Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 152
United States Minutes of United States–French Conversations, First Session, at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, April 22, 1953, 3:30 p.m.1
Present:
- French—MM. Bidault, Pleven, Bourges-Maunoury, Letourneau, Maurice Schumann, Alphand and adviser
- U.S.—Messrs. Dulles, Wilson, Humphrey, Stassen, Dillon, Draper2 and advisers.
[Here follows discussion of French rearmament and problems concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.]
The Secretary believed continuance of substantial economic aid to France will have to take the form of assistance to the prosecution of the Indochina war under some kind of program which our military people can tell our Congress seems to make sense and holds promise of a satisfactory outcome, perhaps in a couple of years.
The JCS had reported that the reaction from French visits to Korea was not very satisfactory, that nothing we were doing there could be used. We were not surprised about that initial reaction because it took our own people in Korea a very long time to realize the capabilities of the South Koreans. There is a tendency to minimize those capabilities. The problem is to some extent political as well as military. For instance, while decisions at a high level are taken in Paris regarding the Associated States, implementation or interpretation in the local light may be in a different spirit, in a community which has so long been in colonial status and where certain relations have been established between white and colored people. For instance, social relations may be lacking and some people not admitted to certain clubs. As far as implementing those decisions in the field is concerned, and the relations with the local people, we realize that we have a similar problem in our south for which we have not always found a solution.
It is not easy, but before the U.S. can give any commitment even as far as the Executive is concerned, we would like to feel that we have answers, or at least observations a) allowing us to picture our help honorably and fairly as not merely economic aid but as aid which has a particular purpose, and b) constituting a program which we [Page 484] could say from the political standpoint is one which has a fair chance of success in changing the rather gloomy aspect of the affair at the present time. With a program for Indochina on a joint political-military basis it is possible to get our Congress to make a substantial contribution. Our own Congress is desperately anxious to reduce taxes. Taxes are being cut in Britain and in Canada and everybody says we should do the same. Cutting down governmental income means a still larger deficit. Any further aid must therefore be presented in an extremely effective and appealing way to get it through. There is a realization of the critically important role that the French play. “You help us to help you.” We have explained ways in which that could be done.
Mr. Wilson said that we notice in Korea that by training the Koreans we give them confidence and faith, a feeling of unity and competence that they can go on their own, that really gets the people together. Also, he was sure the French look forward to the day when it will not be necessary to have so many troops from France over there. He thought the French wanted them to be strong enough to keep the country free and be part of the spirit of French influence but did not want to have French troops there forever in large numbers. If those people can strengthen themselves they cannot only meet the present emergency but also take care of themselves.
M. Letourneau recalled the time he had spent at the Pentagon to explain the program and the conditions for its realization. He had said at that time that one cannot seriously doubt—even though it is being done—the will of France as regards the freedom of Vietnam and the constitution of national armies since they had been doing it for three years. The plan has been pushed so that French troops can be reduced but also to get the states themselves to develop a national sentiment that will allow them to face local difficulties as soon as possible. Complete withdrawal of the French is not involved. General Clark, when he came to [from?] Korea, was very proud of his Korean army but said that if the U.S. left Korea it would all disappear. Therefore, he wishes to maintain the U.S. effort in Korea just like the French in Indochina. It is true that the Laotian affair involves a singular aggravation. An operational plan had been given to the Pentagon, including certain inevitable risks. Within 2½ years, as President Eisenhower has said, it would allow us to arrive at a situation where the picture would be reversed although it would not mean complete victory. That plan is essentially based on the development of national armies. It requires for its solution finances, cadres and rapid training of units.
The French missions which have been received in Korea were very useful. Marshal Juin himself has brought back information that the [Page 485] French propose to use in the formation of the Vietnam army. But the problem is not the same in Indochina as in Korea. The problems facing the two armies are not comparable, but some lessons can be applied.
M. Letourneau did not believe that Saigon headquarters can be fairly accused of not entirely applying the political policies of Paris. The French have no reason to fear that the Vietnam government would be more demanding when they have an army. Their exigencies are not worrisome since the Vietnam government cannot pursue any other policy. He said he had not many ways of showing good faith and the good faith of his subordinates except perhaps to submit to a lie detector, which would not be customary. As to racial discrimination, the question of clubs, the problem has never arisen in Indochina as in other colonies because there has always been close touch between local and French families. The problem arises even less now that there is a Vietnamese government. There may be individual cases, but one cannot draw conclusions from them about the good faith of the French. The French generals are not more stupid than other generals, and they want victories and know that their only hope are the native armies, and the key to that is confidence in and fairness to the Vietnamese.
He had the feeling that the operational plan discussed in Washington seemed convincing to the people he saw there and that not much else could be done. The solution seemed reasonable and if the plan were put into effect the only problem would be financial. It was felt that Congress would find it acceptable. It remains capable of execution even today. The Laos affair is unpleasant but it should not interfere with the development of the Vietnamese forces.
[Here follows discussion of aid to France in general.]
Secretary Dulles … said it would be the hope of the Executive Branch of the U.S. government—we can at the present time speak only of recommendations to Congress—that if there is a program for Indochina which has the endorsement of our military advisers, which has a chance of success, would propose a figure comparable to $525 million for this year and there are circumstances where we might possibly increase that a little bit. However, that would have to be a program where we could in effect say to Congress: This program has enough chance of success that if you invest a certain amount for a certain time, it will largely clear up the situation—not, as M. Letourneau has pointed out, in terms of actual victory but by reducing the dimensions similar to those in Malaya or with the Huks in the Philippines. Then there was the question whether we do that if the French reduce their over-all military expenditure. That would mean that we assume a larger percentage of the total rather than an increase. Some slight adjustment [Page 486] may not be impossible but we felt that it would not be very practicable to do that on a scale that our people felt the French had run out and we were holding the bag.
(Complimentary exchanges and a rather hurried close in view of the scheduled U.S.-British bilaterals. It was agreed that if the French desired the remaining agenda items could be covered in a subsequent meeting.)3
- Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of Defense Wilson, Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, and Mutual Security Director Stassen were at Paris for the 11th Session of the North Atlantic Council, Apr. 23–25. While in Paris, they participated in bipartite and tripartite conversations with their French and British counterparts on a variety of subjects of common concern. For documentation on the Council session and the meetings with British and French officials during the same period, see volume v.↩
- William H. Draper, U.S. Special Representative in Europe, Mutual Security Agency.↩
- For extracts from the U.S. record of the second U.S.–French meeting, Apr. 26, see p. 507.↩