Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs¹

top secret

[Washington,] May 28, 1954—9:15–10:55 a.m.

Present:

• The President, Secretary Dulles, Deputy Secretary Anderson, Admiral Radford, General Ridgway, Admiral Carney, General Twining, General Shepherd,² Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Bowie, and Mr. Cutler

1. The President said that at the outset he wanted to make two general points:

a. While military personnel should be entirely frank in expressing their military views to their associates in other government departments, they should not appear to be discussing issues from the policy point of view in public, or in negotiations with friendly countries.

b. In Indochina there were certain political prerequisites to establishing a satisfactory basis of operation, and without these prerequisites no purely military victory would prove worth having.

The President said that the course which the US would take was a political course, not determined entirely by military considerations, and that we must take care not to frighten our friends in negotiations by bellicose talk.

2. Secretary Dulles stated that the meeting was called to discuss the line of strategy to be used in the Five Power Staff talks. Whether or not so intended, there was always a risk that purely military talks would lead into political considerations. Secretary Dulles then referred to the May 21, 1954, JCS paper, entitled “Defense of Southeast Asia in the event of loss of Indochina to the Communists”,³ which he held in his hand. He remarked that its basic thesis was that if Indochina were lost, there was no validity in attempting a static type defense, but it would be necessary to strike directly at the sources of power of Communist China. While not attempting to appraise this military issue, the Secretary said that if the US entered the Five Power Staff Meeting advocating this thesis, it was his political judgment that there would be no further progress made in the Five Power Staff talks. It was necessary to moderate our purely military judgments to take account of political factors, to give the Thai people, the Burmese, and the Malayans some hope that their area would not simply be overrun and occupied until China was destroyed, in order to keep them on our side. The Secretary said that retaliation against overt Chinese Communist aggression was acceptable as a policy on a limited basis, but not in the broad context indicated in the JCS paper. He was referring to retaliation against overt Chinese Communist aggression, and to retaliation against military targets in China supporting such aggression. He recalled that at the Bermuda Conference, Sir Winston had agreed that in the case of new Chinese Communist aggression in Korea, there might be (after a 48 hour interval to show clearly the armistice was broken by the Chinese) a retaliation against military targets in China in the general vicinity, directly supporting the aggression. Secretary Dulles went on to say that we should not abandon the idea of a NATO type defense in Southeast Asia, which, while inadequate in itself, would, if properly supported, have a deterrent value. In other words, we must have some local defense, but not as much as the JCS paper calls for, to combine with the deterrent effect of our striking power.

3. Secretary Dulles then went on to spell out what he meant by limited military objectives in China which might be retaliated against in the event of overt Chinese aggression: airfields and communication lines being used to support the aggression; amphibious operations against a place like Hainan, which if held by friendly forces would be a serious threat to Communist China. The US to hold its allies would have to limit its counter-measures to targets having a demonstrable connection with Chinese aggression. If our plan were initially designed to destroy the total power of China, our allies would think we were heading toward general war. The Secretary pointed out that of course in attacking limited objectives, as described, we would inevitably risk a more general war; but if we leapt to general war all at once, our allies wouldn’t leap with us. He added that we should be ready to lend token or small (ground) forces to local countries for their defense so that they would not feel abandoned, with only our promise that after we had conquered the Chinese and driven them out, we would liberate these local countries.

4. The President intervened to say that the US should so conduct itself as not to lose to the free world side the 300,000 to 400,000 French Union forces now in Indochina.

