Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762B.00/3–2954: Telegram

No. 769
The Director of the Berlin Element, HICOG (Parkman) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn¹

confidential

Berlin, March 29, 1954—2 p.m.

1141. From EAD. Reference our telegram to Bonn 1139, repeated Department 978, Moscow 244, London 207, Paris 238.²

If immediate or future tripartite public statement or parallel notes to USSR regarding Soviet declaration being contemplated, following considerations perhaps pertinent:

Soviets no doubt keenly aware of difference between, on one hand, three powers positive statement as to how they would react to any attack against Berlin and, on other our failure say what we would do if access to Berlin interfered with. In essence, declaration grants to GDR authority previously held by USSR in Germany minus authority stemming from quadripartite agreements. Thus, for Soviet purposes, definition of powers held by “sovereign” GDR depends upon what Soviets contend is or is not covered by quadripartite agreements. Within certain limitations, therefore, definition of GDR powers can be expanded or contracted as suits Soviet policy. Since West has not clearly expressed determination to keep routes to Berlin open to degree necessary for maintaining position here, this may be field in which tendency to expand GDR powers will develop. Seen in this light, although declaration seems to have been motivated primarily by other considerations, it could serve as basis for probe to elicit Western reaction, which Soviets would then take as indication of what we will do if access threatened.

While access most important question to be treated in statement or note, might also be desirable, for reasons not yet apparent, to reiterate our view that East German officials are agents of Soviets in theory and fact. Points of contact between ourselves and Soviets and, to lesser degree, between West and East Germans are numerous enough to permit considerable maneuvering by Soviets/GDR in defining dividing line between Soviet and GDR competence in light of declaration. This connection, believe it would be useful exercise to draw up inventory of such points of contact and basis for method presently used in handling contact in each case. We should then develop series positions on attitude or action we would take if Soviets or GDR attempt alter method. (For example, if HICOG employee at zonal border confronted with Vopo instead of Soviet soldier for travel order check, what should he do? What would governments of three powers do?)

GDR will doubtless begin almost immediately to weave principle of sovereignty into its line on unity and into its statements on East-West German negotiations. In testing three powers and West Germans, GDR will probably offer negotiate with Federal Republic specific issues (e.g., further easing of inter-zonal travel restrictions) in context which carries threat of increased restriction if no response to offer by Federal Republic thus, GDR “sovereignty” becomes potential lever to pry Federal Republic into position where it negotiates, without process clearly involving Soviets. Statement by West that East German officials are agents of USSR would put Soviets on notice we will not give them advantage of operating behind cover of GDR threat or action. Statement might even deter them from so operating.

Any statement from us should be quite firm without being provocative. If such statement is to be made or note sent, would seem advisable take such action reasonably soon so as minimize chance Soviets will grant GDR authority in access field or GDR will exert authority without further grant.

Statement might make following points (some of which might not be appropriate for note):

(a) Declaration on USSR–GDR relations does not appear to essentially alter situation in Germany. East German regime in fact remains under control of Soviet Union even in those areas of responsibility where independence has ostensibly been granted.

(b) Three powers do not, of course, recognize sovereignty of East German regime nor do they intend to deal with it as a government.

(c) Three powers continue to regard East German officials as agents of the Soviet occupying power.

(d) Three powers consider that quadripartite agreements cover, inter alia, maintenance of three powers position in Berlin and movement of nationals and goods of three powers, of other countries, of Federal Republic and of Berlin between the Federal Republic and Berlin. Three powers do not recognize right of representatives of East German regime to implement such agreements except in purely administrative capacity as agents of Soviet occupying power and, even in that capacity, to no greater extent than may be acceptable to all four powers.

(e) Change in procedures affecting movement of persons or goods between Berlin and Federal Republic, except in direction of less control, not acceptable to three powers.³

Foregoing drafted before we received Department telegram to Bonn 2715 repeated Berlin 649, Moscow 599, London 5005, Paris 3359, Vienna 2840.⁴ We recognize desirability of not overemphasizing importance of Soviet declaration. At same time, since Department apparently already considering problems which might arise as GDR assumes “sovereign” rights and seems be particularly concerned (as we are) with potential effect this process on our access rights, we believe telegram as originally drafted may still be pertinent and possibly serve useful purpose in your consideration this problem.

Parkman

1. Repeated to Washington, London, Paris, and Moscow; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.
2. Document 766.
3. For text of the Tripartite Declaration on the German Democratic Republic, issued by the U.S., French, and U.K. High Commissioners at Bonn on Apr. 8, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 19, 1954, p. 588.
4. Supra.