Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/4–2953

The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Counselor (MacArthur)¹

personal and secret

Saigon, April 21, 1953.

Dear Doug: I was glad to get your letter of April 10² with its suggestion that despite the remote situation of Indochina, people in the Department knew where it was and in fact were devoting considerable attention to the development of the war here. I also note that the Department was a bit taken aback by the magnitude of the bill which M. Letourneau submitted, particularly since much of his statement of account was exclusive of hardware.

Very few of us who have watched the course of the war in Indochina closely are satisfied with the progress made. However, undeniably the situation is infinitely better in Vietnam than it was a few years ago. As you will see from the enclosed copy of my letter of April 10 to Frank Nash, we are in the position of trying to steer a sane middle course between undue pessimism and unjustified optimism. This requires some dexterity. On balance, as I wrote to Frank, it seems to me that a large program of aid for Indochina is fully justified and can be made to bear fruit, provided that we can exercise a sufficient amount of control and leadership to see that the hardware and actual budgetary investment are properly used and made to pay dividends.

I must confess that I am unhappy at the vague outline of the vague strategic plan which M. Letourneau presented during the Washington talks last month. Two years to wait for victory in a war which is already seven years old seems a long time; while the strategy outlined of pushing the enemy forces back against the Chinese border from which support comes does not seem to me to be the way in which to wipe out the Viet Minh war power. I believe that General Trapnell and our other military experts would prefer a more audacious war plan with the possibility of cutting across presently extended Viet Minh positions and severing the Viet Minh LOC with the Chinese base. However, the French commanders follow a Fabian policy and seem content, at least under the present High Command, to sit in well-fortified strong points and hope that the enemy will attack them where they are strongest. This, of course, no intelligent enemy commander is going to do.

I have gone thus into detail about certain aspects of the military problem because I have the conviction that this year only do we have an unusual opportunity to tell our French friends very frankly what we think is lacking in their strategic concept and what we think ought to be done by them if they are to receive that added U.S. assistance for which they have asked. The new administration has every right to say that it needs to take a new look at the Indochina war and every right to demand that new conditions be met. However, next year the case will not be the same as by that time, through whatever arrangements we have agreed upon this year, we will have given at least tacit and perhaps overt approval to the war plan for Indochina. Accordingly, if we want to speak frankly, boldly, and of course always in a constructive spirit, the time is now.

I feel that I am talking to the converted in this respect, because I see in the Secretary’s great speech on foreign policy to the American Society of Newspaper Editors,³ which arrived in yesterday’s radio bulletin, that he has said we would be favorably disposed to giving increased military and financial assistance to plans which are “realistically designed” to end this war.⁴ Only realism will justify the increased assistance which it is in our power to give.

I am sending a copy of this too-lengthy screed to Frank Nash and the two Phils—Bonsal and Sprouse—and presume that when Don Heath gets back from his well-earned holiday either you or Phil Bonsal will show it to him.

With kindest regards, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

Rob

[Enclosure]

The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash)

secret and personal

Saigon, April 10, 1953.

Dear Frank: I hope you are no more surprised than I am at the Saigon dateline. This certainly is a contrast to my recent concerns with the military and political situation in the Middle East, but I must say that in trading a revolution for a war I find myself in an exceedingly interesting spot. As you no doubt learned from Don Heath when he was back in Washington for consultation in the recent talks with the French Prime Minister and his colleagues, the Department rushed me out here to remain in charge of the Embassy while the Ambassador was back in the States, and thus yours truly remains the boy on the burning deck and still very much at your service.

I have been a little concerned in recent weeks to see that some of the military reporting on the posture of affairs in Indochina is distinctly on the pessimistic side. One of the most recent of our distinguished military visitors, Gen. “Iron Mike” O’Daniel, in fact sent off a Top Secret message to Admiral Radford (OARMA Saigon MC–69–53)⁵ in which he strongly criticized the French and Vietnamese tactical organizations, the alleged weakness of the French High Command, and the antiquated methods (in his view) which are being used here in fighting the Communist Viet Minh. I was also shown yesterday a Top Secret despatch from our Naval Attaché to ONI,⁶ which conveys the general impression that the French themselves have no particular desire to win the war in Indochina.

I believe that these reports, although sent with every good intention in the world, are misleading. Certainly no one could be more impatient than Ambassador Heath, General Trapnell, or myself to see our French and Vietnamese allies get on with terminating hostilities in Indochina with a resounding defeat of the Communists. However, in this strange conflict, haste is made slowly. If we are to be able to utilize native energies for the liberation of Vietnam, we must keep in mind that the Vietnamese Army per se did not exist until de Lattre called it into being on a shoestring only a scant two years ago. Much progress has, however, been made in creating new formations, and I think that once the new battalions are blooded and their officers and NCO’s have had combat experience, we may look with ever increasing confidence to a good performance in the future.

The French commanders as soldiers are, of course, not happy with the posture in which they find themselves. They are compelled to spend an inordinate amount of military manpower on merely maintaining their LOC and mounting guard on such areas of the country as are vital to the maintenance of a war base in Vietnam. However, once new native battalions have been trained, there should be no reason why the guard duty could not be taken over by the Vietnamese themselves, thus releasing the French Union professional forces for that war of maneuver which alone can beat the Viet Minh on their own ground.

This is a rather long-winded way of saying that, although perfection has not been attained in Indochina, the situation is not in my opinion as gloomy as some of these recent military reports would suggest. For my part, I am willing to venture that, if you can give us the arms, we can assure Washington that both the French and the Vietnamese will use them with ever increasing effect until the day comes that the free world forces will chalk up a victory in Indochina against international Communism.

Best regards, plus,

Cheers,

Robert McClintock

1. This letter and its enclosure were transmitted by MacArthur to Secretary Dulles for background reading. However, a handwritten notation on MacArthur’s note of transmittal by Roderic L. O’Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary, indicates that Dulles did not see this material prior to his departure for Europe on Apr. 21.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. On Apr. 18, Secretary Dulles delivered an address titled “The First 90 Days” before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington. The speech was broadcast on network radio and television. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 603–608.
4. The passage under reference read as follows: “In relation to Indochina, the French Government and the Associated States have been told that we would be favorably disposed to giving increased military and financial assistance to plans realistically designed to suppress the Communist-inspired civil war, which for 6 years has wracked the area and seriously drained the metropolitan resources of France.”
5. Not printed.
6. Not identified.