751G.00/6–2653: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
2561. Repeated information Paris 478, pouched Hanoi. Bao Dai received me immediately following his arrival in Saigon yesterday afternoon. He informed me a principal purpose of his trip was to present to General Navarre his, Bao Dai’s plans for increasing and using the National Army.
The Vietnamese National Army should be increased by further 95 battalions in calendar year 1954, Bao Dai said. With the 54 battalions to be added this year, the army should finally clean the Viet Minh out of Cochin China and the provinces at present partially pacified in central Vietnam and also occupy and completely pacify southwestern part of Tonkin Delta during campaign season beginning next October. The reason for placing Vietnamese troops in southwestern part of Tonkin was emplace them for an offensive against Viet Minh in Thanh-Hoa–Vinh–Ha-Tinh region, which was the main source of food and troops for the Viet Minh. Bao Dai went on to say he did not know exactly when it would be possible to move on Thanh-Hoa–Vinh, but indicated it might be possible towards the end of the next dry season. When this region was occupied and pacified, then National Army could join with French Union forces in final operations to destroy the Viet Minh in north and throughout Vietnam. He stated, however, it would not be possible to envisage the completed destruction of Viet Minh resistance within next year. It would take two or even three years to build up Vietnamese National Army to point where with French they could completely destroy enemy resistance.
[Page 620]In effect, he said, what he was proposing was to transform the war from one in which the main fighting was done by the French Union forces, aided by the Vietnamese National Army, to one where the principal fighting would be done by the National Army, aided by the French Union troops. He thought that Navarre would agree both to his plan to increase the National Army and his conception of military operations. Navarre could not, however, agree to provide the money necessary for the build-up of the National Army. That could be done only by the French Government—when one was formally constituted. Accordingly, Bao Dai accompanied by his chief of staff, General Hinh, would follow General Navarre to Paris next week when the latter would report to the new government his estimate of and plans for the situation. Bao Dai hoped that the French Government would provide necessary funds for increasing the National Army. If it refused, he, Bao Dai, would “find the means somehow”.
He admitted that he was a little worried lest a new French Government might endeavor to withdraw from its involvement in Indochina through concluding an armistice with the Viet Minh. If a French Government decided on such course, he of course could not stop it, but he, Bao Dai, would not be a party to an armistice under present condition. It would be impossible to conclude an armistice, given the present relative strength of the Viet Minh, except one tantamount to surrendering to the Viet Minh. The latter must be beaten, and to do so would require national sacrifices on the part of the Vietnamese Government, which he was prepared to order.
I remarked that Letourneau when in Washington had given some tentative, but far from final, figures as to the additional financial outlay involved in building up the Vietnamese National Army. The American Government had expressed willingness to study the possibility of aiding in this increase, but no decision could be given one way or another until we had final figures and estimates. Bao Dai said that should be easy. It cost 800,000 francs a year for equipment for maintenance of a Vietnamese soldier.
I inquired as to Bao Dai’s intentions in the forthcoming meeting of the High Council of French Union and asked whether his government would seek changes in the present constitution of the Union. Bao Dai said that he was not particularly interested in any “paper concessions” at this time. All he wanted now from France was help in building up his army to a real fighting force. When that was achieved, the question of the relations of Vietnam with the French Union could be easily decided on the basis of something like equality. He remarked that of course, if France “capitulated” to the Cambodian King’s demands, it [Page 621] would automatically have to extend the same concessions to Vietnam and Laos. He spoke in contemptuous terms of the King of Cambodia’s action in leaving his country. (Bao Dai has obviously not forgotten the period last year when the Cambodian King’s action in taking to field personally against the rebels was contrasted with Bao Dai’s apparent inactivity). Bao Dai said that he hitherto recognized the Cambodian Monarchy as the legal government of Cambodia, but when the King left his kingdom, he opened the door to rebellion, whether by the Issaraks, the Viet Minh, or an outright Communist revolution. He said that he could hardly consider Cambodian Government in view of King’s flight as a legal government and that he had ordered his chief of staff to make appropriate disposition of his troops to prevent Viet Minh raids or operations against Vietnam from Cambodia. He remarked that the Viet Minh had been free to enter or leave Cambodia at will.
He spoke bitterly of the unexpected action of the French in unilaterally devaluing the piaster, but said that I would note that Vietnam had made no official protest to France. He was not interested in “rowing with” the French or obtaining small concessions, provided France would help him in building up the Vietnamese National Army. He remarked that France had agreed to finance the 54 battalion increase this year, but so far not a cent of money had been forthcoming. The Vietnamese Government could carry on through June but then the promised French contribution must be forthcoming. (Tam told me the same thing yesterday.)
French High Commissioner Gautier today told me of his talk with Bao Dai, which, with the exception of the latter’s expression to me of fears lest a new French Government attempt to negotiate an armistice with Viet Minh, was almost a replica of Bao Dai’s talk with me. Gautier said Bao Dai assured him that he was not pressing for any concessions, merely for assistance in building up his army. Gautier said this was a tribute to Bao Dai’s realism and intelligence. He knew for a fact that Bao Dai had been receiving a flood of letters, some signed, some anonymous, urging him to follow the example of the Cambodian King and strike out for complete independence. Bao Dai was shrewd enough to see that any such action would indispose the French Government and Parliament to continuation or increase of French military and financial sacrifices in Indochina. He was also shrewd enough to see that any popularity as he might gain by an outburst against the French would be ephemeral and unreliable. Gautier said that in any case the existing accords imposed only two real infringements of Vietnamese juridical independence—one being the [Page 622] stipulation that legislation or decrees affecting French interests as defined in the accords would not become binding on French nationals until promulgated by the High Commissioner, and the other the regime of the mixed courts. France was ready to negotiate an acceptable adjustment of these two issues. Indeed, on May 31, he had written to Vietnamese Government offering to abolish the stipulation re necessity of High Commissioner’s promulgation of laws and orders affecting French nationals, proposing instead a system of advance consultation with the High Commissariat on measures affecting French interests. As regards the mixed courts, the existing accords had carried the concept of the co-sovereignty of France and Vietnam, which was not compatible with true independence of latter. France was prepared to drop any connection between the French courts and the Vietnamese courts, provided the latter in cases involving French nationals would have French judges on the bench with Vietnamese judges, but these French judges would be officials of and responsible to the Vietnamese Government, not to France.