5. Admiral Radford then referred to the NSC decision last winter as to the type of retaliatory attack to be made by the UN if the Communists broke the armistice by a fresh aggression in Korea: a retaliation limited to military targets in China related to the Chinese Communist offensive operations in Korea. He said that the May 21 JCS paper to which the Secretary referred was intended to be a comment by the JCS upon the request of the Thai for the expenditure of US money in building airfields in Thailand and making a military defense in Southeast Asia (after the fall of Indochina) against Chinese aggression. He said that of course the Chinese Communists would probably not overtly aggress against Thailand if they got possession of Indochina, but would resort to subversion. The point of the JCS paper was to make clear the unsoundness of a military defense line in Thailand and Burma, with large forces deployed there, in order to repel there overt Chinese aggression. In order to stop such aggression, it was not militarily sound to make a defense base in Thailand; the necessary counter-measures were an attack on Communist China. In fact, Thailand would be harder to defend militarily than Indochina. Admiral Radford then referred to three plans which were currently in preparation:

a. A plan by Hull to meet renewed Chinese Communist aggression in Korea by attacking military targets in Manchuria and North China.

b. A plan by CINCPAC to meet overt Chinese aggression in Indochina by attacking military targets in South China.

c. A plan by SAC for attacking military targets between North and South China in the event of wider hostilities.

Admiral Radford accordingly thought that there was no difference of opinion really between himself and the Secretary of State, and certainly no disagreement between the British and US Chiefs, as to base agreement in Thailand. However, he thought Thailand was a poor place in which to spend money for the defense of Southeast Asia.

6. The President intervened to say that we should not lose any asset we don’t have to lose. We don’t have to station a lot of American troops in Thailand, but we want to keep Thailand friendly, and to keep the French in the game. Pending effective united action, countries participating, other than the US, and having local land areas to protect, should furnish ground troops. The US might put in a division of marines temporarily in Southeast Asia. The President pointed out again that our friends thought we were belligerent, wanted to fight, and were immature; therefore, we must be careful not to alarm them. The President said if the military were going to talk about atomic weapons during the Five Power discussions, he hoped we could stimulate one of the other countries to raise the subject rather than have the U.S. introduce it.

7. Admiral Radford said that it was not necessary in the military talks to mention atomic weapons. We could just say we would attack military targets which directly support Chinese action against Indochina or Korea without specifying the weapons. Admiral Radford then said⁴ it would be possible to attack military targets in North and South China, supporting overt Chinese Communist aggression, with conventional weapons, but that for some targets it would be much more effective and much cheaper to do so with new weapons. (tThere was no indication at the time of dissent from this indicated use of new weapons in the event of overt Chinese Communist aggression. ) Later Mmention was made of the undue alarm which will arise byfrom talking about the use of new weapons, unless we had have to answer a question.)⁵

(8. Admiral Carney, who will represent the Chiefs at the Five Power Staff talks, asked for guidance as to how to keep the discussions to a military basis. The President said that he would have “to play it by ear” as they went along, but that every effort should be used to keep them talking. He suggested trying to keep the French in the fight by referring to their preponderance of troops and experience, as a reason for deferring to them in matters of command of ground operations. This approach would flatter the French vanity, and buck them up. The President went on to say as the US would be the principal supplier of sea and air power, we should have a good deal of freedom of action there.)

9. On the question of the agenda for the Five Power Staff talks, Admiral Radford feared that the British might want to talk about a limited defensive line in Southeast Asia, whereas we want to talk about the whole issue. The President spoke very highly of General Harding, and doubted if he would have come over here with a limited and rather hopeless point of view.

10. Secretary Dulles then indicated his opinion of the UK policy. The British are trying to get cease-fire and armistice based on partition of the States. They are abandoning the pocket or enclave idea. The British position to which the French would agree would eventually bring about peace, a total pull-out of French Forces, and a weak non-Communist regime at the back of in the south of Indo-china. Then the British would seek to extend ANZUS to include the UK, and would get ANZUS to guarantee a buffer north of Malaya to protect Malaya and Hongkong. Thus cleverly, the British would be able to pass as the peacemakers and go between for east and west, and would strengthen their ties with India and Malaya, without any real expense by the USK. Of course, the US would have to consider whether it could disassociate itself from with such a settlement at Geneva, and would decline to whether in such event it could join in a regional grouping for the purpose described.⁶ Secretary Dulles thought this result might be evidenced during the next two weeks.

