Office of the Historian

751J.11/4–2453: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State

secret
Saigon, April 24, 1953—2 p.m.

1998. Sent Paris niact 307 (for Secretary) repeated Department 1998. Following is English text of letter in French which I am requesting Thomson to present from me to Prince Savang tomorrow.

“Dear Prince Savang:

I trust you will forgive the informality of this personal letter, but the need is urgent and I rely upon our mutual interest in maintaining the integrity of Laos to justify so candid an approach.

I have asked Mr. Thomson, our Chargé d’Affaires in Vientiane, to approach His Majesty, your august father, indicating the solicitude felt by the Secretary of State, the Honorable John Foster Dulles, in the welfare of His Majesty and the hope of the Secretary of State that the King and yourself will not undergo the risk of capture by the advancing Communist forces. In light of the Viet Minh drive toward Luang Prabang, withdrawal from that capital would seem the course of wisdom. It is our belief that the maintenance of the Royal Laotian Government in close contact with its sovereign and with the Crown Prince is essential if the independence of Laos is successfully to be defended and the present course of events redressed. Your Highness is familiar with the history of the Second World War when many royal governments, even when forced into exile, maintained the courage of their peoples, discomfited the enemy, and eventually returned triumphant to their native soil.

I have asked Mr. Thomson to be of any aid he can and trust that I shall have personal pleasure of calling upon you and upon His Majesty, the King, at such place of residence as you may choose to select. Sincerely yours”.1

McClintock

  1. The communication was actually delivered on Apr. 29. In telegram 2041 from Saigon, Apr. 30, McClintock relayed the following information sent from Vientiane by Chargé David R. Thomson in telegram 187 of Apr. 29: “I presented letter to Savang here this morning. He said he has entire responsibility King’s safety. Savang highly confident regarding defense Luang Prabang and considers critical point not yet reached; therefore, King to remain, as key inspiration defense. Implied he would get King out and stay Luang Prabang himself if situation worsens. … I presented all arguments, but Savang’s mind made up. … I believe audience King would be superfluous.” (751J.11/4–3053)

    In telegram 111 to Vientiane (2039 to Washington), Apr. 30, McClintock transmitted the following response: “I fully concur your view non-utility of seeing King. … However, trust you will continue impress on Savang great importance our government attaches to royal family remaining out of Communist hands. By ‘royal family’ I mean also Savang. It would be most unfortunate if he should be used as Communist tool.” (751J.11/4–3053)

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