Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

760.5/7–754: Telegram

No. 349
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

top secret
niact

Washington, July 8, 1954—7:12 p.m.

146. Concur London’s 100² that representations required. Expanding thereon, we propose following. We believe time factor requires démarches be undertaken in any case by July 10 at latest.

We envisage démarches not only in Athens and Ankara but also in Belgrade, all of which should cover following points:

(1) We are all seeking to make Balkan Alliance something which not only does not conflict with NATO but which supports in every way possible goals of Western solidarity, defense capability and unity. If alliance appropriately drafted, it can well serve these purposes, and should be susceptible of warm welcome by NATO powers. On the other hand if alliance on its own terms raises problems for NATO members or if presented to NATO in way which fails to take into consideration genuine interest of other NATO nations, disservice to cause of West will result.

(2) Following aspects of draft in our opinion require further consideration if they are not to raise serious questions in NATO and have unfortunate effects we all wish to avoid.

(a) Article 2 is of “automatic” type. We believe this clause will give greatest trouble to NATO members, including ourselves. This departure from formula of Article 5 of NAT may prompt some NATO nations to state that their NATO obligations would not require them to go to war if Greece or Turkey involved as result of Balkan Pact. This would tend to create impression in Soviet mind of division on Balkan Alliance and would present cause of friction within NATO. Apparently small drafting changes could cure this point, and in interest of solidarity of West, we believe highly desirable.

(b) Article 7 requires clarification with respect to reference to UN Charter. Would article only be operative in case of Security Council action which would be open to Soviet veto? Is it intended post-occupation Germany be covered?

(c) Reference to Chapter 8 of UN Charter seems to us unwise. General reference to UN Charter preferable or reference to Article 51, as we have often said. Same issue arose and was satisfactorily resolved re drafting Ankara Pact.

(3) We feel that presentation to NAC based on text which does not cure these issues as well as fact that some points still unresolved amongst Greek, Turk and Yugoslavs, would be premature and prejudicial. Highly desirable to have all these points resolved amongst 3 Balkan powers prior to (a) any formal presentation of problem in Council and (b) signature of pact. While we would see no objection whatsoever and perhaps some benefit Kyrou having exploratory talks with Permanent Representatives on very confidential basis, presentation to NAC for comments should in our view and in interest solidarity NATO, be postponed until these matters are resolved if unfortunate results are to be avoided.

(4) We reiterate we wish to see full NATO support for alliance, and believe that full US, UK, and French support for alliance in NATO could be given if these problems resolved on expert level and NATO nations given feeling they would have opportunity to develop views in orderly way for consideration.

(5) While we appreciate this may upset time table of signing treaty at Ministers meeting on July 20, we believe issues adequately important and effect on NATO sufficiently serious to indicate that this course of action should be followed.

We note London’s 100 suggests parallel approaches by US, UK and French Ambassadors in Athens and Ankara. Prefer suggestion in London’s 61³ that US, UK or France speak for all three in Athens. Suggests UK representative speak for all three in Belgrade and that US make approaches in Athens and French in Ankara.

For information US representatives only, separate telegram follows instructing Embassy Belgrade make further purely US approach.

Would particularly appreciate any comments Thompson may wish make re relationship this exercise to Trieste problem.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Wolf; cleared in EE, WE, EUR, NEA/GTI, L, and G; and signed by Dulles. Repeated for action to Athens and Ankara and for information to Belgrade, Paris, and Rome.
2. Telegram 100, July 7, recommended that the United States, United Kingdom, and France instruct their respective Ambassadors in Greece and Turkey to express the concern of their governments about the articles in the draft military treaty which appeared to conflict with the articles of the North Atlantic Treaty. (760.5/7–754) The draft military treaty was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 36 from Athens, July 6. (760.5/7–654)
3. Not printed. (760.5/7–654)