Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 432
Memorandum of Conversations, by William J. Galloway, Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State
Subject:
- Meetings with UK and French representatives on possible meeting of Manila Pact Foreign Ministers.1
Participants:
- M. Claude de Cheysson, French Foreign Office
- M. Jacques Roux, French Foreign Office
- M. Pierre Millet, Counselor, French Embassy
- Mr. Harold Beeley, Counselor, British Embassy
- Mr. Michael Joy, First Secretary, British Embassy
- Mr. MacArthur, C
- Mr. Sebald, FE
- Mr. Hoey, PSA
- Mr. Galloway, C
Mr. MacArthur and Mr. Sebald held two meetings today on the proposed meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Manila Pact signatories. The first meeting was held in the morning with the French officials listed above, and the second meeting, in the afternoon, included both the French officials and the British representatives. Between the two meetings, Mr. Joy brought to the Department for the Secretary a letter from Sir Roger Makins which set forth the views of Sir Anthony Eden concerning the proposed meeting of Manila Pact Foreign Ministers, and also proposals for US–UK [Page 987] French talks on Indochina prior to a Manila Pact meeting. A copy of Sir Roger’s communication to the Secretary is attached.
Mr. MacArthur said he believed there was some misunderstanding in regard to the proposed meeting of Manila Pact Foreign Ministers, particularly as to the purpose of such a meeting. He then reviewed the developments which had led to the suggestion by some of the Manila Pact signatories, notably Australia and Thailand, for an early meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Following the Manila Conference, representatives of some of the signatory governments, particularly Australia and Thailand, had made inquiries as to US views on implementation of the Manila Pact. Both these Governments felt it important that early attention should be given to further steps in connection with the Pact so that there would be tangible evidence that interest was being maintained in making the Pact a reality and the psychological effect in the area would not be lost due to flagging momentum on the part of the member nations. It had been pointed out to us that the various ratification processes might consume several months’ time and that it might well be April or May of 1955 before the Treaty actually entered into force. In these circumstances, several of the signatory governments believed it important that there be an early manifestation of activity on the part of the member nations. Specifically, it was suggested that it would be desirable for the Foreign Ministers of the signatory governments to hold a meeting at an early date and before ratification was completed and the Treaty entered into force, to discuss and agree on how the Treaty would be implemented. December had been suggested, but this obviously was inconvenient because of NATO meetings, New Zealand elections, the Holiday seasons, etc. It was then thought that perhaps early January might be the first convenient time for the Ministers to meet together, and a date of around January 10 had been suggested.
Prince Wan had, at Manila, invited the Ministers to hold the next meeting in Bangkok. The Thai Government again put forward this proposal just a few weeks ago. Of all the treaty signatories, Thailand is the most directly threatened, and Prince Wan believed a meeting in Bangkok could have a very beneficial effect throughout the area, and particularly on the Thai people themselves, who would feel, as a result of the presence of the Foreign Ministers in Bangkok, that Thailand had strong and dependable partners. This feeling would strengthen their efforts and will to resist Communist infiltration and subversion.
It was believed that the meeting should be at Foreign Minister level. A meeting at lower level would give the impression that lesser importance was attached to the Southeast Asia area and would invite invidious comparisons between support for Asia and [Page 988] support for Europe where very frequent meetings of Foreign Ministers are taking place.
It should be made clear that the meeting would not be a meeting of the Council established by the Manila Pact, since the Council could only begin operation when the Treaty entered into force; rather, it would be a meeting of the Ministers for the purpose of discussing and agreeing on arrangements to be put into effect when the Treaty did come into force. Such arrangements would include organization of the Council itself and determination of necessary rules of procedure and provisions for implementing the Council’s responsibility in regard to military planning. The meeting also would afford the Ministers an opportunity for a general exchange of views on developments affecting the security of the area. Presumably, there would also be discussion of measures, in implementation of Article II, for cooperation to counter and resist Communist subversion in the area. There might be some general discussion of the economic problem in Asia.
It had been suggested by the New Zealand representative that, assuming there would be a meeting of Foreign Ministers, a working group should be established to begin preparation of the subjects for ministerial discussion. New Zealand had suggested Washington as the location for this working group since the Washington missions of the Manila Pact nations all have had considerable experience on Manila Pact matters.
