to other commitments. An estimate of the cost could not be made until the full French requirements have been stated.

1. This State Department draft was not cleared with the participants.
2. Lt. Gen. Frank F. Everest, USAF, Director of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. Gen. T. D. White, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF.
4. Lt. Gen. Earle E. Partridge, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, USAF.
5. Vice Adm. Μ. B. Gardner, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations).
6. Col. Edwin H. J. Carns, USA, Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
7. Captain Richard H. Phillips, USN, Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
8. Robert Amory, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
9. Dated June 30, p. 624.
10. The enclosure does not accompany the source text of the record of the meeting. The source text of the enclosure printed here, which is labeled “draft,” is in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 157.
11. See footnote 1, p. 616.
12. For text of NSC 124/2, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia,” a report approved by President Truman on June 25, 1952, see volume xii.