Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.0221/3–2754: Telegram

No. 768
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn¹

secret

Washington, March 27, 1954—4:06 p.m.

2715. Re announcement new DDR status our preliminary views as follows:

We judge new Soviet–DDR relationship on surface may be somewhat similar to arrangements provided for Federal Republic in Contractuals.² Soviets evidently retaining right station troops and doubtless right to protect their security as well as right to act in matters covered by international agreements re Germany. On paper new DDR status appears preserve for USSR essentially same fields authority reserved to Allies in Article 2 Convention on Relations.³ If so, we think at present stage no official notice need be communicated to Soviets. In general we believe our basic line (as set forth Department’s A–1323 March 16, 1953,⁴ much of which seems still pertinent) should be to take official notice only of any further developments which (1) directly affect right of access to Berlin, or (2) go further than we have under Contractuals, or (3) are contrary to Soviet–Allied agreements.

It seems to us that best position to take in public statements is that German unification remains basic to our policy, that we will not permit any new paper arrangements between Soviets and DDR to stand in way continued support for and service to interests East Germans themselves, that DDR sovereignty is fictitious and nothing has really changed since Soviet officials, whatever their new titles, supported not by population but by presence Soviet troops, remain as real rulers Soviet Zone and SED minions will continue carry out orders. At same time we believe that since our position is that no real change has occurred we should not build up importance of development by giving it inflated political and propaganda treatment. When necessary we should express ourselves along lines mentioned, since we consider best course for present is to play down new arrangement, treating it as of little significance and avoiding any impression that it is important event or disturbing us.

In attempting to anticipate practical problems which may sooner or later arise, we think most likely ones would be DDR attempts to control rights Berlin access, especially personnel movements. If DDR interferes with access or announces intent to assert control, we think prompt consideration should be given to despatch letters to Semenov and/or notes to Kremlin, notifying Soviets that Western Powers will continue hold Soviets strictly responsible for actions DDR officials and that Western Powers intend maintain and protect rights won as result World War II as well as rights embodied in agreements re Germany to which USSR is party. Guiding principle for us should be to avoid taking initiative in changing existing procedures in order to hold Soviets fully responsible. If as practical matter we have to adapt our practice to new requirements, decision should be determined by consideration whether situation should be tolerated or is such that Soviets should be challenged and charged with consequences. At first sign DDR interference we would welcome full report and your suggestions. We appreciate that our decisions on these problems may have to be somewhat reconciled to views of our Allies and Federal Republic.

In meanwhile Department is studying variety of practical problems which may arise. This requires legal and inter-Department and inter-agency consultation. Department intends forward its views early next week.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Carlson and cleared by Thurston, Bonbright, and Lyon. Repeated to Berlin, Moscow, London, Paris, and Vienna.
2. For documentation concerning the Contractual Agreements of May 26, 1952, see Documents 50 ff.
3. Document 51.
4. Airgram 1323 speculated on possible measures to be taken by the Soviet Government in its relations with the German Democratic Republic. (762B.5/3–1653)