Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762B.00/4–2154: Despatch

No. 771
The Director of the Berlin Element, HICOG (Parkman) to the Department of State

confidential
No. 789

Berlin, April 21, 1954

Subject:

• Fourth Party Congress of the SED:¹ Topic A—General Political analysis

Organization of Reporting on the Congress

Because of the significance of the Fourth Party Congress of the Socialist Unity (communist) Party (SED) for analysis of Soviet and SED policies in Germany, this office has organized its reporting of this major event as follows:

I. Information telegrams, referenced below,² on the highlights of the Congress as it occurred. Both political and economic topics were covered.

II. A series of despatches which provide additional information, but concentrate on analysis and comment on the major trends and problems revealed by the Congress.

Initially, it has been planned that these despatches will cover the following general topics:

A. General political analysis of the Party Congress and specification of the major trends and problems. The policies which the SED has decided to implement as indicated by the Congress.

B. Decisions made at the Party Congress to improve and strengthen the SED as the principal German mechanism of international communism in Central Europe. The new Party Statutes and the comments of Walter Ulbricht and Karl Schirdewan will receive particular attention.

C. The treatment of the topic of defense and internal security by the Party Congress. The statements of important leaders on the degree of opposition to the regime and their analysis of SED and GDR capabilities.

D. Personalities, collective leadership, and the election of leading organs of the party.

E. Implications for US policy and analysis of future moves by the SED based on our observations of the Party Congress.

This despatch covers topic A above and is the first in the series of despatches. Subsequent despatches will carry the topic designation.³

Summary

The Fourth Party Congress of the SED was held in East Berlin March 30–April 6 after an interval of four years since the last Party Congress which was held in July 1950.⁴ In this interval there have been significant political, social and economic developments in both East and West Germany; fluctuations and changes in the policies of the occupation powers; and a major change in the balance of power in Europe. For these reasons, a Party Congress was evidently needed to re-examine the development and capabilities of the SED and to determine SED policies, in view of the deeper division between East and West Germany which now suggests an indefinite split of the nation.

In these circumstances, and considering the disproportionate strength in favor of West Germany plus the internal political and economic weaknesses of the East German state, it was both logical and practical for the Party Congress to approve policies which are essentially defensive in nature, and which are aimed at strengthening the GDR as a state and at rebuilding a platform for communist political action in West Germany. Such action of the Party Congress may be traced directly to the sixteenth session of the SED Central Committee last September^* when Walter Ulbricht reviewed SED policies in light of the West German federal elections. It was clear at that time and it has been further verified by the Fourth Party Congress that Soviet policy in Germany has fallen back on the national sovereignty thesis in its alleged championship of German unity and its efforts to disrupt the speed of integration of West Germany into the Western system. The next line of defense would seem to be full satellization of the GDR; but there was no hint in the Party Congress that this measure is receiving attention now. Rather, the Party Congress underlined the SED’s plans to fully employ all types of tactics, ranging from the “united, patriotic front” technique to the “workers’ front” and “unity of action” within the German working class, in order to prevent remilitarization of West Germany and to create a “new Germany” which would be of no danger to its neighbors and which would provide for the social welfare of its citizens.

Internally, the regime is faced with admittedly complex political and economic problems, essentially, the task of narrowing the gap between the SED–GDR and the populace. Political action rather than economic concessions was given as the principal immediate means for solving this problem.

Introduction

The two significant groups of interrelated problems before the 2400 selected delegates and alternates at the Fourth Party Congress of the SED were:

1. How can the SED be further developed and improved in order to increase its capabilities as the most important German mechanism of international communism and Soviet policy in Central Europe? The answer to this question was given in standard Marxist–Leninist jargon superimposed on the previous development and experiences of the SED since the party was formed by amalgamation of the German Communist Party (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1946. The prototype provided by the Nineteenth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in October 1952 was plainly visible behind the decisions made in adopting new SED Party Statutes, electing a new Central Committee, and underlining the concept of collective leadership in the reelected central apparatus.

2. What policies should the SED pursue in view of the deeper division between East and West Germany as a result of the major developments since the Third Party Congress in July 1950 and particularly since the Second Party Conference in July 1952?⁵ The answer to this complex problem was framed with implicit and/or explicit reference to: (a) the growing strength of the West German Federal Republic in international affairs as reflected in the long note exchange between the Western Powers and the USSR culminating in the Berlin Conference last January and February; and (b) to the increased economic and political stability and potential military power of the Federal Republic as reflected in the results of the federal elections in West Germany last September when the communist-neutralist parties suffered resounding defeats.

The connecting links between these interrelated problems and the interrelated answers, from the SED’s point of view, were given in two previously evident trends: strengthen the German Democratic Republic, and try to build (or rebuild) a platform for political action in West Germany. For the present, both of these policies have a decided defensive connotation. The “revolutionary” ring to SED policies has been replaced by the concept of building socialism in one part of Germany which will have “magnetic” power rather than “explosive” potentialities. Considering the pressing domestic economic problems facing the East German regime, which have been made more difficult by the June uprisings and the errors of the past, and given the renewed communist theory of impending politico-economic crises in the West, this apparent decision to build up the East German base of operations is both logical and necessary.

