Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762B.00/5–354: Despatch

No. 772
The Director of the Berlin Element, HICOG (Parkman) to the Department of State

confidential
No. 823

Berlin, May 3, 1954.

Ref:

• Berlin D–789 of April 21, 1954¹

Subject:

• Fourth Party Congress of the SED: Topic C—The Treatment of the Problem of Defense and Internal Security by the Party Congress

Summary and Conclusions

One of the most vital questions facing the East German Communist Party since the June uprisings has been the problem of defense and security forces and long-term stabilization. This has required a public relations decision on the method to be used in publicizing the strength and activities of security forces and a decision on the employment of security forces in a manner which promoted stability but did not provoke dangerous reactions from the populace. The Fourth Party Congress of the SED revealed that the policy of the regime is to continue to soft-pedal the de facto military forces (KVP) in public statements and propaganda especially where these may be noticed abroad or in West Germany. There appear to be several more reasons (listed below) for this policy than heretofore. The policy and the reasons are consistent with the dual communist policies of building the strength of the East German state and of trying to attract West German workers by holding up the GDR as an example of socialism in practice.

The SED recognizes that it faces major obstacles among the populace which must be overcome before it will be able to solve internal security problems. It correctly sees that these obstacles are closely linked to the broader question of the allegiance of the people to the GDR state and the need to convince the people of the correctness of SED policies. However, it obviously intends to crush internal opposition, justifying the actions of security forces on the basis of “external danger” and the “provocations of enemy agents”.

The Congress revealed no plan or measures designed to eliminate the “havens of safety” in West Berlin and West Germany from which, it was alleged, “arsonists, murderers and other criminal elements” launch their attacks on the “democratic” East German regime. In the light of SED’s recognition of internal opposition but its failure to reveal measures against the base of agent activity which it continues to link to internal opposition, it is clear that: (1) the SED is being restrained by higher policy considerations from moving against Berlin, and (2) the SED does not really take its own linking of internal opposition and alleged provocations inspired from outside as seriously as it did six months ago. Therefore, unless the party and the government can narrow the gap between the regime and the people, long-term stability is questionable and continued emphasis on systematic repression is probable. In the final analysis, this requirement makes the communist position in East Germany uncomfortable and unsteady and tends to assure the permanent hostility of the populace for the regime.

Public Relations and Communist Policy as Indicated by the Treatment of Security Forces at the Congress

One of the most vital questions facing the East German Communist Party (SED) and the East German government (GDR) since the June uprisings has been the problem of internal security and long-term stabilization. This problem cuts across many parts of the party and government apparatus but it is the particular responsibility of the Party Control Commissions;^* the Ministry of the Interior and its subordinate agency, the State Secretariat for State Security; and the Ministry for Justice.

In view of the obvious significance of internal security, it was to be expected that this problem would receive major attention at the Fourth SED Party Congress. While there was abundant mention of the need for “watchfulness” against foreign and domestic enemies, and it cannot be said that security was neglected, there was a noticeable soft-pedaling of the usual sharp language and retaliatory threats which have marked previous party assemblies and the speeches of top leaders like Ulbricht. The following points may explain the principal reasons for this development:

1. The party leaders wish to convey the impression that the regime is stable and confident that it can cope with threats to its security. The frequent boasts of the strength and determination of the state apparatus and the manifold reiteration of the dominating role of the SED in the GDR and as “the strongest party in Germany” support this conclusion.

2. The party leaders, fully aware of the Soviet peace offensive and its objectives in Europe, do not want to weaken the general communist propaganda line by needless emphasis on East German military developments or East German reactions in advance of effectuation of plans for West German remilitarization. The single reference to the East German reaction to the latter possibility was a short remark by Ulbricht, who said, “If the formation of a West German mercenary army should be accomplished, we will, of course, be compelled to put the question of the defense of the Republic before the working class and the farmers of the GDR.”

