751G.00/4–2253
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
Subject:
- Effect of Possible Korean Armistice on Situation in Indochina2
If an armistice is achieved in Korea it will be due primarily to the show of effective strength there by the United States with a certain amount of backing from the United Nations. The cost in men and matériel to the Chinese Communists and to the North Koreans and in matériel to the Soviet Union has been heavy and presumably very influential if not conclusive in the decision to proceed toward an armistice.
These factors are not operative in Indochina. Franco-Vietnamese strength has not in the past few months increased its pressure on the Viet Minh with its wholly native force of at least 350,000; on the contrary the latter have maintained and pursued the initiative since October, 1952. The enemy is now invading Laos after having seized the Thai country last fall. There is no manpower drain on the Soviet Union or on the Chinese Communists. The cost in matériel to the Communist world of the struggle is relatively slight, particularly in comparison with the effort being made by France and the United States. And United Nations interest in and potential support of the free world side in Indochina would hardly be impressive if the issue were raised in the UN.
Therefore, the reasoning of the enemy regarding Indochina will be quite different from that he seems to be applying to Korea. There can be no interest in Moscow or Peking in a cessation of hostilities except [Page 487] on conditions which will result immediately or in the short term in the removal of French military power from Indochina and in control of the country by a government or governments which would be a part of the Communist world. This reasoning, of course, would be modified if the enemy thought there was a probability that in the near future the strength of our side would be materially increased; presumably he has no more evidence than we of such a possibility. He will at least reserve his judgment as to whether our side can develop sufficient effective native forces to alter the military equation.
On the basis of the above summary analysis the probabilities in Indochina in the event of an armistice in Korea would seem to be the following:
- (1)
- A continuation and possibly to some extent an intensification of assistance in arms, equipment, training and advice to the Viet Minh from Communist China. (There are limits imposed by transportation routes, terrain and capabilities of the Viet Minh.)
- (2)
- A continued absence of overt Chinese intervention or of enemy air. (There is no reason in the present military and political situation why the enemy should run the risk of free world counteraction against Communist China or even of UN complications.)
- (3)
- The Soviet and the Chinese Communists will presumably turn a deaf ear to any attempt to engage them in any discussion of the situation in Indochina unless they believe the Viet Minh is in jeopardy. They have no reason to think so at present.
- (4)
- An offer by the Viet Minh, heavily bolstered with propaganda lures and threats (for local consumption) of a cease fire to be followed by democratic processes and by the departure of foreign troops may be anticipated. Peace after over six years of war is attractive to Frenchmen and to Vietnamese—particularly in the absence of any convincing prospect of military progress on our side. And the power of decision as to how long and under what conditions the struggle will continue is no longer exclusively in the not too aggressive hands of the French; the creation and development of the Vietnamese National Army and the increased control thereof exercised by the Vietnamese Government give to Bao Dai and to Tam an increased share in the decision of peace or war. Such an armistice offer would certainly at least complicate the military effort and the political situation on our side.
The above emphasizes, if any emphasis were needed, the fact that the free world position in Indochina is highly vulnerable and would become more vulnerable in the event of an armistice in Korea. The French and ourselves can survey the course of events of the past six years; we at least can see plenty of occasions on which the French could have behaved more effectively. But we are today confronted with six or eight enemy divisions the movements of which our side seems unable to control beyond interdicting them from more than a rather heavy penetration of the Tonkin Delta (i.e., Hanoi and Haiphong at least seem safe).