SED Policy Framework

Seen in the context outlined above, the January 30 Memorandum of the GDR government on German unity,⁶ the March 25 statement on the “sovereignty” of the GDR,⁷ and the April 6 “manifesto” of the Party Congress entitled the “Way to Solve the Problems of the German Nation”⁸ form a “trilogy” of policy within which the SED and GDR can pursue the following tactical objectives: to delay or prevent remilitarization of West Germany, to increase the status and usefulness of the GDR state, and to exploit or capitalize on the German unity motivation if possible by setting up unofficial unity of action with social democrats and workers in West Germany. All of the points in the “trilogy” were underlined during the Fourth Party Congress, and the “manifesto” was adopted by the Congress. They, together with the boast that the SED has fully rehabilitated itself since June and reestablished the hegemony of the “party of the working class” in the now proclaimed East German “workers and farmers state”, comprise the offensive, albeit future offensive, and optimistic side of the SED’s analysis of the current political situation.

Internal Political Action Program

The Party Congress was used as a forum to reiterate and propagandize the optimism and internal solidarity of the SED and to impress East Germans that the party means business in carrying out its policies. To prove its earnestness and dedication, the SED focused great attention on itself and openly discussed the failures and weaknesses of the past and its own shortcomings. In the process, it revealed its major political problem, to narrow the large gap between the regime and the populace, and its most pressing economic problems, to get more better-quality and cheaper production of agricultural products and consumer goods.

These immediate political and economic problems were purposefully interwoven by both Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Central Committee, in his report of the Central Committee to the Congress, and by Otto Grotewohl, Minister President of the East German Government.

Ulbricht’s principal contribution was to tie together the new GDR “sovereignty” with the German unity issue. He tried to show that strengthening the GDR (sovereignty) brings unity closer by setting up a co-equal GDR which the Federal Republic must recognize and with which it must negotiate German unity and/or seek “normalization” of life in Germany. Therefore, since the East German populace ardently want unity, they must support the GDR. It remains to be seen whether this argumentation will stand close scrutiny by the people.

Grotewohl, in a surprisingly frank comment on Ulbricht’s report, said that propaganda alone would not solve the problem of “getting closer to the masses”. It must be backed by action. The required action is the improvement of the living standards of the people. He called for an all-out effort to effectuate the New Course, to produce and distribute the material goods which would provide visible proof of the party’s correct policies.

Neither these top leaders in the party and the government nor any of the other major speakers revealed new material incentives or plans to improve immediately the economic picture or to enlist the support and cooperation of the people. Rather, they implied that the party and state are secure and can compel compliance with the demands for more work and frugality and better organization. Ulbricht admitted that production of goods in the sum of one billion DM(E) over and above the current plan for 1954 was required if there is to be a price reduction before the end of the year. He said the abolition of rationing this summer, as originally “promised” in September 1953, would not be effectuated since it would increase the cost of living by raising prices. He announced that the Central Committee would prepare the framework for a second Five-Year Plan next autumn. The new Five-Year Plan is to provide for the proper balance in the economy by stressing power, brown coal, agricultural and chemical production and providing for rebuilding of destroyed urban areas.

The other most important announcements for strengthening the GDR and binding the masses closer to the regime were political in nature:

The National Front is to conduct a plebiscite on the subject: “For a peace treaty and withdrawal of occupation forces—or EDC and General Agreement and continued occupation for 50 years.”

There will be new single list elections for the Volkskammer (national parliament) next autumn to establish if the populace supports the domestic and foreign policies of the GDR and its program for German unity. (The elections were due this autumn under the GDR constitution).

The community governments (under 10,000) will be reformed and democratized according to the same procedure by which the district (Bezirk) and county (Kreis) units were reorganized in July 1952. This means that power in the community will be centralized in the hands of the local mayor and the community legislative organ will be subordinate to the mayor and his council. The move can be made under the current authority held by the Council of Ministers. It will be part of the SED’s efforts to strengthen its political position in rural and agricultural areas.

For the Assistant High Commissioner:

N. Spencer Barnes

Chief
Eastern Affairs Division

1. For a complete record of the proceedings at the Fourth Congress of the SED, which met from Mar. 30 to Apr. 6, see Protokoll des IV. Parteitages der SED. Excerpts of documents produced by the Congress are also printed in Dokumente der SED, volume V.
2. At the bottom of the first page of the source text, there appeared a list of 11 telegrams from Berlin, bearing dates from Mar. 31 to Apr. 10. All of these telegrams, reporting various aspects of the SED Congress, are in Department of State file 762B.00.
3. Topic D was covered in detail in despatch 791 from Berlin, Apr. 22, not printed. (762B.00/4–2254) For a discussion of topic C, see despatch 823 from Berlin, May 3, infra. For a summary of the discussion of topic B, see despatch 866 from Berlin, Document 773. No discussion of topic E has been found in Department of State files.
4. For documentation concerning the Third SED Congress, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, pp. 942 ff.
5. See Berlin/EAD telegram September 19, 1953, sent Bonn 426, rptd Dept 377, Moscow 47, pouched unn Paris and London. Also see Berlin D–229, Oct. 5, 1953. [Footnote in the source text. For telegram 426, see Document 751; despatch 229 which described the proceedings of the sixteenth session of the SED Central Committee, Sept. 17–19, is in file 661.62/10–553.]
5. For documentation concerning the Second SED Conference, see Documents 702–704.
6. See footnote 2, Document 396.
7. See footnote 2, Document 766.
8. The text of the “manifesto” under reference is printed in Dokumente der SED, vol. V, p. 74. The new statute of the SED, also prepared for and approved by the Fourth SED Congress, is printed on p. 90 of the same volume.