Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751H.00/6–2753: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

secret

Paris, June 27, 1953—1 p.m.

6666. Repeated information Saigon 310, Phnom Penh 9. Deptel 6209 June 26 (Saigon 2535, Phnom Penh 8).¹ Embassy has no way estimating effect on Cambodians of statement by French Government of nature suggested reference telegram but does not believe US intervention at this time to obtain such statement is desirable. We do believe that we would be justified, however, in expressing informally to Foreign Office our serious concern over reports of French reinforcements being sent Cambodia, which instead of serving to calm situation might produce opposite effect, particularly in view inflamed Nationalist sentiments and possibilities Viet Minh or other anti-French elements might use occasion to stage incident setting off explosion.²

In reply our query regarding these reinforcements, Roux told us last night they were solely for purpose protecting large number French residents in event trouble. He says that while no final decision yet taken there is increasing support for course of action by which French Government, prior to Bermuda Conference, would open talks with three Associated States (with Bao Dai, Laotian King and perhaps Cambodian Prime Minister Pen Nouth) at Paris intended to assure them in principle of degree of independence they desired. Details of settlement would then be reserved for discussion at forthcoming meeting of High Council French Union. Impression gained is that this represents not only Foreign Office thinking but also ideas of other official circles.

Cheysson tells us that his efforts have been directed to buttonholing various French political figures, within and out of National Assembly, with view to paving way for arrival Tam with request for revision accords governing Franco-Vietnamese relations. He has had many sympathetic listeners but appears to think that no one here will take initiative in view of French policy toward lines designed to give Associated States maximum freedom within French Union and that, while increasing number French realizes something along these lines is essential, impetus must await Tam’s presentation Vietnamese program. Tam would, of course, present Vietnamese demands in frank and friendly fashion and would not follow Cambodian example.

In light of foregoing and intense French preoccupation with IC problem as shown during long governmental crisis, we believe that we should for moment not do anything on US side which would tend to rock boat. There is much bitterness here over actions Cambodian King and IC problem is one of great sensitivity. However, we could easily justify our concern over sending French reinforcements to Cambodia and use that as peg on which to hang expression our interest in future course of action. Roux’s reference to possible talks with Associated States prior to Bermuda Conference may reflect French desire to be in position meet US–UK queries or pressure on IC problem, particularly if, as seems clear, “burden-sharing” element of IC problem is to be introduced by them. French must put some kind of best foot forward if they are to be in position to ask for increased support.

Dillon

1. In telegram 6209 to Paris, June 26, not printed, the Department of State requested the views of its representatives in Paris, Saigon, and Phnom Penh as to the value of a statement by the United States to the French Foreign Ministry to the effect that the formation of a new government offered the opportunity for a “forward-looking and soothing” pronouncement on Cambodia. (751H.00/6–2653)

   Joseph Laniel, an Independent Republican, was elected Premier of France by the National Assembly on June 26. He formed a government on June 28 which included Paul Reynaud, Henri Queuille, and Pierre-Henri Teitgen as Vice-Premiers; Georges Bidault as Minister of Foreign Affairs; and René Pleven as Minister of National Defense. For Laniel’s account of developments in regard to the Indochina situation from the time of the formation of his government through the Geneva Conference of 1954, see Joseph Laniel, Le drame indochinois, de Dien Bien Phu au pari de Geneve (Paris, Plon, 1957).

2. In telegram 6253 to Paris, June 29 (sent to Phnom Penh as telegram 9 and also to Hanoi and Saigon), the Department of State stated the following: “Embassy Paris authorized at discretion informally transmit Foreign Office concern over tense situation Cambodia including troop reinforcements and hope new Government will take early opportunity relieve tension by words and deeds.

   “At same time sincerely trust Cambodian Government continue maintain calm and not allow extreme elements create atmosphere in which negotiations would be difficult.” (751H.00/6–2753)

   In telegram 6707 from Paris, June 30, Ambassador Dillon reported having expressed informally to the Foreign Ministry the concern of the United States over the Cambodian situation. (751H.00/6–3053)