Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 138th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, March 25, 19531
eyes only
[Extracts]
Present at the 138th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United [Page 427] States;2 the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget;3 the Deputy Secretary of Defense (for Items 3 and 4);4 the Secretary of the Army5 (for Items 3 and 4); the Secretary of the Navy6 (for Items 3 and 4); the Secretary of the Air Force7 (for Items 3 and 4); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (for Items 3 and 4); the Chief of Naval Operations (for Items 3 and 4); the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force8 (for Items 3 and 4); the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps9 (for Items 3 and 4); Assistant Secretary of Defense Nash (for Items 3 and 4); Captain Paul L. de Vos, USN, Joint Chiefs of Staff (for Item 3); the Acting Director of Central Intelligence;10 the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;11 the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Planning;12 the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC;13 and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.
. . . . . . .
Secretary Dulles then went on to indicate that his problem regarding the French in Europe was bound up with Indo-China.14 It was beyond the capabilities of France to shoulder the load represented by its commitments in Europe and its commitments in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the forthcoming conversations must try to figure out a way to end the heavy drain, both military and economic, which Indo-China represented for France. Secretary Dulles indicated that he and other American officials would explore with the French visitors a program designed to bring about a situation in Indo-China which within a year or eighteen months would substantially reduce the strain on French human and material resources. Secretary Dulles did not expect [Page 428] to reach any final conclusions or to make any commitments during this visit, but it was a great opportunity, since we were dealing with a man in the person of Premier Mayer who was completely frank and wholly dedicated to our objectives in Europe.
Secretary Dulles then informed the Council that he had just come from a meeting with fourteen members of Congress.15 He gained the impression from this meeting that these Congressmen felt that if the American people could be given reason to believe that the difficulties in Indo-China will end by the French according Indo-China a real autonomy, and if a program could be devised giving real promise of military and political success in Indo-China, the Congress would at least be open-minded in its consideration of continued United States assistance to the French in Indo-China.
In response to Secretary Dulles’ remarks, the President said that two ideas immediately occurred to him. Would it not be advisable, he inquired, to arrange for Premier Mayer to speak to the American people on the radio or on TV, and give a full explanation of the French attitude and objectives in Indo-China? Such a speech could go far to counteract the familiar belief that the French desire to perpetuate colonialism in Indo-China. Mayer could explain the lively desire of the French to get out of Indo-China and the real reasons which prevented them from doing so at this stage in the hostilities.16
. . . . . . .
Mr. Wisner then went on to brief the Council on the difficult military situation in Indo-China, in the course of which he underscored the views of the Secretary of State as to the serious drain that the campaign there represented for the French.17 In the course of his briefing, Mr. Wisner noted the existence of two schools of thought on the Indo-China problem within the United States Government. One school insisted that there could be no improvement in the situation until military success had been achieved against the Communists. The other insisted that it was impossible to make any significant military progress until political improvements and a greater degree of autonomy for the native governments had been secured. The Central Intelligence Agency believed that this difference was sterile and missed the real point of the problem, which was that military and political progress must go along hand in hand.
. . . . . . .
- This record was prepared on Mar. 26 by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on the basis of his notes of the meeting. Similar records for almost all NSC meetings held during the Eisenhower administration exist at the Eisenhower Library. There is no evidence that the memoranda in this series were formally approved by the Council or circulated to its members on a regular basis. For additional extracts of this memorandum of discussion, see volume vi.↩
- Richard M. Nixon.↩
- Joseph M. Dodge.↩
- Roger M. Kyes. Items 3 and 4 concerned national security policy in general.↩
- Robert T. Stevens.↩
- Robert B. Anderson.↩
- Harold E. Talbott.↩
- Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg.↩
- Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.↩
- Frank G. Wisner.↩
- Robert Cutler.↩
- C. D. Jackson.↩
- James S. Lay, Jr.↩
- These remarks by Secretary Dulles were made in the context of discussion of the position of the United States in the forthcoming talks with the French Ministers in Washington.↩
- No record of the meeting under reference has been found in the Department of State files.↩
- The President’s second point dealt with a subject other than Indochina.↩
- These remarks were a portion of the comments made by Wisner on significant world developments affecting the security of the United States.↩