Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

State-JCS meetings, lot 61 D 417

Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting at the Pentagon Building, April 24, 1953, 11 a.m.¹

top secret

Washington, April 24, 1953, 11 a.m.

Present

• General Collins
• General Vandenberg
• Admiral Fechteler
• General Ruffner²
• General White
• Admiral Fife³
• Colonel Carns
• Admiral Duncan
• Mr. Paul H. Nitze
• Mr. Walter Robertson
• Mr. U. A. Johnson
• Mr. Frederick E. Nolting
• Mr. J. Chase
• Mr. Charles C. Stelle
• CIA
• Mr. Allen Dulles⁴
• General Cabell⁵
• NSC
• Mr. S. Everett Gleason
• General Gerhard [Gerhart]
• For the Indochina discussion:
• Mr. Heath
• Mr. Bonsal
• Mr. Gullion⁶

. . . . . . .

Indochina

Mr. Nitze: On Indochina we thought that it would be helpful if we could get clear on how the comments you have already made on the LeTourneau Plan stand up in the light of the recent developments in Laos.

General Vandenberg: I think that the situation in Laos serves to emphasize our comments. The JCS have the feeling on the LeTourneau Plan and on the situation in Indochina that the French have not really been taking the native people into their confidence. They don’t seem to trust the native forces enough to want to use them in large units and they only plan on using the native forces in very small units. Their strategy has been completely defensive and called for merely local actions by small units. The French have known about the possibility of this Laos attack for a long time and they have done and are doing nothing to stop it. In the plan they have presented they want to start where it is easy, in the South, and they don’t seem to want to go after main enemy supply lines and main concentration of enemy forces, which are in the North. The whole French position seems to be a defensive one and one of not really wanting to fight the war to a conclusion. I feel that if the French keep on in this manner, we will be pouring money down a rathole. There have been some funny things going on in Indochina. The French request for C–119’s hasn’t been made through our MAAG. Our officers are not invited to witness operations and their advice is neither wanted nor accepted.

Mr. Nitze: Our question was directed primarily at what was meant in your evaluation of the plan when you said that it was “workable”. We wanted to know whether you thought it was workable in the sense that it would get us over the hump in a military way or whether you thought that it could be carried out but you were making no estimate as to the actual probable results.

General Vandenberg: We have listed our reservations to the plan and I think what we had in mind was that if the French did a lot of other things, at the same time there might be some slight chance of success in what they are proposing. It is very difficult for us to say whether the French Plan will actually succeed or not.

General Collins: It is difficult for us here in Washington without the detailed knowledge of the situation which the French have in the field to say that a French plan will or will not work.

Ambassador Heath: There is one point that I think should be made with respect to what General Vandenberg has said. I don’t think it is fair to say that the French are plotting to hold back the natives and not let them get ahead too fast and that is the reason why they are not planning to use large native units. That might possibly have been the case two years ago, but I don’t think we can say that is the case now.

General Vandenberg: One thing that is difficult for me to understand is that the people in Southeast Asia are certainly no poorer fighting material than the South Koreans were. We have had real success in training South Koreans rapidly. We feel that it is difficult to develop successful leaders if you restrict them to small unit operations.

General Collins: How are the French going to find out if the natives can develop leadership if they don’t give them a chance to gain experience? I personally have been shocked by the last message⁷ that has come in from Linares. It seems to me that it seems to carry all the earmarks of a message by a man who admits defeat and thinks there is nothing he can do about it.

Mr. Nitze: It is true that the political situation in Indochina is not really comparable to that in Korea. The French have to be concerned not only about the military capability of the native forces but also about their loyalty to the French.

Mr. Robertson: From this discussion it seems to me that the message which went to Paris on your evaluation of the Letourneau Plan is somewhat ambiguous.⁸ That message says that the plan is workable and although it lists your reservations, gives the general impression that you approve of the plan. Your discussion here doesn’t give that impression.

General Vandenberg: We can’t say from here that the plan is workable. If pressure were applied to the French to carry out the reservations that we pose and if they should carry them out, then the plan might work.

Mr. Robertson: Our Secretary has made the point that it is very difficult to apply effective pressure on a government which is in as weak a political situation as the French Government is. Pressure on a government will only get effective results if the government that we apply pressure on is in a position to get things done.

General Vandenberg: It seems to me that it may not be necessary to go about it in such a way as to apply pressure to the whole French government. If your Secretary could talk to the French Minister of War and make our points to him, it might be that he could get the Minister of War to light a fire under the Chief of Staff in Indochina or maybe if necessary to relieve him and get a more aggressive general out there.

