751J.5/4–2453: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
1994. Department pass Moscow, Rangoon; sent priority Paris 303 for the Secretary, repeated Department 1994, London 22, Moscow 1, Bangkok 74, Rangoon 16, Singapore 45, Vientiane, Hanoi, Taipei unnumbered. Will make later recommendations re Paris telegram 224, repeated Department 5644, April 23.1 Present telegram is concerned with political problem which we face following, as I expect, fall of Luang Prabang to advancing Viet Minh forces.
Vientiane’s 31 to Department, repeated Saigon 174, Paris unnumbered April 232 indicates that Gautier, Salan, and Crown Prince yesterday were to discuss question of whether France would sponsor protest to UN. Knowing Salan and Gautier, I am certain they will counsel against such a course.
My recommendation is that Secretary indicate firmly to French Government that it should present Laotian protest to Security Council. US should support but not sponsor resolution. Although UN action will not prevent successful Viet Minh military operations, reference of invasion to SC will present two alternatives, either of which may be to our political advantage:
- 1.
- If USSR vetoes SC resolution, onus for lack of action re invasion of Laos will fall on Soviets.
- 2.
- If USSR abstains, Chinese Commies may feel their present move in SEA does not have Soviet backing.
If Western Powers fail to make an issue of Laotian invasion, it seems inevitable that such countries as Siam and Burma (cf Bangkok’s 2080, April 22)2 will feel that present threat to SEA is of little concern to West. Furthermore, failure to take cognizance of Laotian invasion in as wide a frame of reference as possible would tacitly accept contention of Viet Minh forces that they are fighting a civil war for “liberation” of peoples held in yoke by French imperialism. We ourselves did not accept North Korean thesis of civil war against South Koreans and it seems difficult to understand how a similar contention could be allowed to pass here.
In light of methodical advance preparations which characterize Viet Minh military operations, I doubt if present attack on Laos was something thought up at last moment by Commies. However, it has immense potentiality in establishing a secure base for further subversive activity throughout SEA, and Chinese Commies will see advantages so far as their internal position is concerned in an easy [Page 492] victory in SEA which might offset any concessions which might have to be made in connection with a Korean armistice. Obverse of medal is that Chinese by successes gained this area could build up potential concessions to trade off with west re Korean armistice or general settlement Far Eastern Affairs.