11. The President directed Admiral Carney to keep in close touch with the State Department from day to day during the talks. He said he thought the British were more interested in Hongkong than Malaya, that they did not want to be a partner to making advances on Communist China which might prejudice their position in Hongkong.

12. Dulles then raised the question of the advisability of sending an two ROK divisions to Indochina. He said if an additional division were needed in Indochina he would prefer to have a ROK division go there rather than US ground forces [even if?] this meant keeping an additional US. division in Korea.⁷ Radford immediately agreed. It was felt that the use of Asian troops in Indochina would be a great advantage over the use of white troops. In order to make such a transaction possible, the US might be willing to put a US division back into Korea. Radford pointed out that of course Rhee would ask for something in return, although he had recently renewed his offer of ROK troops for Indochina.

13. The President stated the great objectives of the US to be watched during the Five Power Staff talks:

1. Try to hold on to whatever strength exists now in Southeast Asia.

2. Bring in to the defense native peoples, willing and anxious to protect themselves, in a way which makes clear that we are not supporting colonialism.

14. Dulles referred to an editorial in the Washington Post this morning which (strangely enough) took the line that the US should not go so far in opposing colonialism as to risk the security of the world.

15. Dulles then read the attached memorandum to the meeting, copies of which were distributed: [Here follows the memorandum as filed. Because it is a separate document, it is printed as an attachment below.]

16. Dulles felt quite sure that the British did not want to participate in talks which would lead imply that the UK into would participation participate in the present fighting in Indochina. Radford did not agree to this judgment. In response to the Secretary’s question whether the Tonkin Delta could be held by redeployment of French Union Forces, Radford answered in the clear affirmative, but that it would be necessary to have competent Vietnam forces to take it. Dulles referred to the necessity of holding enough Vietnam territory from which to recruit more forces. On the issue of whether the French were or were not now willing to sign the two treaties with Vietnam, Dulles said he understood from Dillon⁸ that they were now prepared, but that the Emperor was uncertain. Radford said that success in any military operations in Indochina depends on creating a political atmosphere and effective Vietnamese Government which will enlist Vietnamese support. Without this military success would not be obtained.⁹

17. Dulles said that it was his original understanding that talks between the US and French on preconditions of interventioninclude including training, recruiting, command, etc.This should be done in Paris rather than as a part of the Five Power Staff talks. Dillon had just now recommended that these talks be carried on in Washington; but they would have to be separate from the Five Power Staff talks, between France and the US.

18. If it turns out that the British do wish to limit the Five Power Staff talks to merely a holding operation, or something to be done after Geneva, Dulles took the position that the Five Power Staff Conference should not be broken off, because it was valuable as window-dressing with the Russians, who had no way of knowing what was going on. Radford said he felt quite sure that the Chiefs of Staff of Australia and New Zealand had an idea similar to the idea of our Chiefs.

19. Dulles feared that Mr. Eden was trying to do what Chamberlain had done, bringing back from Geneva “peace in our time”, and get elected Prime Minister.

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President¹⁰

top secret

[Washington,] May 28, 1954.

Subject:

• Memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the defense of Southeast Asia in the event of loss of Indochina to the Communists

I. Objectives

1. If all or part of Indochina is lost to the Communists, our objectives must be to prevent the loss of the rest of Southeast Asia—

a. by Communist subversion within the free countries; or,

b. by overt aggression from Communist China or the Viet Minh.

II. JCS Paper

2. If there is overt military aggression by Communist China, or forces which are directed by it, then I am inclined to agree with the thesis of the JCS that we should not rely primarily upon a static type of defense (as in Korea) but rather on an offensive against Communist China. This latter does not seem to me to require an all-out war against Communist China designed to destroy what are called the “sources” of its power. It might well be that under these circumstances it would be adequate to limit our offensive to areas and facilities which are related to China’s offensive. I have in mind, for example, attacking in China airfields and communication lines and other bases which are used to support the offensive, and possibly the seizure by amphibious operation of an island position such as Hainan, which at the point of junction of Indochina and China would seriously threaten their lines of communication and carry a threat supplementary from that of Formosa to the South China mainland.

