760.5/7–854: Telegram
No. 350
The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in
Yugoslavia1
29. As soon as feasible following tripartite démarche foreseen by Deptel 1462 to London, Ambassador Riddleberger should make unilateral US démarche along following lines preferably, we think but subject your discretion, to Marshal Tito.
- 1.
- As the Yugoslavs are aware the US considers that the developing Balkan Alliance between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey can and should represent an important element of strength in Free World defenses. We conceive it to be an integral part of our overall policy toward Yugoslavia which, as the Yugoslavs know, is based on the Yugoslav contribution to defense of Free World. We believe that, because of our common interests with the Yugoslavs, we have the right to discuss these matters with them even though formally the US is not a direct party of the proposed Alliance.
- 2.
- First point is basically matter of tactics. Our concept of the Balkan Alliance requires that it be fully compatible with and hence make a contribution to NATO: conversely that it not represent a negative element. In order for this to be so, sensibilities of NATO members must be given due consideration for in a very real sense the strength of both the Alliance and of NATO are interrelated. While, of course, technical legal approval by NATO is not involved we are convinced that NATO members must be given full and adequate opportunity to consider substance of Alliance as it relates to their individual obligations and commitments. This connection, if final text is such that US, UK and France can unreservedly endorse it, we anticipate no insurmountable difficulties. Furthermore, if text is of such a nature, we can see no real reason why complete text should not be given NAC, though we are of open mind as to whether such action tactically desirable.
- 3.
- As regards substance of proposed Alliance, and this has an important bearing on the relationship of the Alliance to NATO, while we are concerned that Article II seems to go somewhat beyond Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty (and thus will cause difficulty in NATO which might prompt one or more NATO members to reserve their position as regards action in the event Greece and Turkey involved in war by reason of automatic nature of Article II), we also note Article VII does not seem equally bind Yugoslavia in the event Greece and Turkey are involved in a war by reason of their NATO obligations. The difficulty here seems to us to revolve around reference to “United Nations Charter” in Article VII and possible reference to Chapter VIII of United Nations Charter in preamble. As we informed Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey at time [Page 664] Balkan Entente was drafted, in our view reference to Chapter VIII is undesirable because it raises real possibilities of effective action being prevented by a Soviet veto.
- 4.
- We are similarly concerned with what we understand to have been Yugoslav reaction Greek and Turk desire make reference in a special article to cooperation with other international organizations whose purpose is reinforcing international peace and security, and wonder if this and the previous point do not reflect a basic attitude which we feel must be fully and frankly explored. We have the feeling that perhaps the Yugoslav attitude flows from a belief that their growing relations with the West will ultimately involve them in closer relations with the Italians which might give the Italians some unfair advantage over them. (Ref last para Athens 37 to Department3). While we, of course, understand the Yugoslav position on this broad question, and would not expect the Yugoslavs to acquiesce in any relationship which would in fact give the Italians an unfair advantage, we believe all concerned are agreed fundamentally that closer Italo-Yugoslav relations are inevitable if Yugoslavia and the Western nations pursue their present courses, and that such relations are in fact necessary and desirable. All our present actions revolve around such a rapprochement: Trieste solution is just first step which must pave the way for creation of necessary interrelationships between Alliance, US, UK, French-Yugoslav military planning, Italian-Yugoslav planning, possible Italo-Yugoslav treaty relation, and some practical, though not necessarily formal relationship with NATO. While we have not as yet any clear vision of how these relationships should develop, we are convinced that they must develop and believe that to be fruitful the relationships between any and all of the nations concerned must progressively reflect and not shy away from this inevitability.
- 5.
In the light of the foregoing substantial issues, regarding which we really do not believe we are at variance as between ourselves and the Yugoslavs, tripartite powers (US, UK and France) have asked the Greeks, Turks and Yugoslavs to reconsider some aspects of the present draft Alliance, in the hope that they will be willing again to consult and to eliminate the elements in the present draft which we see as points of discord. We recognize and concur in the very real sense of urgency of the three Balkan partners and their desire to conclude the Alliance as rapidly as possible, but believe they they will agree with us that unless the Alliance not only reflects full confidence among the Alliance partners but also acquires that support among NATO members which is essential to its success, the purposes of the Alliance partners themselves and the best interests of the free world in general will not have been well served.
End of points to be using in making démarche.
In preparing the foregoing points the Department has been guided not only by the substantive issues of the draft Alliance which concern us, but also by the belief (which has been strengthened [Page 665] by the broad approach taken by the Yugoslavs in their request for high level economic discussions with the US) that the Yugoslavs may be seeking some broad guidance and reassurance as regards our overall purposes in dealing with Yugoslavia. We are conscious in this connection of the far-reaching beneficial effects of Churchill’s discussions with Tito during Tito’s visit to London. While we are not in any position to go as far as Churchill in giving assurances to the Yugoslavs at this time, we believe the Ambassador can, by speaking of broad issues rather than directing himself to factual or drafting points in the text of the Alliance itself, accomplish much the same purpose in persuading Tito that we are not in fact trying to booby-trap him but are really concerned at the overall effectiveness of the regional arrangement we all wish to see created. Ambassador may, however, also draw on discussion textual issues contained Deptel 146, if he so desires.