S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5429/3
Note to the National Security Council by the Executive
Secretary (Lay)
top secret
NSC 5429/3
[Washington,] November 19, 1954.
Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far
East
References:
- A. NSC 5429/2
- B. NSC 166/1
- C. NSC 152/31
- D. NSC Action No. 11482
- E. NSC 146/2
- F. Memos for NSC from Executive
Secretary, subject, “U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect
to Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Government,” dated September 28
and October 5, 1954,3 and NSC Action No. 12354
- G. NSC Action Nos. 1224 and 12345
- H. NSC Action No. 12506
- I. NSC Action No. 256
- J. NSC 125/2 and 125/6
- K. NSC 170/1
- L. NSC 171/1
- M. NSC 5405
- N. NSC Action Nos. 10867 and 11128
- O. NSC Action Nos. 12589 and 125910
The enclosed statement of policy was prepared by the NSC Planning Board, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1259–d, in the light of the existing situation
and of the report by the Secretary of State referred to in NSC Action No. 1258–a,11 the discussion
referred to in NSC Action No. 1258–b,12 the
recent decisions referenced above (F, G and H), NIE 13–54 “Communist China’s Power Potential Through
1957”,13 and drafts of
NIE 10–7–54 “Communist Courses of Action
in Asia Through 1957”.14 It is transmitted herewith for consideration
by the National Security Council at its meeting on December 1, 1954.
A Financial Appendix covering the Far East is not submitted with this report,
but one will be prepared for the information of the Council at a later
meeting.
The enclosed policy, if adopted by the Council and approved by the President,
is intended to supersede NSC 5429/2 and to
guide the implementation of all other existing Far East policies (references
B–N), modifying them where inconsistent, pending Planning Board and Council
review and revision of these more particular policies.
It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of
policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he
approve it, and direct its implementation by all appropriate executive
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, subject to review in the
light of final decisions on basic national security policy, and designate
the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.
[Page 974]
[Enclosure]
Draft
Statement of Policy by the National
Security Council on Current U.S. Policy in the Far East
general consideration
1. The primary problem of U.S. policy in the Far East is to cope with the
serious threat to U.S. security interests which has resulted from the
spread of hostile Communist power on the continent of Asia over all of
Mainland China, North Korea and, more recently, over the northern part
of Viet Nam.
2. In its five years of power, the regime in Communist China has
established and consolidated effective control over the mainland and has
maintained and developed close working relations with the Soviet Union.
[While there is now no reason to anticipate an early collapse of the
regime nor any means of seeing when one might occur, inherently such
regimes have elements of rigidity and instability which might produce
crises or break down unexpectedly.]* We should be ready to exploit
any opportunities which might occur as a result of inherent internal
weaknesses.
3. The task of the United States in coping with this situation is further
complicated by:
- a.
- The vulnerability of the non-Communist countries in the area
militarily, and in varying degrees, politically, economically,
and psychologically, to further Communist expansionist
efforts.
- b.
- The deep-seated national antagonisms and differing assessments
of national interest which divide these countries from each
other and severely hamper efforts to combine their collective
resources for their own defense and welfare.
- c.
- The intense nationalistic feelings, fed by residual
resentments against European colonialism coupled with a
widespread feeling of weakness and inadequacy in the face of the
worldwide power struggle, which inhibit many of these countries
from cooperating closely with the United States.
- d.
- The divergencies on Far Eastern policy with our European
allies, principally with respect to our posture toward China,
which limit the extent of political and economic pressures which
can be maintained against the Asian Communist regimes without
divisive effects on the basic United States-led
coalition.
Note: In addition to the foregoing general
considerations, attention is directed to NIE 13–54, “Communist China’s Power Potential Through
1957,” published June 3, 1954, and NIE
10–7–54, “Communist
[Page 975]
Courses of
Action in Asia Through 1957,” forthcoming at an early date.
objectives
4. Pursuant to a policy of being clear and strong in its resolve to
defend its vital interests, if necessary at the risk of but without
being provocative of war, the principal objectives of the United States
in the Far East should be:
- a.
- Preservation of the territorial and political integrity of the
non-Communist countries in the area against further Communist
expansion or subversion.
- b.
- Progressive improvement of the relative political, economic
and military position of the non-Communist countries vis-à-vis
that of the Asian Communist regimes.
- c.
- Reduction of [relative]† Chinese Communist
power and prestige.
