774.11/2–2554: Telegram
No. 1290
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the
Department of State1
niact
954. Re urtel 953.2 News of acceptance Naguib’s resignation comes as surprise and shock here as it will abroad. Even those aware of periodic disputes between Naguib and RCC did not anticipate open rupture at this time. (As of 11 o’clock last night Nasir himself expected differences would be smoothed over as on previous occasions.)
Naguib’s going will unquestionably be serious loss to regime (even more from international point of view than from domestic one). There is no one in sight to replace him in role of genial, winsome “father of the country”. Development will also be widely interpreted as weakening present government and will lead to speculation over possibility further schisms in RCC.
On other hand, it has long been evident that Naguib was little more than figurehead while Nasir was real brains and spark-plug of revolutionary movement. Actual power structure remains unchanged, whereas accession to Naguib’s demand for extraordinary powers including veto over RCC decisions would have placed government at mercy of man who actually not qualified exercise such powers.
Background to blow-up was increasing insistence of Naguib (spurred on, I am told, by his wife, presidential legal advisor Suliman Hafiz and officers of his bodyguard. that he be given real presidential powers. It appears Naguib sometime ago demanded same authority as United States President but was told present regime temporary and definition presidential powers must await decision on new constitution. Naguib then proposed immediate plebiscite on question presidency alone. When this refused and situation aggravated [Page 2222] by several petty disagreements, Naguib submitted resignation three days ago but continued exercise functions. RCC made repeated efforts mollify him but offered no major concessions.
Naguib seems to have deliberately chosen most inopportune moment to face RCC with demands (just before inauguration Sudanese Parliament and at delicate stage Anglo-Egyptian talks) apparently in belief RCC would not dare accept his resignation. It is typical of RCC officers that they unanimously decided to do so, in full awareness of inevitable world-wide repercussions, rather than bow to pressure on what they consider vital question of principle. Decision was approved by Cabinet and by entire group of “free officers”. Trouble therefore not expected from Armed Forces, nor is it likely there will be difficulties at this juncture from organized populace despite Naguib’s personal popularity.
- Repeated priority to London as telegram 311, as 19 to Rome, as 40 to Paris, as 62 to Amman, as 67 to Beirut, as 35 to Baghdad, as 24 to Damascus, as 21 to Jidda, and as 45 to Tel Aviv.↩
- In telegram 953 from Cairo, Feb. 25, not printed, Caffery reported that the RCC had issued a communiqué that said that three days earlier, Naguib had resigned from all posts that he occupied; that the RCC, under Nasir’s leadership, would continue to govern the country; and that Nasir was appointed President of Council of Ministers. (774.11/2–2554)↩