751G. 5/4–2453
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (Halaby) to the
Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, April 24, 1953.
Dear Mr. Secretary: During the course of the
French-United States talks in Washington last month, the French Minister for
the Associated States presented to the Department of Defense the proposed
French Strategic Plan for the Successful Conclusion of the War in
Indochina.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to provide a military appraisal of
the proposed Plan and comment on the feasibility of United States logistic
support of the Plan as requested by the French in light of other
requirements and commitments for United States Military Aid.
Forwarded herewith, as inclosure, are the comments and recommendations of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Proposed French Strategic Plan for the
Successful Conclusion of the War in Indochina.
The Acting Secretary of Defense accepts the substance of the comments and
recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and has forwarded them to
Secretary Wilson and General
Bradley in Paris.
In the light of Minister Letourneau’s
request and our assurances to him, these views and attached documents must
be handled with utmost security precautions and on a strict “need to know”
basis.
Sincerely yours, For the Asst Sec Def (ISA):
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
Secretary of Defense (Wilson)
top secret
Washington, 21 April 1953.
Subject:
- Proposed French Strategic Plan for the Successful Conclusion of
the War in Indochina.
- 1.
- With reference to your memorandum, dated 2 April 1953,1 subject as above, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposed French plan for
concluding the war in Indochina and submit herewith their comments
(Appendix)2 and recommendations. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff point out that the French plan was not presented in
writing. The present knowledge of this plan is limited to that
obtained
[Page 494]
through the
minutes of oral presentations by M. Letourneau and General Allard,
supplemented by questions related thereto during subsequent
discussions.
- 2.
-
While the French plan as presented was lacking in detail,
certain weaknesses are indicated which are summarized briefly as
follows:
- a.
- It does not appear to be sufficiently
aggressive.
- b.
- Excessive effort appears to be devoted to cleaning up
Viet Minh pockets without sufficient consideration being
given to cutting the enemy’s supply lines, particularly
in Northern Indochina.
- c.
- It appears that insufficient emphasis is given to
placing of responsibility in the hands of the Vietnamese
and the training of leaders therefor.
- d.
- The plan appears to rely extensively on small-unit
operations.
While the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the French plan
could be improved in light of the foregoing comments, they feel
that the plan is workable. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
agree that augmentation of Vietnamese forces will be necessary
in order to bring the conflict in Indochina to a successful
conclusion.
- 3.
-
In connection with the foregoing and the comments set forth in
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Appendix hereto, attention is invited
to the following pertinent documents which are attached as
Annexes hereto:
- a.
- A dispatch received from the Chief, Military
Assistance Advisory Group (Indochina) (DA IN 257701) (Annex
“A”);
- b.
- Dispatches requesting General
Clark’s views on the strategic
situation in Indochina (DA 934687) (Annex “B”); his initial views
(DA IN 251110) (Annex
“C”); his modified views (DA IN 253811) (Annex “D”); and his final
recommendations (DA IN
258870) (Annex “E”).
- c.
- A dispatch received from Admiral Radford expressing his
views on the strategic situation in Indochina (260315Z)
(Annex “F”).
It will be noted that General Clark’s views
are somewhat more optimistic than those expressed in this
memorandum. This may be due in part to the fact that General
Clark’s views are probably based almost
entirely on information acquired during his brief visit to
Indochina.
- 4.
- While reserving further opinion as to the merits of the French
plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed
augmentation of forces in Indochina be supported subject to the
following:
[Page 495]
- a.
- There will be no compensating reduction in over-all U.S.
armed forces because of fiscal limitations.
- b.
- The specific requests for U.S. support will be processed
through normal channels for screening of force requirements
and scale and type of equipment.
- c.
- France and the Associated States will contribute to the
maximum extent of their capabilities.
- d.
- The additional financial support beyond that for MDAP requirements necessary to
assure the successful execution of the plan will be made
available by the United States from other than U.S. military
or MDAP funds.
- e.
- No financial commitment will be made to France until:
- (1)
- The cost of the program can be considered in
relation to all other MDA needs; and
- (2)
- A decision has been made to authorize adding new
requirements generated by the French plan to the
regular MDAP for
FY 1954 (as
presented by the military departments to the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Bureau of the
Budget in the FY 1954
Special Budget Review), and to MDA Programs subsequent
to FY 1954.
- 5.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that as much pressure as is
feasible should be placed on the French from a political point of
view to obtain a clear-cut commitment to:
- a.
- Modernize training methods;
- b.
- Prosecute the proposed plan with redoubled determination
and vigor;
- c.
- Expedite the transfer of responsibility to the Governments
of the Associated States and accelerate the rate of training
of indigenous forces with emphasis on leadership
training;
- d.
- Intensify efforts to cut enemy supply lines;
- e.
- Wrest the initiative from the Viet Minh and take more
effective steps to insure that recaptured areas are retained
under Vietnamese control; and
- f.
- Utilize more extensively, where appropriate, units larger
than battalions.
In connection with the requirement for improvement in training methods,
the United States would be willing to furnish such specialized
assistance as may be desired by the French.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
W.
G. Lalor
Rear
Admiral,
U.S. Navy (Ret) Secretary
