790.5/11–1954

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)1

secret

Subject:

  • Preparation for Cooperative Action under Article II and Article IV, Paragraph 2, of the Manila Pact
1.
In accordance with Mr. MacArthur’s memorandum to you of October 25 (Tab A),2 and your instructions of November 13,3 a Departmental [Page 983] working group has been meeting to prepare recommendations with regard to cooperation under the Manila Pact in combatting communist subversion. The working group has taken account of the fact that the Department has supported a Thai suggestion that a meeting be held in Bangkok, possibly in January, on a foreign ministers level (Tab B).4
2.
The working group has agreed that it is of the utmost importance that the United States demonstrate, particularly to the Asian members of the Manila Pact, U.S. interest in the Pact and U.S. intention to participate in the Pact in such a way that benefit will flow to all the members. The working group believes that cooperation in a program to counter communist subversion in the Treaty area under Articles II and IV, 2 of the Treaty could contribute importantly to convincing the Asian members that the U.S. is deeply interested in their problems and in increasing the value of the Pact to them.
3.
The working group has prepared recommendations regarding possible organization both within the U.S. Government and with the other members of the Pact for carrying out a program of countering communist subversion (Tab C). The working group has also prepared a tentative outline of the type of activities that might be undertaken in such a program (Tab D).
4.
The working group recommends that an inter-Departmental working group chaired by State and with representatives from Defense and CIA be constituted as soon as possible to consider these recommendations.

[Tab C]

Organization for Cooperative Action Under Articles II and IV, 2 of the Manila Pact5

1. Multilateral Organization

There should be set up in the territory of one of the Asian members of the Pact a Working Group consisting of a National Representative of each of the members assisted by such small international secretariat as may be required to prepare, circulate and file documents, and minutes of meetings. It would be contemplated that each National Representative on the Working Group would devote his full time to this matter. Such Representatives, with the exception of the Representative of the host country, could be attached [Page 984] to their respective diplomatic missions for administrative support.

It would be envisaged that it would remain the primary responsibility of the national authorities of each member to take action within their respective countries against communist subversion and that the role of the other members would be to support and cooperate with the efforts of such national authority. When the National Representative of a country reports to the Working Group his country’s need for assistance in a given field, as for instance information on training of police authorities, the other National Representatives might be asked to extend assistance in those fields in accordance with the capabilities of their respective authorities.

2. U.S. Government Machinery

As a means of back-stopping the U.S. Representatives on the Working Group mentioned above, it is recommended that a Committee consisting of a representative each of State, Defense, and CIA be set up in Washington. It would be the function of this Committee to furnish ideas and other support to the U.S. Representative on the Working Group, and to backstop his requests for U.S. assistance. This Committee should call upon other agencies of the Government for appropriate support and assistance where necessary. The Committee could request the designated representatives of their Departments on the OCB to seek OCB support, on an ad hoc basis, for a project approved by the Committee. The Committee should be chaired by the State representative, who in the light of the Secretary’s request that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs be the point of responsibility in FE for work on the Manila Pact, would initially be that official.

3. State Department Organization for Back-Stopping the State Representative on the Washington Committee

The State Department Chairman of the Washington Committee should be back-stopped by a Group of representatives of the interested bureaus and offices of the Department. These would include C, NEA, EUR, FE, S/P, R, P, and U/OP and such other experts and officials as the Group might consider appropriate from time to time. It would be the function of this Group to supply from Departmental sources information and support to the State representative on the Washington Committee. The Chairman of this Group would initially be the State representative on the Washington Committee.

[Page 985]

[Tab D]

Possible Elements of a Program for Cooperative Action Under Articles II and IV, 2, of the Manila Pact6

1. Suggested Limitations upon a Program

a.
Economic Assistance. Economic assistance and development is certainly one important means of countering communist subversion. From the U.S. point of view, however, it would not be useful to confine a U.S. economic program to the countries who are members of the Manila Pact. U.S. economic programs now under consideration tentatively envisage the possibility of some use of the “Colombo plan” organization. In any case, however, since Japan is not a member of the Manila Pact and since any U.S. economic program in the Far East would be devised with Japanese interests in mind we should avoid extensive discussions in the economic field within the framework of the Manila Pact.
b.
Military Assistance. Our view of the Manila Pact has consistently been that it is different from NATO in that there is no expectation of building up important local military forces within the framework of the Manila Pact. We therefore should also discourage extensive discussion of levels of military forces within the framework of the Manila Pact.

2. General Outline of a Possible Program

Because of the limitations which it seems useful for us to place upon the type of activities to combat communist subversion that could appropriately be discussed and undertaken within the framework of the Manila Pact, it seems clear that the primary fields of useful effort would be: the development of adequate standards of security for classified materials; exchange of information on communist subversion; cooperative training and assistance in the development of local security forces; and cooperation in information and political warfare activities. Elements of a program in these fields might be of the following nature:

a.
Exchange of information on security practices with reference to classified materials, and establishment of satisfactory standards of security in dealing with such materials. (There are useful precedents for such a program in the development of NATO security practices.)
b.
Exchange of information on communist personalities, and communist subversive activities and propaganda within the states of the Treaty area.
c.
Exchange of information on measures against communist subversion taken or contemplated by the Treaty members.
d.
Preparation of recommendations for cooperative efforts to strengthen local police and security forces through (1) exchange of [Page 986] views and experience as to how to use such forces in combatting communism; (2) arrangements for cooperation in training of local police and security forces; (3) cooperation in devising effective indoctrination of such forces.
e.
Preparation of recommendations for cooperation in developing effective propaganda and information activities, and for developing ways in which the overt and covert information agencies of the member countries might help each other.
f.
Exploration of methods of cooperating in the development of: non-communist labor organizations; useful civic organizations such as those in the Community Center Movement in the Philippines; and exchange of persons in the cultural and educational fields.
g.
Exploration of such semi-covert political warfare activities as might usefully be undertaken within the Manila Pact framework. (An example might be cooperation in countering the Pan-Thai activities of the Chinese Communists.)

  1. This memorandum bears the following handwritten notation: “Approved in principle by Sec. in mtg. on Nov 23 as basis for proceeding with CIA and Def. C—W[illiam] J. G[alloway] ll/23/54.” No memorandum of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.
  2. Ante, p. 951.
  3. No other record of these instructions has been found in Department of State files.
  4. At Tab B is telegram 1745 to Manila, Nov. 13, p. 964.
  5. Drafted by Stelle and Higgs on Nov. 18.
  6. Drafted by Stelle and Bell, Nov. 17–19.