790.5/5–2754
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Thai and Malayan Affairs (Landon)
Subject:
- Five-Power Staff Talks in Washington
Participants:
- Thai Charge d’Affaires, M. R. Thuaithep Devakul
- PSA—Mr. Day
- PSA—Mr. Landon
The Thai Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Devakul, was invited to call and was informed, on a confidential basis, that United States military authorities were inviting military representatives of Australia, New Zealand, France and the United Kingdom to meet at Washington on June 3 for staff talks regarding military problems in Asia. It was explained that these were further discussions in a series, previous meetings having been held at Hawaii and Singapore.
Mr. Devakul asked whether these discussions were part of the Secretary’s program for “united action” to which Thailand had subscribed. It was explained to him that the proposed discussions were not essentially part of “united action” but might be regarded as a preliminary exercise which might be of value in “united action.” It was pointed out that agreement among the concerned nations had not yet been reached as to “united action.”
Mr. Devakul pressed his point and asked whether Thai military would be invited to join the staff discussions at Washington, pointing out that Thailand was in the heart of the problem area of Southeast Asia and was primarily concerned with any plans for easing the situation. He was informed that an invitation could not be extended at this time but that we would keep him informed of developments and would hope that the Secretary’s program for “united action” including Thailand would develop.
Mr. Devakul was not satisfied and he gave his personal adverse reaction with force but with restraint.
Mr. Devakul then took his departure but apparently felt so strongly on the subject that he proceeded to Mr. Landon’s office where he spoke without restraint in the Thai language using very strong metaphors to express his profound displeasure at the exclusion of the Thai military from the military discussions. He used such phrases as “another example of the archaic idea of the white man’s burden” and “Thailand accepted ‘united action’ without reservation but apparently there is some reservation regarding the [Page 520] Thai.” He repeatedly made the claim that he was not critical of the United States Government or of the Secretary but blamed the United Kingdom. He asserted that it was his personal belief that if the United States Government were to join equally with Asian partners in opposing Communism it would have to take a very strong position to move the British and French into the atmosphere of the modern world.
Mr. Devakul was asked if he would like to discuss this problem with some higher official in the Department, perhaps even the Secretary. After some thought he decided that it would be preferable to await the return of Ambassador Sarasin who is expected to arrive in Washington from Bangkok on June 31 with instructions from the Prime Minister regarding action at the United Nations. As he took his departure, Mr. Devakul was somewhat calmer and he commented several times that his reaction was not an official one but was his personal reaction and that his comments were to be regarded as purely his own and not those of his Government.2
In telegram 13 to Bangkok from Geneva, June 1, Smith reported on a conversation between himself, Robertson, and Ambassador Pote Sarasin the previous day:
“Sarasin reported Thai Prime Minister extremely upset that Thai not invited participate five power military talks in Washington. Under Secretary explained five power talks continuation of talks over period several years and did not represent discussion by members of collective security organ. Purpose of talks, in addition to impetus for collective action, was to obtain best possible military evaluation of Indochina situation. Other interested countries would be kept informed and at appropriate time it was hoped, have conference to include them. At this stage it would be impossible to get United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, if participation other countries included. Would be helpful if Sarasin could explain situation to his Prime Minister.” (790.5/6–154)
↩In his memorandum (written in the third person) of a conversation held with Philippine representatives, also on May 27, Bell wrote in part:
“Mr. Bell told Dr. Gamboa and General Romulo that five-power staff talks among the representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand would begin the latter part of next week. Mr. Bell emphasized that these talks would be wholly military.
“General Romulo, Dr. Gamboa, and the Philippine Armed Forces Attaché Captain Carlos Albert, who had been told of the proposed talks by Dr. Gamboa, all protested that they would cause an extremely bad reaction in Manila. General Romulo stated: ‘This is the worst thing you could have done.’ Captain Albert and Dr. Gamboa both supported this point of view.” (790.5/5–2754)
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