Office of the Historian

751G.5/3–2453: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State

top secret
Saigon, March 24, 1953—5 p.m.

1841. Repeated information Paris 260. Department pass Defense. Embassy telegram 1830 March 20. Following are high points of briefing given General Clark at Nam Dinh in Tonkin Delta by General De Linares and Colonel Nemo, Commander Franco–Vietnamese forces Southern sector delta:1

1.
Viet Minh in North has 5 divisions including 1 heavy division and 2 detached regiments on periphery around delta. Heavy division and 2 others lie immediately to North of French perimeter, while 2 other divisions, the 304th and 320th, lie West and South. Two detached regiments are on Yunnan border NNE of delta. Recent information indicates that positions of all 5 divisions are being shifted and that important advance dumps have been established in vicinity of Moc Chau. Meanwhile, Viet Minh has 3 regular regiments inside delta. Total Viet Minh forces comprise 88 battalions of regulars, plus 20 battalions of guerrilla formations.
2.
Franco–Vietnamese forces in same area total 85 battalions, but 60 battalions are immobilized in delta and in Nasan enclave. General De Linares said he had only 25 battalions available for maneuver made up of 8 paratroop battalions and 17 regular. He contrasted this [Page 422] meager corps of maneuver against enemy capacity of 45 battalions maneuver.
3.
General De Linares said there were three hypotheses as to enemy intentions in forthcoming campaign season:
(a)
An enveloping movement in North utilizing recently established new lines of communications from Yunnan which would strike at Northernmost French airfield at Lai Chau. This would place Viet Minh forces in contact with Thai elements. However, in light of recent shifting of Viet Minh divisions and establishment of forward dumps near Moe Chau, De Linares in last two weeks had decided reject this first assumption.
(b)
Second hypothesis was that enemy would strike almost due West from present positions of 320th and 304th divisions through Moc Chau to Laos. Viet Minh had capability to mount such an offensive both in respect of LOC and in advance supply arrangements.
(c)
Third possibility was that, after a feint in direction of Moc Chau, Viet Minh might attack Southern Delta in force through gap in French fortified line, which exists on Southeastern fringe of delta perimeter.
4.
Colonel Nemo, in explaining nature of delta warfare, said that struggle was carried out at two levels—”the asphalt and the mud.” French and Vietnamese control asphalt in daytime laboriously reopening lines of communications which were sealed at night, while Viet Minh in many areas control the mud, the inundated rice paddy.
5.

Over-all impression was that French and Vietnamese are bogged down in delta and that neither side can gain successful advantage there. Meanwhile, Viet Minh has military initiative and Franco–Vietnamese forces in North are merely on precariously held air strips or fortified hedge hog positions in territory completely dominated by Viet Minh.

Situation may change in delta if and when proposed 54 commando battalions of Vietnamese Army are trained and are able to operate in delta, thus relieving regular French and Vietnamese battalions for offensive operations. However, there is no sign of this as yet.

6.
General Clark will formulate his recommendations for possible United States military assistance upon his return to Tokyo. His preliminary thinking, however, is to recommend that United States if possible, supply sufficient helicopters to enable airlift of 1 battalion. A helicopter transport capability in General Clark’s view is ideally suited to conditions of lake and island warfare which characterize delta hostilities and isolated French-held air strips in interior. General Clark likewise hopes to be able to release C–47 aircraft to increase Franco–Vietnamese transport capability, but said to me that he did [Page 423] not think they could be made available before mid-April (Paris telegram 5169 March 21 repeated Saigon 203 refers).2

McClintock
  1. Further information on this briefing was transmitted to Washington by the Embassy in despatch 409, Mar. 26. (751G.5/3–2653)↩
  2. The reference telegram is described in footnote 1, p. 389.↩