- d.
- Disruption of the Sino-Soviet alliance through actions
designed to intensify existing and potential areas of conflict
or divergence of interest between the USSR and Communist China.
- [e.
- Creation in non-Communist Asia, and ultimately within
Communist China, of political and social forces which will
zealously spread the greater values of the Free World and
simultaneously expose the falsity of the Communist ideological
offensive.]‡
courses of action
5. In order to preserve the territorial and political integrity of the
area, the United States should:
- a.
- Maintain the security of the Pacific off-shore island chain
(Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa and the Pescadores, the Philippines,
Australia, and New Zealand) as an element essential to U.S.
security; assisting in developing such military strength in each
area as is required by U.S. security and is consistent with each
area’s capability and maintenance of domestic stability.15
- b.
- In the event of unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea,
employ, in accordance with Constitutional processes, U.S. armed
forces against the aggressor. While supporting the unification
of Korea by all peaceful means and maintaining appropriate
safeguards against ROK offensive
action, continue military and economic assistance programs
consistent with Korea’s capability and maintenance of domestic
stability, subject to continued ROK cooperation.
- c.
Conclude a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China
covering Formosa and the Pescadores, together with
appropriate
[Page 976]
safeguards against Chinese Nationalist offensive action
except by joint agreement. Pending the negotiation and
ratification of such a treaty, continue the existing
unilateral arrangement to defend Formosa and the Pescadores
(excluding the Nationalist-held off-shore islands).
For the present, seek to preserve, through United Nations
action, the status quo of the
Nationalist-held off-shore islands; and, without committing
U.S. forces except as militarily desirable in the event of
Chinese Communist attack on Formosa and the Pescadores,
provide to the Chinese Nationalist forces military equipment
and training to assist them to defend such off-shore
islands, using Formosa as a base. However, refrain from
assisting or encouraging offensive actions against Communist
China, and restrain the Chinese Nationalists from such
actions, except in response to Chinese Communist provocation
judged adequate in each case by the President.
- d.
- In the event of Communist overt armed attack in the area
covered by the Manila Pact prior to the entering into effect of
the Pact, take actions necessary to meet the situation,
including a request for authority from Congress to use U.S.
armed forces, if appropriate and feasible. When the Pact is in
effect, be prepared to oppose any Communist attack in the Treaty
area with U.S. armed forces if necessary and feasible,
consulting the Congress in advance if the emergency
permits.
- e.
- In the event of Communist overt armed attack or imminent
threat of such attack against any other country in the area (not
covered by a security treaty to which the United States is a
party), this evidence of a renewal of Communist aggressive
purposes would constitute such a grave menace to the United
States as to justify the President in requesting authority from
Congress to take necessary action to deal with the situation,
including the use of U.S. armed forces, if appropriate and
feasible.
- f.
- In the event of unprovoked Communist armed attack on the
personnel, aircraft or vessels of the United States, promptly
take punitive action including the use of armed force if
necessary and appropriate.
- g.
- Encourage the conditions necessary to form as soon as possible
and then participate in, a Western Pacific collective defense
arrangement including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of
China and the Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the
Manila Pact and ANZUS.
- h.
- If requested by a legitimate local government which requires
assistance to defeat local Communist subversion or rebellion not
constituting armed attack, the United States should view such a
situation so gravely that, in addition to giving all possible
covert and overt support within the Executive Branch authority,
the President should at once consider requesting Congressional
authority to take appropriate action, which might if necessary
and feasible include the use of U.S. military forces either
locally or against the external source of such subversion or
rebellion (including Communist China if determined to be the
source).
- i.
- Assist where necessary and feasible non-Communist Government
and other elements in the Far East to counter Communist
subversion and economic domination.
- j.
- Maintain sufficient U.S. forces in the Far East as clear
evidence of U.S. intention to contribute its full share of
effective collective aid to the nations of the area against the
Communist threat, and to provide assurance to the people of the
Far East of U.S. intent and determination to support them in the
event of Communist aggression.
6. In order to enhance the individual and collective strength of the
non-Communist countries, the United States should:
- a.
- Increase efforts to develop the basic stability and strength
of non-Communist countries, especially Japan and India, and
their capacity and will to resist Communist expansion.
- b.
- Continue (1) to recognize the Government of the Republic of
China as the only government of China and its right to represent
China in the United Nations, and (2) to furnish direct support
to its defense establishment and its economy.