3. You will recall that at Bermuda we discussed with Churchill and Eden the area of possible attack against China, if the Korean truce would be violated, and it was then understood that the area to be subjected to our attack would be an area which bore some demonstrable relationship to the attack itself.¹¹

4. It is, of course, possible that the area of conflict would expand in a cyclical manner, but I do not think that we necessarily have to base our strategy exclusively on unlimited war.

5. Whatever may be the military judgment on this matter, I can say that from a political standpoint, it will be difficult for us to achieve a working coalition unless it is based upon an effort at least to limit the consequences of a possible future Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia.

6. Furthermore, I feel that in order to retain the loyalty of the peoples whom we would defend, it is necessary to pay some respect to the concept of local defense. As in the case of NATO, the local defense does not need to be sufficient to withstand an all-out attack. It should be sufficient to deter such an attack since the local defense would be powerfully reinforced by the other offensive deterrents, of which I speak.

III. Subversion

7. It is, in my opinion, more likely that a Chinese offensive against Southeast Asia would take the form of subversive and indirect aggression rather than open direct aggression. This does not seem to be dealt with at all by the paper and perhaps this is not a type of problem on which the JCS wish to express themselves as it largely involves political judgment.

8. In my opinion the risk of subversive indirect aggression can be largely countered by some buildup of local forces, as in Thailand, by some token participation of forces of the coalition and by economic and social measures which may cost us some money but infinitely less than would be required to build a major military defense in the area which I agree seems quite unwise to attempt.

IV. Conclusion

9. In summary I conclude that if all or part of Indochina is lost, there is (?) a reasonable possibility of holding the rest by a policy of collective defense implemented by a small measure of static defense plus considerable economic aid, plus a clear willingness in the event of open attack to use offensive measures which are however in the first instance at least to be limited to and related to the offensive itself.

1. This memorandum is attached to copies of two notes, both dated June 1. In the first, MacArthur informed Cutler that he was returning the memorandum with some penciled modifications. In the second, Cutler replied: “Thanks for your notes. I’ve adopted all changes on my copy except those checked in red, which I don’t recall. They are probably correct but I don’t recall them.” As printed here, portions of the original memorandum which MacArthur wished to delete are indicated in cancelled type and his additions are italicized. Alterations which Cutler did not adopt are identified by footnotes.

   In a note to O’Connor, June 2, MacArthur wrote in part: “You will note that he adopted some of our changes but did not adopt four of them as he did not recall them. This is probably not too important, as his notes are informal and are not a record. However, my notes were quite accurate, and I feel that the suggested changes we made reflect accurately what took place. In particular, the first paragraph (no. 10) at the top of page 4 did not accurately portray what either Bob Bowie or myself understood the Secretary to say.” (Attachment, below)

2. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
3. See the attachment to the letter from Acting Secretary Anderson to Dulles, May 25, p. 514.
4. This addition to Admiral Radford’s remarks was not adopted by Cutler.
5. The period after “weapons” in the ninth line and the closed parenthesis after “question” in the last line of paragraph 7 are part of MacArthur’s revision.
6. Cutler did not adopt the modifications in this sentence.
7. Cutler did not adopt the modifications in this paragraph.
8. C. Douglas Dillon, Ambassador in France.
9. Cutler did not adopt this addition to Admiral Radford’s remarks.
10. The memorandum bears the following typed marginal note: “May 28/54 as presented by the Secretary of State at meeting in President’s office in a.m.”
11. The major discussion at the Bermuda Conference of consequences of a possible truce violation in Korea took place during the second restricted tripartite session of the Heads of Government meeting. For a memorandum of this meeting, held Dec. 7, 1953, see vol. v, Part 2, p. 1809.