Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 141
Discussion Paper for United States-French Political Conversations, Washington, March 19531
FTP D–4/1
Discussion Paper on Indochina
u.s. objectives
The US objective is to obtain a clearer idea of French intentions and capabilities in Indochina. We would hope to ascertain how Franco-Vietnamese military plans and such additional US aid as it may be possible to contemplate can be combined so as to bring about within the next 24 months a defeat or at least a serious decrease in the effectiveness of the regular Viet Minh divisions in Tonkin. (It is recognized that the problem is not wholly military but that political factors particularly those relating to the Vietnamese concept of French intentions and capabilities are highly important.) We will not achieve this objective in toto at these conversations.
french position
The French Ministers may be expected to discuss recent developments in Indochina. They will recognize that results have been insufficient but they will state that the development of national armies particularly in Viet Nam will guarantee improvement. They will express the confident hope that within the next 15 to 18 months control of the entire south can be regained and a real offensive mounted in the north.
The French will state that they will require additional aid if these results are to be achieved. We do not know what their request will be. They will endeavor to transfer to us as much as possible of the burden on the French budget of the conduct of operations in Indochina. They may suggest modifications in the MSA Act to make this feasible.
[Page 424]position to be presented
The US should express understanding and admiration for the effort made by the French over the past seven years in Indochina and great satisfaction at the increased momentum being given to formation of national armies. The US should express willingness to study any stated request for US aid both budget-supporting and in end-items provided the necessary approval of Congress can be obtained but will be unable at this time to make an over-all commitment (see paper on US Aid to France).2 The US should stress, however, the necessity for the development by the French of an over-all strategic concept for the aggressive prosecution of hostilities in Indochina which would enable responsible US officials in the Departments of State, MSA and Defense to advocate continued and additional financial support for the Franco-Vietnamese effort in Indochina. The US would hope that the French would propose to us methods for achieving a common understanding as to future operations and as to the analysis of results of past operations in Indochina. The US should emphasize of course that there is no thought on our part of participating in either the planning of operations or in responsibility for their execution.
discussion
The following notes are designed to assist in the discussion by the US delegation of certain aspects of the Indochina situation.
Need for Over-all Strategic Plan. What is desired here is a plan which would specify the military capabilities and actions required to achieve our objective—the defeat or at least a serious decrease in the effectiveness of the regular Viet Minh divisions in Tonkin. Since, in 1950–1951, the Franco-Vietnamese troops successfully defeated a major enemy attempt to seize control of the entire Delta, the military situation has not developed satisfactorily for our side. The 1952–1953 campaign has been a disappointment. There had been high hopes of effective offensive operations by our side. At the French request, we helped make it possible temporarily to double the transport aircraft (C–47) available to the French High Command with the idea that the total of 100 C–47s thus provided would make possible important parachute drops as part of an offensive campaign to seek out and destroy enemy forces and supplies. Instead the enemy seized the initiative, overrunning the Thai country, and, while the added transport planes were of vital help in providing an air lift to beleaguered French positions and while the French obtained a brilliant defensive success at [Page 425] Na San, present indications seem to point at further enemy initiatives rather than at any important offensive activity by our side in the immediate future. (We are not at present, however, aware of specific French planning.)
We have been impressed with the apparent insufficiency of combat-worthy mobile reserves on our side. Actual and planned increases in native forces should help to supply these needs either directly or indirectly by releasing high quality combat troops now pinned down in static defense or internal security activities. Whether total requirements will require the French to furnish fresh troops from outside the area beyond currently planned replacements is unknown at present.
Chinese Communist potential. French political and military leaders have occasionally indicated to us their fear that, if the Viet Minh appeared on the verge of defeat as a result of a Franco-Vietnamese offensive, the Chinese Communists might decide on a massive invasion of Tonkin perhaps under the “volunteer” disguise and certainly with extensive air support. There is some reason to believe that this thought has been one of the factors which has led the French Government to envisage an indecisive conduct of operations. It would be most helpful if the French Ministers can depart from their conversations in Washington convinced that they are participating in an over-all Far Eastern policy which will contain Communist China and deter aggression from Communist China. Under present conditions the French share in this program would be the defeat of the Viet Minh as a demonstration of the free world ability to meet aggression with effective force.
Economic Factors. We would hope in the forthcoming discussions to arrange for talks on various economic matters in which DMS and MSA would participate. Among these are two major matters on which it would be helpful to secure current French views. We have been encouraged at the recent increase in Vietnamese financial contribution to the war effort but it is generally believed that the residents of Viet-Nam, including French businessmen, could make an even greater contribution. In the second place, the artificial rate of exchange between the franc and piaster increases the burden upon the French budget of conducting the war in Indochina. There are factors of both an economic and a political nature which bear upon both of these problems and they are probably not susceptible to an easy clear-cut solution. We should explore French views indicating our concern particularly in view of the fact that these two items apparently increase the total burden currently carried by the French and the American taxpayer in Indochina. (The apparent French hope to increase our share of the Indochina burden makes particularly advisable direct participation by us in the consideration of these two matters.)
[Page 426]Political Factors. We should ask the French for an appraisal of political progress in Viet-Nam and in the other Associated States with particular reference to evolution toward the assumption of greater responsibility in all fields by the Associated States. We should express an interest in the proposed reorganization of French administration and representation in Indochina in order more closely to accord with the status of the Associated States as sovereign members of the French Union.
United States Relations with the Associated States. When M. Letourneau was here in June 1952, a special meeting was held at which the Ambassadors of Cambodia and Vietnam were present in order to receive a report on French–United States conversations affecting them. We have had indications from the Vietnamese Ambassador here that he regards a more effective participation as desirable. On the other hand, Bao Dai has stated that he does not want a participation which would put his country in the light of a mere appendage to the French delegation. At the same time, effective Vietnamese independence and the assumption of independent responsibilities in the military field are increasing steadily. The question of how relations between the United States and Viet-Nam particularly in matters of military and financial aid are to be conducted may be expected to be a delicate one. It is a question on which we should urge our French friends to let us have their thinking and to give us some suggestions. We should avoid if possible being put in the position of taking any specific initiative. It would be most desirable for the French to make some workable suggestions before the Vietnamese bring pressure to bear on us.
- This paper, presumably drafted in the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, is one in a series of background papers prepared for the Mayer visit. This draft reflects the comments of and working level approval by an interdepartmental steering group headed by Ridgway B. Knight, Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, which coordinated the preparation of background material for the talks with Mayer. For additional documentation on these preparations, see volume vi.↩
- Several papers in the FPT D–2 series deal with the question of overall aid to France. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 141)↩