- c.
- Encourage the prompt organization of an economic grouping by
the maximum number of free Asian states, including Japan and as
many of the Colombo Powers as possible based on self-help and
mutual aid, and the participation and support (including
substantial financial assistance) of the United States and other
appropriate Western countries, through which, by united action,
those free Asian states will be enabled more effectively to
achieve the economic and social strength needed to maintain
their independence.
- d.
- Take all feasible measures to increase the opportunities of
such countries for trade with each other and with other Free
World countries.
- e.
- Provide in South and Southeast Asia, through the economic
grouping referred to in c above or otherwise, such economic and
technical aid over an extended period as can be used effectively
to accelerate the present slow rates of economic growth, and to
give to the peoples in these areas a sense of present progress
and future hope, which is currently lacking. [At present, it
appears both necessary and feasible to increase materially the
scale of assistance to South and Southeast Asia, which are most
directly threatened by Communist expansion.]§
- f.
- Develop and make more effective information, cultural,
education and exchange programs; and expand the program for
training of free Asian leaders [by organizing and subsidizing
education centers in the area and utilizing and supporting U.S.
facilities.]||
- g.
- Encourage the countries of the area to use qualified Americans
as advisers and develop a program for training such persons
[particularly in the broad political aspects of the countries
concerned.]¶
- h.
- Seek, by intensifying covert and psychological activities, and
by utilizing indigenous persons to the greatest extent feasible,
to (1) increase the understanding and orientation of Asian
peoples toward the Free World and (2) expose the menace of
Chinese imperialism and world Communism.
- i.
- Encourage and support, more vigorously and effectively, the
application of private capital to the development needs of free
Asian countries under arrangements avoiding “exploitation” yet
acceptable to private interests.
7. [To stimulate Sino-Soviet estrangement, obtain maximum support from
our principal Allies on a common Far Eastern policy, and gain a
psychological advantage from taking a positive initiative, it is
proposed that study be given to (1) the feasibility of negotiating a Far
Eastern settlement which might include such elements as those below, and
(2) measures which would facilitate such negotiation, including adequate
pressure on the Chinese Communists.
- a.
- Recognizing the existence of two Chinas, neither of which can be
wiped out without a new world war.
- b.
- Seating both Chinas in the UN
Assembly, neither to have a seat on the UN Security Council, substituting India for China as a
permanent member of the Security Council.
- c.
- Opening trade (import and export) with Communist China on the same
basis as with the European Soviet bloc. (In this connection
consideration might be given to raising the COCOM controls on the European Soviet
bloc, both with respect to commodity coverage and stringency of
control, in order to provide a more realistic basis for effective
and uniform controls towards the entire Communist bloc in Europe and
Asia.)
- d.
- Admitting Japan to the UN.
- e.
- Unifying Korea by the withdrawal of foreign forces and the holding
of free and supervised elections.
- f.
- Obtaining the abandonment of subversive Communist pressures in
South Viet Nam.
- g.
- Obtaining an undertaking by China—for whatever value it might
have—to refrain from providing physical or other types of support to
subversive groups in any part of Asia.]**
[Page 979]
8. [Meanwhile until such over-all settlement is reached and]†† in order to
weaken or retard the growth of the power and influence of the Asian
Communist regimes, especially Communist China, the United States should:
- a.
- Continue to refuse recognition of the Chinese Communist regime
and other Asian Communist regimes, but deal with each on a local
basis and with regard to specific subjects where the regime is a
party at interest.
- b.
- Continue to oppose seating Communist China in the Security
Council, the General Assembly, and other organs of the United
Nations.
| Proposed by State, Treasury, Budget and
CIA |
Proposed by Defense, Commerce, ODM and JCS (see also Annex
B) |
| c. Maintain the embargo on U.S. trade with Communist
China, and continue to exert our influence on other Free
World countries for the maintenance of the current level of
trade controls against Communist China; without, however,
exerting our influence in such a manner as would be
seriously divisive or lead nations needing Chinese trade to
accommodation with the Communist bloc, provided that the
level of controls applicable to the USSR is maintained. |
c. Adopt the following policy: - (1)
- Continue the U.S. embargo on Communist
China.
- (2)
- Use the total bargaining position of the United
States to gain acceptance of embargo or near embargo
by all other non-Communist countries.
