Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762B.00/3–2654: Telegram

No. 767
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

confidential
priority

Bonn, March 26, 1954—9 p.m.

3004. While it will take time fully to assess implications for US policy of Soviet declaration of DDR sovereignty, and practical application to our problems and position here, following are my initial views of guides to developing our position:

• First: While refusing to recognize DDR, we must not let ourselves be led into taking a position which will prejudice interests of either East or West Germans as people or US relations with Federal Republic. More important than ever so to deal with East German individual as to encourage his feeling that the West stands with him. This requires solution of practical problems, e.g., DDR passport for transit across Federal Republic and visits to Western countries, with emphasis on political aspects rather than technical legal concepts international law. Department will have observed that latter have never hampered Soviet, and indeed West has modified them as necessary during and following two world wars. I propose urge British and French here to recognize these facts and that phraseology of Soviet statement clearly tells us Soviets will deal with HICOM only when their own interests so dictate but otherwise will ignore our protests and refer us to “sovereign” DDR. I propose also to make point we must devise plans to recapture initiative and avoid conservatism which has sacrificed past chances, e.g., letter on freedom of communications² prior to Berlin conference. I suggest to Department desirability of statement that German unification remains basic to our whole policy and that, while we will not recognize illegal Soviet-imposed DDR regime, we will not permit this to stand in way of continued support for and service to interests of East Germans themselves.³
• Second: I cannot assess impact on French, British or Italian but note that we were in the past able to count on Soviet aggressive moves to strengthen Western solidarity, I should hope we might find they have once more helped us and this Soviet action can be used to break log jam with respect to EDC. While German reaction is so far purely speculative, my guess is only a few leaders, including Chancellor, will initially appreciate range of practical problems unloosed by Soviet action. Full significance will soon become apparent, however, and I believe we can use this effectively to urge German flexibility on pending questions if there is comparable response in other capitals.
• Third: SPD is, of course, unpredictable. It will not surprise me if Ollenhauer, smarting under criticism from own ranks and outside, and perhaps under Wehner influence, charges recognition and further splitting of Germany to allied intransigence at Berlin and failure to offer abandonment of EDC in return for German unification. If so, I would expect further reaction against their present leadership. Department should note several potential leaders of SPD reform are its guests and while any discussion with them of internal SPD policy would be resented, it might be extremely fruitful to arrange high level conference to discuss implications of Soviet move for Germany and German people.

I would appreciate Department views in this field before I seek Chancellor’s views Monday.

Conant

1. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.
2. Prior to the convening of the Berlin Conference, Conant had wished to address to Semyenov a letter concerning the removal of travel restrictions between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic. At the request of the British and French, he had agreed to postpone sending such a letter until after the end of the conference. For the correspondence between U.S. and Soviet representatives on this subject in the spring of 1954, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 5, 1954, pp. 508–510, and ibid., June 7, 1954, pp. 879–881.
3. For the specific recommendations by Parkman concerning the issuance of a statement of the sort suggested by Conant, see telegram 1141 from Berlin, Document 769.