Mr. MacArthur said the US favored the suggestions which had been put forward for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers. We agreed it was important to give evidence of continuing interest in the Pact and to maintain the psychological momentum initiated with the signing of the Treaty. We also agreed with Prince Wan’s views concerning the important effect which could be expected from a meeting in Bangkok. January 10 would be an acceptable date, and the Secretary, feeling it important that Foreign Ministers should attend, planned to attend the meeting himself. We envisaged the meeting lasting for two or three days. We agreed with the importance of advance preparatory work and would be happy to have a working group convened in Washington for this purpose.
Mr. MacArthur then referred to Sir Anthony Eden’s communication which suggested meetings among the three powers on Indochina problems, and which apparently envisaged that questions relating to internal political action in Indochina would be discussed at a Manila Pact Foreign Ministers’ meeting. Mr. MacArthur thought there were two separate questions involved. He believed the US would not envisage such a discussion of Indochina questions at the Manila Pact meeting. It would not be appropriate for the Manila Pact countries to discuss taking action in internal affairs of [Page 989] any of the three Associated States when they were not even at the meeting. Mr. MacArthur recognized, however, that the Ministers, during a general exchange of views, might well wish to discuss in general terms the serious problem posed by the situation in Indo-china. As for Mr. Eden’s suggestion that the three powers discuss these Indochina problems, Mr. MacArthur was sure the Secretary would have an open mind on this.
The French representatives seemed to agree with the views expressed by Mr. MacArthur with respect to discussion of Indochina questions, although they offered no specific views themselves. The UK representatives summed up Mr. Eden’s view to the effect that if there was to be a meeting of Manila Pact Foreign Ministers, the Indochina problem would certainly need to be discussed since it was the most important problem in the area; otherwise, the impression would be created that the Manila Pact was not living up to its responsibilities. Mr. Eden was mainly concerned that whatever was to be said about Indochina in such a meeting, there must be agreement among the three powers on a common line. (It was inferred that the British representatives felt that Mr. Eden probably would not press for a discussion in the Manila Pact forum of all the questions relating to Indochina listed in his communication.)
The UK representatives stated that they could not give assurance that Sir Anthony Eden would be able to attend a meeting of the Manila Pact Foreign Ministers. Also, Sir Anthony believed a meeting of the Ministers should only be held after the Treaty had been ratified. They raised the question as to whether the Treaty wouldn’t actually come into force by some time in March of 1955. If the Treaty might come into force by this time, would it not be better to have the Ministers’ meeting later, since this would mean waiting only another two months or so. Mr. MacArthur said this was a point which would need to be considered by the other signatory governments.
After further discussion, it was agreed that an attempt should be made to determine what ratification schedules were contemplated by the various member nations. Mr. MacArthur estimated that US ratification might be completed by late January or early February. The French representatives said that French ratification could be completed very quickly if the Treaty were not submitted to Parliament (the French constitution does not require that the Treaty be submitted to Parliament), but if the Treaty were to be put before the Parliament (this has been the practice of the French Government on past security treaties), French ratification should be completed probably in February or March. The French representatives expected a Cabinet decision on this question in the next week or so. [Page 990] The UK representatives said their Government was in a position to ratify very swiftly.
It was then agreed that, in any event, a working group should be established in the near future in Washington to proceed with preparation for an eventual ministerial meeting of the Manila Pact signatories. The question was left open as to whether the Foreign Ministers would meet before or after ratification and entry into force of the Treaty, and it was agreed with the French representatives that this point should be discussed informally Monday2 in a meeting of the representatives of the Manila Pact powers which Mr. MacArthur would call.
- Participants not previously identified are: Claude de Cheysson, Chef de Cabinet to Mendes-France; Jacques Roux, Director for Asia-Oceania; and Robert E. Hoey, Officer in Charge of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia Affairs.↩
- Nov. 22. Minutes by William H. Gleysteen, Jr., of the Reports and Operations Staff, are not printed. (790.5/11–2254) For another reference to the meeting, see MacArthur’s memorandum of Nov. 30 to the Secretary, p. 999.↩
- No other record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files but see footnote 2, p. 964.↩
- Not printed.↩