General Collins: I think that we have had an experience which might illustrate the only way you can get the French to do things. We have urged them, for I don’t know how long, to send some of their people to Korea to see if they couldn’t get useful ideas of what we are doing and in the line of training. For a long time nobody came. Then Clark and I personally worked on Juin, using the fact that we were both personally acquainted with him and urging him to get some of the French in Indochina to come up and look things over in Korea. So finally they came, and from all we could tell they were enthusiastic with what they saw and what we were doing. Then they went back to Indochina and they dropped right back in the same old groove. They pointed out all sorts of differences between the Korean situation and the Indochina situation, and found a lot of reasons why they couldn’t do the things in Indochina which we are doing in Korea. The real truth is that they don’t do what we are doing in Korea in Indo-china because they really don’t want to. In my opinion General Salan is really a second rater. What they need out there is a man who is really a good general. In my thinking Guillaume⁹ is the type of man they need.

Ambassador Heath: The French have always leaned towards having a “tame” general in Indochina.

General Vandenberg: Why is that, Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador Heath: The French politicians want a man whom they think they can manage.

General Vandenberg: Doesn’t that really mean that the French haven’t given up all hopes of holding on to their position in Indochina.

Ambassador Heath: Yes, I think that is true.

General Vandenberg: Then in that case the natives can’t feel that they are fighting for themselves. They must feel that they are fighting only for the French.

Mr. Bonsal: We can’t make the picture too black and white. The practical elements of independence are actually being given to the Associated States. The basic decisions to arm the natives and to give the local governments authority have already been taken by the French. But the situation is that the enemy has had five years to train his army and to train his leaders. The French and we really only started two years ago to develop a native army. The enemy therefore has a considerable head start. Our present problem is the French have presented us with a plan. The question is how and through what channel are we going to convey our ideas to the French. And another question is what ideas should we present to them. There is, for example, the suggestion which Mayer made to the President—that we should assign some officers to Indochina to work with the French in the field of strategy and operational plans.

General Collins: We have a very able man out there now in Trapnell, but the French only permit him to be a supply officer and so far the French have never welcomed his suggestions. This is the first I have heard of the French proposal that we assign somebody to work with them on plans and operations and this is a brand new proposal.

Mr. Bonsal: I think we should decide how we are going to go further on this particular point with the French and also how we are going to give the French our evaluation of the plan that they have presented.

General Collins: I think we should be clear that we really have not been presented with a plan by the French. What we have been talking about is really what we got from an oral presentation which the French made while they were here.

Admiral Fechteler: Radford is in Indochina today. Should I relay to him what Mayer said to the President and ask for his ideas?

General Collins: My own feeling is that we should find out from the French in Paris how far the French are prepared to go and how much assistance they want in plans and training.

Ambassador Heath: Could I go back to your discussion of the type of leader that the French need in Indochina and ask if it should prove that Guillaume was unavailable or unacceptable, if you had any other French general in mind.

General Collins: Koenig¹⁰ is, from everything I hear, an able general, but Ridgway and our people in France would have a better basis for opinions on particular French generals than we do here.

General Vandenberg: We can’t pick a man for the French, but we should tell them what we think is required in the situation.

Mr. Nitze: In looking at the LeTourneau Plan we had the feeling for our part that with what we considered to be politically feasible both in Indochina and in France, there really weren’t too great prospects that this plan would achieve complete success, even in the limited objectives which it lays out. But then if you look at the alternative of what would happen if we should cut down our assistance to the French and at the various things that might happen, then it shapes up like a real defeat in Indochina. So we lean to the view that since the alternative is so bleak, we probably should go along and give this plan a try even though it may not achieve what the French are saying it might.

General Collins: By and large we agree that we should go along with this plan but we think we should first put the squeeze on the French to get them off their fannies.

Mr. Nitze: We have to realize that the political tools at our disposal in getting the French to achieve results are not as effective as they might be. With a weak French government it is not a simple matter of just telling the French what we think should be done and then expecting that the French would automatically get it done.

General Vandenberg: In our air force dealings with the French recently we just haven’t gotten the impression that the French were acting towards us the way we would expect an Ally to act. I have here a long list which our people have gotten together of ways in which the French have failed to cooperate all over the world. (At this point General Vandenberg read a lengthy list of what he characterized as French failures to assist U.S. air force operations which included such things as French failure to lift troop ceilings for U.S. forces in Morocco, French delays in negotiating air base agreements in various places, French refusal to have certain types of U.S. military personnel in Algeria, French refusal to permit deployment of AC and TAC formations in various places in Africa, French failure to agree on various POL supply facilities, French refusal to supply overhaul facilities in Indochina, etc.)¹¹ All of these things amount, I think, to a general indictment of the way in which the French are working with us.

