Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 320
Memorandum by Robert
Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, to the Secretary of
State1
top secret
Washington, June 2,
1954.
Attached is a copy of my notes of this morning’s Conference in the
President’s office.
For my own convenience, I have summarized the Conference as follows:
- a.
- In the event of overt, unprovoked Chinese Communist aggression in
Southeast Asia which would be a direct threat to the security of the
United States and to other nations having security interests in the
region, Congress would be asked immediately to declare that a state
of war existed with Communist China, and the U.S. should then launch
large-scale air and naval attacks on ports, airfields, and other
military targets in mainland China, using as militarily appropriate
“new weapons”, in the expectation that some of such other nations
would join in opposing such aggression.
- b.
- The U.S. should seek firm agreement in advance from other nations
having security interests in the region (such as some, or all, of
the Philippine Islands, Thailand, France, the Associated States,
Australia, New Zealand, etc.) to join with the U.S. in counteracting
this threat to the security of the free world.
I trust that the Secretary of State will make an appropriate summary to
present at the Council Meeting tomorrow.
[Attachment]
Conference in the President’s Office, June 2, 1954,
11:45 a.m.
Present:
- The President
- Secretary Dulles
- Deputy Secretary Anderson
- Admiral Radford
- Mr. MacArthur
- Mr. Cutler
- 1.
Secretary Dulles said that he had asked the President to hold
the meeting so as to be sure that there was uniformity of views
with respect to action which the U.S. might take in the Far
East. He drew a sharp distinction between the types of action:
[Page 530]
- a.
- Intervention by the U.S. in the Indochina conflict as
a part of a collective grouping and subject to the
preconditions already agreed upon.
- b.
- In response to overt unprovoked Chinese Communist
aggression in the Far East.
Secretary Dulles pointed out that in view of
what he and the President had already said, it seemed to him
that such overt unprovoked Chinese Communist aggression (by air,
sea or ground) would be like a declaration of war against the
United States by Communist China, and would involve a direct
threat to U.S. security. In such case he thought the President
should go to Congress for authority to act in the best interests
of the United States, without any requirement of having to
bargain with other nations as to how they would act.
- 2.
- The President asked whether the U.S. should not look carefully to
see whether it was more directly threatened by this overt unprovoked
Chinese Communist aggression than was the U.N. If he was to go to the Congress for authority, the
President said, he would not ask any half-way measures. If the
situation warranted it, there should be declared a state of war with
China; and possibly there should be a strike at Communist Russia in
view of her treaty with China. Reiterating that he would never be
willing to have the U.S. go into Indochina alone, the President
asked Secretary Dulles how he would state his appeal to Congress for
authority in the case of overt unprovoked Chinese Communist
aggression.
- 3.
- Secretary Dulles stated that he would say that another aggressor
was loose in the world; that this open unprovoked action by
Communist China threatened the security of the United States and
those allied with the United States by treaty. When the President
asked if these circumstances would bring the ANZUS treaty into operation, the
Secretary replied that it would. The President wanted to know how we
could get the people of the United States behind a U.S. action to
attack Communist China for aggressively moving to the south and not
to the north against Japan. The Secretary replied that both the
President and he had already publicly said that they would not
tolerate a deliberate open act of aggression by the Communist
Chinese. The President stated that he had always put the idea of
collective undertakings in what he said, and that what he was now
pleading for was preliminary preparation so as to be sure that
someone was ready to go along with the United States in the event of
open unprovoked Chinese Communist aggression. He also pointed out
that the temper of the people in the U.S. was such today that the
Administration, in asking for authority to use force against the
Communist Chinese, might be defeated or that the resolution might
just squeak through. The President said
[Page 531]
that the question at issue was not one merely
of logic, but of how to bring along the American people into a
realization of the danger to U.S. security in an open unprovoked
Chinese Communist attack.
- 4.
- Radford intervened to say that he had just talked with the Chief
of Staff of Australia, and that he was heartily with us in our view.
In fact, General Rowell said that he was surprised that, now the
election was over, the U.S. hadn’t already turned the heat on
Australia.
- 5.
- The President reiterated his apprehension about the U.S. going it
alone. If there were an open unprovoked Chinese Communist aggression
before a settlement at Geneva, he supposed the U.S. would have with
it Thailand, the Philippines, France, and the Associated States. He
thought we should work now to get some others like Australia to be
ready to stand with us. Then it would be much easier to make plain
to the Congress and to the American people why it was necessary for
the U.S. to act. If, under these circumstances, the U.S. took action
against Communist China, the President said there should be no
half-way measures or frittering around. The Navy and Air Force
should go in with full power, using new weapons, and strike at air
bases and ports in mainland China.
- 6.
- Several people expressed the view that, particularly if the
position of the U.S. were clear to the world, Communist China would
not be likely to commit an act of open unprovoked aggression in
Southeast Asia. The President suggested that the Secretary of State
should state at a press conference that when appropriate
arrangements with allies had been made, such specific allies would
be prepared to stand with the United States in such an event. Of
course, he went on, if all our allies desert us and none will stand
with us, that would be a different story, requiring a different
consideration. We have got to keep the Pacific as an American
lake.
- 7.
- Reference was made to Thailand and the Philippines having been
hurt by non-inclusion in the Five-Power Staff Conference. The
President said that it should be made very plain to them that the
Five-Power Staff Conference was only one of several group talks
being held, and that the purpose of it was not to make definite
plans for the defense of Southeast Asia, but rather to use what
forces the participating countries could marshal. We agreed with
Radford that the talks should be kept as short as possible, and that
there should be the minimum publicity about them.
- 8.
- At the end of the meeting, Cutler suggested to the Secretary of
State that he prepare a paragraph satisfactory to him for use in the
record of tomorrow’s Council meeting.
