Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

774.00/2–2654: Telegram

No. 1291
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State¹

confidential

Cairo, February 26, 1954—2 p.m.

963. Line taken in Department’s helpful statement (Deptel 988)² borne out by Salah Salim at press conference last night. Salim specifically made points:

(1) No change in foreign policy as result Naguib departure.

(2) Policy made by RCC and not determined by any one man.

Tone of his remarks suggested RCC more anxious than ever settle Suez issue and concerned lest British seize on dispute with Naguib as reason for further delay. Salim added that once Suez question settled “transition period” could rapidly be brought to close and parliamentary life restored.

In piecing together accumulated evidence, I believe following conclusions are justified:

1. Naguib essentially good, honest, patriotic, loyal, lovable, sincere man but weak. He revelled in acclaim and at times privately disavowed responsibility for unpopular decisions of RCC.

2. RCC was well aware of Naguib’s popularity and importance as symbol of new regime and successfully concealed to large degree growing difficulties with President.

3. Decision dispense with Naguib taken with reluctance and full appreciation its potential consequences. Although showdown over locus of power probably inevitable, RCC hoped postpone crisis at least until after Anglo-Egyptian settlement.

4. Naguib forced showdown in belief he could win out. From his point of view situation had probably also become intolerable as his injured vanity was played on by people around him. (His wife reportedly told him on one occasion: “You are nothing but a Fawzi Selo”.)

5. RCC now in extremely delicate position because of necessity justify action against Naguib whom they had formerly built up as leader of revolution. Neither Egyptian public nor world at large aware of extent to which Nasir has from beginning planned and guided movement. He lacks Naguib’s popular appeal and it will be extremely difficult under the circumstances to convince public of what is obvious to anyone meeting him more intimate circumstances; i.e., that at 36 Nasir is already head and shoulders above Naguib in ability and strength of character (London’s 3663, February 25).³

Caffery

1. Repeated to London as telegram 315 and unnumbered to Paris, Rome, the Arab capitals, Tripoli, and Khartoum.
2. In telegram 988, Feb. 25, not printed, the Department informed the Embassy that it had issued a statement saying that the events in Egypt were unrelated to Egypt’s international policies, and that the question of the Suez negotiations was not involved in those domestic developments surrounding the fall of Naguib. (641.74/2–2554)
3. Ambassador Aldrich had reported in telegram 3663, Feb. 25, not printed, that the Foreign Office considered Naguib to be a man of greater stature and depth than Nasir. (641.74/2–2554)