Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762B.00/9–1953: Telegram

No. 751
The Director of the Berlin Element, HICOG (Lyon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn¹

confidential

Berlin, September 19, 1953—1 p.m.

426. From EAD. Before sixteenth session SED central committee September 17 Ulbricht made important policy statement on German unity, text of which published East press September 19. Starting point was reiteration correctness SED June 1951 analysis re rebirth West Germany imperialism. Main points were: Unity only possible through all-Germany negotiations; German people will achieve unity without and against Adenauer, whose election has reduced chances for negotiations, unity and peace; and unity “cannot be suddenly achieved, but will be result common efforts democratic forces in FedRep and GDR”. Speech is very revealing and will be subject detailed despatch analysis.² One of most striking statements in speech is following:

“Under present circumstances, where in Germany in reality two states exist, the unity of Germany can only be brought about through commencement of negotiations between both (states).”

Comment:

1. Ulbricht reaffirmed Soviet strategy in Germany based on long range KPD program of November 1952 (see Berlin/EAD D–710, February 28, 1953³) as embodying way create conditions for unity, requiring change in bases of power in West Germany via social revolution and unity of action within working class.

2. While tactical maneuvers not excluded, negative Soviet thoughts on desirability Four-Power conference now further underlined. Defensive connotations current Soviet position magnified.

3. Increased Communist efforts get East and West Germans together on almost any subject in order legitimize long range program may be expected. Some form all-Germany conference (with Wirths, Elfes, Heinemann and the like) not excluded. However appears equally obvious status quo is firm point in Soviet plans during current interim period prior Soviet anticipation enhancement strength their bargaining position.

4. If West should begin effectuate contractual/EDC treaties in West Germany, as Ulbricht apparently feels is not unlikely as result Adenauer election, then Soviets will fall back principally on national sovereignty thesis for championing unity and disrupting speed of integration. Third line of defense would seem be full satellization GDR. There is definite hint of this in Ulbricht’s remarks, in which he reminds of strength and unity of world peace camp and benefits of membership in it.

5. Ulbricht policy statement is further confirmation extreme weakness current Soviet position and opportunities it opens up for West to be bold in pushing Soviet backs to wall on unity issue. Diplomatic offensive at highest level on unity will probably do more than any other action to sustain resistance mood East Germans and impede Soviet efforts reestablish SED party position of control, so essential for their long range strategy.

Lyon

1. Repeated to Washington, Moscow, London, and Paris; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.
2. The analysis under reference was transmitted in despatch 204 from Berlin, Sept. 22. (762B.00/9–2253)
3. Despatch 710 dealt with the long-range aspects for U.S. policy of the trend toward the granting of de jure sovereignty to the German Democratic Republic by the Soviet Government. (762B.00/2–2853)