Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, “July 1953 Talks”

Lieutenant General John W. O’Daniel to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Radford)¹

top secret
8163/8234

Saigon, June 30, 1953.

CINCPAC pls inform JCS Defense and State. Re msg Assistant SecDef. Upon request Navarre handed me paper containing fol statement verbatim “Principles for the Conduct of the War in Indochina

i To retake the initiative immediately thru the carrying out, beginning this summer, of local offensives and by pushing to the utmost commando and guerrilla actions

ii To take the offensive in the north beginning Sept 15, in order to forestall enemy attack. To conduct the battle which will take place during the fall and winter of 1953–54 in an offensive manner by attacking the flanks and the rears of the enemy

iii To recover from areas not directly involved in the battle a maximum number of units. To pacify these regions progressively

iv To build up progressively a battle corps by grouping battalions into regiments and regiments into divisions and by giving to the units thus created the necessary support (arty engr armor communications) taking into account the very special character of the war in Indochina (the terrain, the enemy). To bring about a max of cooperation with the Air Force and the Navy

v To have a reserve of special type units (armored commandos light battalions etc) designed to adapt the character of the groups and divisions to the nature of the terrain and of the mission assigned

vi To continue the effort of instructing and organizing the army of the Associated States so as to give them a more and more extensive place as well as more and more autonomy in the conduct of operations.”

Comment:Navarre has aggressive ideas hidden in calm manner. Our discussions have been frank and above board. I feel that he is honest and trustworthy and will do everything possible to carry out anything that he says he will do. He appears to be somewhat cautious in policy of reducing number of troops in inactive areas. We feel that there are enough troops in Vietnam to organize at least 5 divisions for offensive action. However Navarre disagrees and this, combined with apparent lack of comprehension by French as to methods of how such a force could be organized makes it unlikely that French can implement such a plan, the French reasoning perhaps being both political and military. However Navarre has agreed to organize 3 divisions from troops now in Vietnam for striking in Tonkin Delta area. Navarre plans to ask French for the bulk of 2 more French divisions, strong in engr and signal support, for employment in order to launch decisive offensive this fall. Navarre’s idea is to win the war here as soon as possible, and have Vietnam army take over for pacification and future action and to withdraw bulk of French forces to Europe. Navarre wants to develop Associated States to the limit. He visualizes arrangements with Associated States similar to those of US with Philippines with long term agreements with French ra quies [?] and economic status. Navarre says this is personal opinion and does not care to be quoted officially. We heartily urge support.

My staff discussing details with French staff concerning implementing future plans of operation pointed to fix timing and support. We have been urging mopping up action during the rainy season. Cogny and his new Deputy Commander in Tonkin Delta area are receptive as is Navarre and I believe they will begin action this summer using amphibious vehicles to the maximum. Using terms of reference as guide, our summary follows: The Letourneau–Allard Plan being modified as indicated above to what I term the “Navarre Plan” full utilization of capabilities not being made and lack of standardization in training noticed. This being discussed with French staff. French military plan being developed as indicated. This also being followed through by staff. Have discussed in detail with Navarre possible methods of knocking enemy off balance, disrupting his supply lines and gaining and maintaining the initiative. He is in accord and I feel he will take steps to implement. Plans are under way to expand training facilities. This is being discussed with the French staff and further report will be made at a later date. Gen Navarre is in favor of transfer of leadership responsibilities to Associated States and Bao Dai has decreed the organization or creation of a staff college for development of higher ranking officers. Better and closer cooperation with MAAG assured. We urge setting up French MAAG for training Associated States army to work side by side with US MAAG. This being considered. Laotian and Cambodian armies being included in plan for future. Navarre believes that French should take a well defined position for the future similar to our action re development Philippines. Navarre and others of the French army have stated to me that Navarre has complete military authority and is not hampered by political directives; however, I believe he will feel freer to act after his forthcoming visit to France. His departure date is definitely set for 2 July.

A higher ceiling is needed for the air as well as for Navy. 25 hundred additional being estimate needed for air. French need to train more Vietnam indigenous personnel in the technical and pilot fields of operations. An increase for flying time for expanded operations cannot be supported unless additional supply and maintenance personnel are acquired for the Air Force. This being discussed with French staff. Psychological and unconventional warfare coordination throughout the command is required. We feel the effort must be centrally controlled and supported and are presenting our views to the French. We do not believe it advisable for us to participate in direct advice training or planning for operations of the army of the Associated States although indirectly much can be done, particularly should French agree to set up a training advisory group to operate side by side with US MAAG.

Plans are under way for further development of an indigenous military potential including manpower and leaders. I feel that we should utilize US service schools in US, and have so stated to French, both for French and for Associated States to develop instructors. Navarre likes the idea. I believe build up of Associated States forces will be accelerated beyond the Letourneau-Allard concept. As indicated, Navarre proposes to wrest initiative from Vietminh as soon as possible. We are discussing plans with French re how to administer and protect liberated areas. Navarre has agreed to small combat intelligence team to US Military Attache, French Indochina with authority to operate in conjunction with French G2 vicinity Hanoi.

Finally we feel that if Navarre is given support on political level he will do much toward bringing war here to successful conclusion. In all cases am endeavoring to obtain concrete, definite answers to problems here through personal talks with Navarre and pursuit to conclusion through staff to staff operations. Feel that our mission here will be fulfilled by 10 July and plan tentatively to depart US via Manila-Honolulu about that date. Heath and Bonsal concur contents this message.

Lt Gen O’Daniel

1. Gen. O’Daniel was chief of the U.S. military survey mission which arrived in Indochina on June 20. This message was transmitted to CINCPAC through U.S. Navy channels and relayed to Washington.