Mr. Robertson: What specifically do you propose that we do?

General Vandenberg: I think that State should set up a high level conference with the French at which we would have both political and military people and talk turkey to them about what we think they should do in Indochina.

Mr. Bonsal: What do you have in mind when you say we should talk turkey to them.

General Vandenberg: I think we should tell them what we think is required in the way of leadership and training and in general point out the reservations that we have spelled out in our evaluation of the LeTourneau Plan.

Mr. Bonsal: Can we say to the French that we think Salan and Linares are second-raters?

General Collins: We will have to talk frankly to the French although we may not need to name names. After all, we are pouring a lot of money into Indochina.

Mr. Robertson: One point we haven’t discussed is where the money is coming from.

General Vandenberg: I suppose it will come out of MDAP.

Mr. Robertson: I think in view of General Vandenberg’s comment that we would be pouring money down a rathole, and since we obviously don’t want to pour money down a rathole, we must figure out how best we can realistically carry out the implementation of the Chiefs proposal, that we try to get the French to do the things that the Chiefs think need to be done.

Ambassador Heath: There is one more problem that I think we should explore. The French say that they can’t raise some of their ceilings on personnel or equipment in Indochina because of their obligations in Europe under NATO. What do we feel would be the relative priority of Indochina and NATO if there is a conflict in requirements.

Mr. Nitze: We might put the question even more dramatically by assuming that the French were prepared to send two French Divisions to Indochina. This would obviously conflict with their NATO buildup. What would be your attitude on the question of sending two French Divisions to Indochina?

General Vandenberg: My own opinion is that France is the keystone of NATO. If the French don’t get into shape to provide forces that they should provide under NATO, we would have to assess NATO as a failure. I think that while this Indochina situation goes on the French will not be able to get themselves into shape to function as the keystone of NATO, so I think the Indochina thing has to be settled before NATO will work. I personally would send the French Divisions to Indochina.

General Collins: The forces presently available in France are 18 month conscriptees and they wouldn’t be worth much in Indochina. The French would have to change their conscription law.

Mr. Nitze: If we were to propose this the French would be, in effect, nationalizing the Indochina war. We would run the risk that the French might prefer to withdraw from Indochina rather than to greatly expand their role in the hostilities.

General Collins: Personally I don’t think the French would withdraw.

Mr. Bonsal: Don’t we have to consider that if things go on very much longer in the present way we may face the situation in which even without a French decision to withdraw there will be for all practical purposes a necessity for the French to pull out as best they can. The actual French troops in Indochina amount to only some one-eighth of the native forces which oppose them. If the military situation doesn’t improve we may find the natives on our side beginning to lose faith in their prospects and eventually joining up with the other side against the French. If that were to happen, the French wouldn’t have to make any decision to give up Indochina. The decision would, in effect, have been made for them.

General Ruffner: Might I say that it seems to me that when Letourneau and the French presented their plan it was really more in the form of a justification for the additional equipment and assistance that they were asking for than it was an invitation for us to come into their planning.

Mr. Bonsal: I do think they have given us more of a picture of what they think they are going to try and do than they have in the past. And also, there is Mayer’s suggestion to the President that we assign officers to Indochina for strategic and operational studies.

General Collins: Today was the first I had heard of Mayer’s statement. If the French really mean this my own feeling would be that we shouldn’t send out a new man but that we should expand Trapnell’s charter and then give him some staff assistance.

Mr. Nitze: How should we go forward from here?

General Collins: It would seem to me that we can’t really go forward until after your Secretary has returned from Paris. Why don’t you have a session with your Secretary after he gets back and then we might have a further talk as to how best we should proceed.¹²

. . . . . . .

1. This State Department draft was not cleared with the participants.
2. Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
3. Vice Adm. James Fife, U.S. Naval Deputy Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean, who had served as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations), August 1951–March 1953.
4. Director of Central Intelligence.
5. Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; Director of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 1951–April 1953.
6. Edmund A. Gullion, member of the Policy Planning Staff; Counselor of the Legation at Saigon, 1950–1952.
7. Not Identified.
8. The message has not been identified. For the message sent after this meeting, see Tosec 9, Apr. 24, p. 503.
9. General of the Army Augustin Guillaume, French Resident-General in Morocco; Commander in Chief of French Forces in Germany, 1948–1951.
10. General of the Army Pierre Koenig, Member of the National Assembly; Commander of French Forces in Germany, 1945–1948.
11. The list does not accompany the source text.
12. Indochina was considered further at the State—JCS meeting of May 1, particularly the question of influencing the situation through the appointment of a new commander for French forces. The exchange of views was inconclusive. The substance of discussion of the meeting is in State—JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417.