3. In line with the policy of making the GDR a “magnet” to attract West German workers and social democrats (refer Berlin D–789 of April 21, 1954), the SED does not wish to stress the police state aspects of the GDR nor does it wish to call attention to its substantial military and police formations while it strives to expose the danger of West German militarism and to capitalize on the traditional German differentiation between “the police” and “the army”.

4. There is good evidence that the party functionaries themselves are concerned about the growing prominence and cost of the security forces. From the published party criticism leveled at former Minister for State Security Wilhelm Zaisser, who was excluded from the party in January, it is evident that there is considerable concern in the top leadership of the SED, and perhaps in the second and third echelons, for the loyalty to the party of the military and police forces. Revealing and concrete evidence of this concern was reflected in the speeches of Interior Minister Willi Stoph and Security Secretary Ernst Wollweber. Both men made the point several times that the party and state can trust and rely upon the military, the police, and secret police. Both emphasized that reliable and proven party comrades occupy key positions in the structures of the security forces. In a pledge of loyalty Stoph said, for example, “The current high degree of training and the successful solution of assigned tasks in the Volkspolizei could only be achieved through the direct leadership, support, and criticism by the Politburo of our party and the leading organs of the party in the Bezirke and Kreise. The consciousness of our Volkspolizei is increasing daily that they are working for their own class, for the workers.”

5. A contributing factor to the impression that there was less than usual emphasis on the security forces during a party assembly was the unfolding of the principle of collective leadership. Thus the previously normal coverage of this topic by the most prominent SED spokesmen, such as Ulbricht, Grotewohl and Pieck, whose remarks always receive greater attention from observers, did not occur but was assigned to persons of lesser prominence like Stoph and Wollweber.

Internal Security Problems as Revealed at the Congress

In addition to the insights provided by the methods and tone of the treatment of the topic of security forces during the Fourth SED Party Congress, the speeches by Willi Stoph and Ernst Wollweber give a clearer picture of the current security problems faced by the SED and the GDR regime and their capabilities and plans for meeting the problems.

The Nature of Opposition to the Regime

Stoph said, “Not all workers are aware of the basic changes accomplished in our part of Germany. Many are not convinced that the ruling class in West Germany follows a policy of war which stands in contradiction to the interests of the working people, because the militarists and warmongers cover their chauvinist, Revanchist policies with speeches on ‘freedom’ and ‘defense’. We must also be aware that many workers, who sense the enemy character of the capitalist state system, have brought over to our democratic state organs their old conduct toward the capitalist state. An example of this is the opinion still held in the populace: ‘Police are Police!’ or ‘Justice is Justice’.

“Capitalist ideology, which has been drilled into the working class for decades by every means, and the falsification of Marxism, with regard to the class character of the state, which has been effectuated inside the working class through social democracy, can only be overcome by steady and continuous enlightenment.”

Capabilities of the Government Apparatus

Stoph said great progress had been made in strengthening and consolidating the state power apparatus since the Third Party Congress in July 1950. He listed the following points: (1) There has been a positive change in the cadre structure in the state apparatus away from the bourgeoisie and toward an overwhelming working class domination. Today 78 per cent of city mayors and 71 per cent of the small community mayors are from the working class. (2) There has been a political strengthening in the state apparatus due to class changes in its structure. This is proved by the general reliability of government employees on June 17.

Speaking of the weaknesses in the state apparatus, Stoph listed five major areas for improvement: (1) The technical and political competency of leading government employees is low. Only 13.8 per cent of current employees of the national government and 7.2 per cent of local government employees have attended an administrative school. (2) There is a general lack of knowledge of laws and ordinances among government employees and a serious deficiency in effectuation of laws. (3) The turnover in personnel in government agencies is too high, reaching 50 per cent per annum in some offices. Frequently false information or hesitancy to make decisions results from this deficiency. (4) Watchfulness must be increased against agents and sabotage and against “enemies of the democratic order” who have penetrated the government apparatus. (5) The quality of work must be improved by stressing personal responsibility and collective consideration of problems.