- (3)
- Reimpose more comprehensive and effective controls
by the United States and other countries over the
Soviet bloc in Europe to prevent transshipments to
China.
- (4)
- Impose additional controls or limitations on
exports to non-Communist countries that do not go
along with the above to minimize leaks.
- (5)
- Retain the U.S. total ban on imports from
Communist China.
- (6)
- Seek the imposition of similar import controls by
non-Communist countries.
- (7)
- Refuse to purchase Communist Chinese type goods
from all non-conforming countries.
|
[Page 980]
Additional Sentence Proposed by FOA
To this end begin early consultations,
particularly with the U.K.
and France, looking toward agreement on China
controls. |
|
- d.
- Utilize all feasible overt and covert means, consistent with a
policy of not being provocative of war, [at the risk of but not
provocative of war]‡‡
to create discontent and internal divisions within each of the
Communist-dominated areas of the Far East, and to impair their
relations with the Soviet Union and with each other, but refrain
from assisting or encouraging offensive actions against
Communist China, and restrain the Chinese Nationalists from such
actions, except in response to Chinese Communist provocation
judged adequate in each case by the President.
- e.
- Continue the policy towards Indochina and Thailand stated in
Annex A.16
9. a. The United States should attempt to convince the other Free World
countries of the soundness of U.S. policies toward Communist China and
toward the Republic of China and of the advisability of their adopting
similar policies, without, however, imposing such pressures as would be
seriously divisive.
b. In its Pacific role, the United States should be less influenced by
European allies than in respect to Atlantic affairs.
10. a. The United States must keep open the possibility of negotiating
with the USSR and Communist China
acceptable and enforceable agreements, whether limited to individual
issues now outstanding or involving a general settlement of major
issues.
[Page 981]
[b Make clear to the Communist regimes that resumption of normal
relations between them and the United States is dependent on concrete
evidence that they have abandoned efforts to expand their control by
military force or subdivision.]§§
[Annex B]
Statement By The Department Of
Commerce
- 1.
- Two things appear clear from the discussion of the policy papers:
- a.
- In the political, psychological and strategic fields the
proposed policy would be substantially a maintenance of the
status quo with emphasis on maximum pressure in all fields
on the Chinese Communists. The pressure while avoiding
actions provocative of war would go so far as to risk the
possibility of war.
- b.
- The policy appears to be based upon an appraisal of the
serious threat to U.S. national security posed by the growth
of Communist power in Asia, and on an estimate that the best
prospect of disrupting the Sino-Soviet alliance is through
maximizing the dependence of Communist China on the USSR.
- 2.
- Consistent with this approach the courses of action with respect
to trade controls (par. 8–c of the foregoing statement of policy)
would have to be along following lines:
- a.
- Continuation of U.S. embargo to Communist China.
- b.
- Use of total bargaining position of the U.S. to gain
acceptance of embargo or near embargo by all other
non-Communist countries.
- c.
- Reimposition by the United States and other countries of
more comprehensive and effective controls over Soviet bloc
in Europe to prevent transshipments to China.
- d.
- Imposition of additional controls or limitations on
exports to non-Communist countries that do not go along with
above to minimize leaks.
- e.
- Retention of the total ban on imports from Communist China
by the United States.
- f.
- Imposition of similar import controls by non-Communist
countries.
- g.
- Refusal by the United States to purchase Communist Chinese
type goods from all non-conforming countries.
- 3.
- It would be manifestly difficult to bring our principal Allies
along with such a program. The attitude of other governments,
particularly the U.K., makes it
doubtful that we can hold even the present international levels of
trade controls short of exerting the most severe diplomatic and
economic pressures on our Allies. The dismantlement of the trade
control structure on the other hand might well lead to a backdoor
breakdown of the entire policy of maximum pressure. Such a breakdown
would cause seriously adverse public reactions concentrated on the
trade area rather than on the total policy.
- 4.
- A sharply different approach to the Communist China problem should
be given consideration by the NSC in
the current review of Far East policy on the basis that:
- a.
- It would be desirable to make capital of any major trade
relaxation towards China both with our Allies and with
Communist China.
- b.
- Current intelligence indicates that in the economic field
no significant conflicts have arisen between the USSR and Red China. Perhaps
then it may be possible to create
potential areas of conflict or divergence by a positive
approach from the United States and the Free World to
Communist China.
Such different approach is set forth in par. 7 of the
above policy statement.