The Security Organs of the State

In his general remarks on the military, the police, and the state security forces of the GDR, Stoph made the following points: (1) In more than any other branch of the state apparatus, the influence of the working class in the police organs is secured and will be further developed. Over 90 per cent of the members of the State Security Service (SSD) (Staatssicherheitsorgane) are from the working class. (2) The SSD has improved since June 17 and has dealt harsh blows to imperialist and militarist organizations operating in the GDR from West Germany and West Berlin. (3) In the difficult days around June 17, all branches of the military forces (Kasernierte Volkspolizei) (KVP) performed their duties faithfully, with few exceptions. Over 80 per cent of the officers of the police are from the working class. (4) A high state of readiness is required in the military forces due to the militarization and chauvinism in West Germany. A large number of members and candidates of the SED and members of the Free German Youth (FDJ) (youth mass organization) have mastered the necessary technical qualifications and become (KVP) officers. (5) “It should not be overlooked that service in the military forces is a great school for the young people who have volunteered. This also approaches the problem of training in the spirit of Marxism–Leninism and is of great significance.” (6) “The officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men of the military forces (KVP) are constantly deepening the friendship to the people of the USSR and especially the victorious Soviet Army which is an example for the armed forces of all liberated peoples.”

The State Security Service

After stating that the elimination of Zaisser had improved the work of the SSD, Ernst Wollweber stressed that members of the SSD are filled with “revolutionary spirit” which enables them to recognize and track down agents and enemies and which assures their attachment and faithfulness to the SED.

Reviewing developments since June 17, Wollweber said: (1) It has been made clear to the workers, who did not recognize it previously, that the events of June were a fascist Putsch. The workers condemn the provocateurs. The party and state have been strengthened. The influence of “enemy centers” has been reduced. (2) The power organs of the state, freed of the false political leadership of Zaisser, have become more capable. Therefore, the plans and intentions of enemy centers to begin a new provocation during the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers could not be effectuated by them.

Referring to the “various criminal organizations” in West Germany and West Berlin, Wollweber said all these agencies were active in preparing for the June uprisings. The only counter measure to eliminate these agencies which Wollweber proposed was: “The current haven in West Berlin and West Germany (for these agencies) is a scandal, and I think our comrades in West Germany can and will help to clarify for the honorable persons in our West German homeland the scandalous protection for arsonists, murderers, poisoners and similar types.”

In justifying and explaining the great publicity given to exposés of agents and show trials since last August, Wollweber said that when the uncovering of enemy agents has proceeded to a certain point, secrecy is no longer necessary and the workers must be told what is at stake and shown that their work, health, lives and accomplishments are endangered. “I think it was proper that we have gone into the factories and, in a number of instances, have explained (this) to the people through the press and radio when the investigations were largely completed.”

The Auxiliary Police Elements

After speaking about the regular police, Stoph referred to the Sector Deputies (Abschnittsbevollmaechtigte)^† and the Voluntary Helpers of the Police^‡ as important elements in the internal security apparatus. Both these elements are made up of approximately 90 per cent working class or working farmer personnel.

For the Future

Stoph told the Party Congress that “the task of our security forces in 1954 is the strengthening and firming up of their ranks and the constant improvement of functional and political work . …” He said discipline, patriotism and morale would be raised. He made it clear that the security forces are subordinate to the SED party and would follow party directives.

For the Assistant High Commissioner:

Thomas W. McElhiney

1. Supra.
2. See Berlin/EAD tel to Bonn 1157, rptd Dept 999, for the highlights of the report of Hermann Matern, Chairman of the Central Party Control Commission. [Footnote in the source text. The telegram under reference is in file 762B.00/4–154.]
3. Refer to Berlin D–687 of Feb. 18, 1953, for a description of the functions of the Sector Deputies. [Footnote in the source text. Despatch 687 is in file 762B.00/2–1853.]
4. Refer to Berlin D–301 of Oct. 13, 1952, for a description of the functions of the Voluntary Helpers. [Footnote in the source text. Despatch 301 is in file 762B.55 10–1352.]